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**THE ROLE OF CHURCH IN STATE AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS
DURING THE KIBAKI ERA, 2002-2013**



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Abstract

Purpose: The primary objective of this study was to determine the role of church in state and public affairs during the Kibaki Era, 2002-2013

Methodology: The methodology employed in this study was qualitative in nature. The study relied mainly on the analysis of an existing dataset from secondary sources. The data was gathered from technical reports, scholarly journals, reference books, past sermons, church publications, official and unofficial doctrine, theologies and from the Kenya National Archives in Nairobi. Other sources of data collection for the study included official statistics collected by government and the various agencies, bureaus and departments. The target population for this study was the mainland churches in Kenya and the role these churches played in state and public affairs in Kenya between 2002 and 2013.

Results: The Kibaki era has been characterized by many an events that have attracted by far and wide the attention of the clergy. In 2005, the most significant development of the 2005 constitutional referendum is not the defeat of the draft, but the emergence of strains and tensions not just between Christians and Muslims, but also between church and state. Another significant development was the fact that the mainline clergy were increasingly viewed as partisan and divided along ethnic lines and serving narrow political interest depending on the ethnic group to which its leaders belonged. The prophetic role and voice of the church to act as the conscience of society was lost, and the church did nothing to evaluate its own role even after the people voted to soundly reject the draft constitution.

Unique contribution to Theory, Practice and Policy: The study recommended that the government should put in place laws that would involve the church in government matters. This can be done by introducing motions into parliament that advocate for the direct involvement of the church. This would involve laws which ensure that a portion of all members sitting in any committee represents the church. This can also be done by the introduction of electoral posts for church representatives just as there are positions for women representatives. The study also recommends that amendments be made to the constitution to make a legal requirement that one of the nominated MPs must be from the church.

Keywords: Church, State, Public Affairs, Political Process

1.0 INTRODUCTION

In the 2002 general elections, Moi considered but eventually decided not to challenge the constitutional ban on a presidential third term. In preparation elections, Kibaki's Democratic Party affiliated with several other opposition parties to form National Alliance Party of Kenya (NAK). A group of disappointed KANU presidential aspirants then quit KANU in protest after being overlooked by outgoing President Moi when he nominated founding Father Jomo Kenyatta's son, Uhuru Kenyatta to be the KANU presidential candidate, and hurriedly formed the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). NAK later combined with the LDP to form the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). On 14 October 2002, at a large opposition rally in Uhuru Park, Nairobi, Kibaki was nominated the NARC opposition alliance presidential candidate after Raila Odinga made the famous declaration, *Kibaki Tosha!* (Kibaki is capable). On 27 December 2002, Kibaki and NARC won a landslide victory over KANU, with Kibaki getting 62% of the votes in the presidential elections, against only 31% for the KANU candidate Uhuru Kenyatta.

As a practicing Catholic, Kibaki maintained close relationship with church officials during his opposition to Moi's government¹. The churches were less prominent, but undoubtedly on Kibaki's side during the 2002 general elections². Even throughout much of his reign, mainline churches were on his side, the Catholic Church definitely and enthusiastically viewed him as a prominent member of the Church. Yet, developments since Kibaki took over power in 2002, show that mainline churches have displayed an increasingly "worrisome trend" in respect to their prophetic voice, civic and public engagement. Observers have noted not just the initial silence, but also these churches' reluctance to criticise Kibaki's government even as the new NARC coalition crumbled under the weight of a pre-election memorandum of understanding that Kibaki refused to honour following the 2002 general elections coupled with allegations of grand corruption such as the Anglo-Leasing scandal, increased allegations of tribalism and many other such injustices. Observers have described this as the litmus test in respect of church-state relations during the first term of Kibaki's rule³.

This worrisome trend on the part of mainline Church Clergy has various explanations. Gifford shows how a new crop of mainline church clergy that took over the leadership of mainline churches after the 1980s and 1990s reformers, which also coincided with the election of President Mwai Kibaki in 2002, became lenient. For mainline churches, the election of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) the ruling party and President Kibaki presented a new dilemma and challenge to them. The mainline churches had been partners with the opposition (now the ruling party) against KANU. With the former opposition now in power, the mainline churches had to resolve the dilemma of how to be the conscience of the nation without damaging the good relationship with Kibaki's government. This is because, for mainline church leaders, NARC's victory was

¹R. Elphick, *Christianity in South Africa*.

²P. Gifford, *Christianity, politics and public life in Kenya*.

³M. Ndarangwi, *Exploring the social impact of christianity in Africa*.

also their victory⁴. They felt obligated to defend the administration that they helped come to power.

Observers believed that the election of Kibaki in 2002 coincided with the election of new mainline church leaders such as Anglican Church Bishop Benjamin Nzimbi who replaced vocal David Gitari who retired while the Presbyterian Church got a new leader, the Rev David Gathii, who replaced the Rev George Wanjau. The Methodist Church also witnessed such changes after Rev Zablon Nthamburi retired. Except perhaps for controversial Presbyterian Church minister the Rev David Gathii, the other mainline church leaders were less controversial, less vocal and less political than their predecessors. None of them has seriously interrogated the state excesses and they seemed unusually silent about socio-political issues affecting the country. At the same time they seemed to lean strongly towards the state as evident by their silence on social issues and the stand they took on the constitutional draft document in 2005/6⁵.

A third explanation given is that the mainline churches have been heavily compromised and co-opted as partners in the governance processes by President Kibaki's regime. With examples, Gifford⁶, shows how clergy from mainline churches were co-opted into state through appointments. Gifford, cites the example of the hitherto outspoken NCKK under-secretary general the Rev Mutava Musyimi who changed from 'principled opposition' to Moi's regime to 'principled cooperation or from fierce criticisms to principled cooperation with Kibaki. Rev Musyimi was soon appointed as the head of the steering committee on Anti-Corruption, an appointment that seemingly appeared to have gravely compromised his ability to independently condemn massive corruption in government especially during Kibaki's first term. Rev Musyimi eventually resigned from his post in 2007 as secretary general of NCKK to join politics, sponsored by Kibaki's party of National Unity (PNU). He won a parliamentary seat and promptly fell silent on public issues sparking off public debates as to what happened to this fierce critic. Another example cited by observers is that of the Artur Commission of Inquiry saga where Bishop Horace Etemesi was appointed commissioner⁷.

One of the latest literatures on the church-state relationship in Kenya by Paul Gifford argues After President Mwai Kibaki took power in 2002; most mainline churches became very lenient with him. The hitherto outspoken National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCKK) under Secretary General Rev. Mutava Musyimi changed from principled opposition to Moi to principled cooperation' with Kibaki. That Musyimi and other church leaders were co-opted into the state through appointments⁸. Musyimi eventually resigned his post in 2007 to join politics, sponsored by Kibaki's Party of National Unity. He won a parliamentary seat and promptly fell silent on public issues.

⁴M. Oloo, *Churches awaiting registration*.

⁵Ibid

⁶P. Gifford, *Christianity, politics and public life in Kenya*.

⁷P. Oluoch, *Religion and Politics in Kenya*.

⁸K. Ross, *God, people and power in Malawi*.

Kenya's clergy, including the Catholic bishops, are not immune to Kenya's tribal politics, according to which political loyalty is determined by place of origin or ethnicity and patrimonial-clientelist obligations, Gifford writes⁹.

Equally troubling though less commented upon is the recent resurgence of Pentecostal and Evangelical Christian socio-political activism and voice in the public sphere, a venture that appears to have posed serious challenges to the public roles of mainline church clergy. Since the unprecedented growth and explosion of the Pentecostal and Charismatic movements in the public sphere, the mainline churches that were for many decades regarded as the voices of the voiceless and the conscience of society were now increasingly faced with the difficult and complex challenge of maintaining not just their own influence and significance, but also their socio-political voice and activism in an increasingly multi-religious, multi-denominational, and multi-ethnic society. The Pentecostals, it seems to me, have further introduced multiple voices into the public sphere and upset the country's religious equilibrium and topography and strained inter-faith relations and dialogue¹⁰.

Objectives of the Study

The objective of the study was to account for the Church's approach to issues of public affairs and politics during Kibaki era 2002-2007.

2.0 METHODOLOGY

The methodology employed in this study was qualitative in nature. The study relied mainly on the analysis of an existing dataset from secondary sources. The data was gathered from technical reports, scholarly journals, reference books, past sermons, church publications, official and unofficial doctrine, theologies and from the Kenya National Archives in Nairobi. Other sources of data collection for the study included official statistics collected by government and the various agencies, bureaus and departments. The target population for this study was the mainland churches in Kenya and the role these churches played in state and public affairs in Kenya between 2002 and 2013.

3.0 RESULTS

During the Kibaki regime, the study found out that the church was very active in political matters. This generally shows that the church had regained its power in addressing the evils in political administration during Kibaki era in Kenya due to the freedom created for expression by the then government. The relationship between the political leaders and the church leaders during Kibaki era was recommendable. The church in this period was seen to be active in all political activities and the church could openly address and criticize any evil in the governance due to the closeness of the

⁹D. Smith, *Religious politics and social change in the third world*.

¹⁰S. Ndegwa, *National dialogue in Kenya*.

leaders who would respect the role of each other in the running of the government. Also, the church had increased participation in the political matters during Kibaki era in leadership. This is as in all aspects, unlike during the Moi era; the respondents reported that the church was very efficient and active in addressing certain issues in the politics.

The church during the Kibaki regime played a great role in addressing evils in the government through effective correction of evils in the administration. The church also became efficient in addressing any event that aimed at violation of human rights and gross injustices from the government. Also, the church's efforts in calling for the constitutional review to suit humanity and protect the people of the nation increased during Kibaki era as compared to the prior period. The church actively continued to offer significant contribution to peace making, conflict resolution and reconciliation in the country.

During Kibaki era, a combination of factors underpinned the response of AIC to politics. AIC seems to have woken up from the slumber of being apathetic to political issues by giving forth the first circular letter on the 2010 draft constitution. However, the study established that AIC did that because contagious clauses were affecting her moral Christian values just like in the case of 1969 oath-taking. The factors that led to silence to political issues involved the Christian ideology factor, co-option of Church leaders to political systems, spiritualization and politicization of the 2005 and 2010 draft constitutions. It is also the conclusion of the researcher that AIC does not get involved in politics unless such social or political issues directly affect her Christian morals. The researcher further concludes that it is not only the theological and doctrinal presuppositions which affect the response of the Church to politics. There are also diverse factors which may affect the silence of Church to politics like political, ethnic, and denominational factors. It is also the conclusion of the study that AIC lacks a proper critical ethic as well as biblical hermeneutics in its response to political issues.

3.1 Church Approach to issues of Public Affairs and Politics during Kibaki Era 2002-2007

Studies done on the response of the Church to politics during Kibaki era by Chacha, and Mue, have shown the Church becoming cold and partisan in socio-political issues. They attribute this silence to the cordial relationship between Mutava Musyimi (the Key personality of Ufungamano and an erstwhile critic of Moi regime) and Cardinal John Njue being a close ally to the president. This silence led to the condemnation of NCKC and its member churches as well as the Roman Catholic Church in 2006 has having lost its credibility as a public watchdog due to their political partiality, soft stance and cooperation with the government¹¹. Chacha construes the close relationship between political leaders and Church leaders marking the genesis of courting religious leaders by patriarchs of political parties.

¹¹D. Gitari, *The church's witness to the living God in seeking just political, social and economic structures in contemporary Africa*.

The consequences were later felt in 2007 election leading to the violence and the formation of coalition government in 2008. According to Chumarr, the instigators of the violence were mostly Christians. Stinton captures the NCKK press briefing in February 2008 apologizing for its partisan role in both before and after the 2007 elections. The Church was to regain her prophetic voice during the 2005 referendum. Mue, views the 2005 Referendum as a way of the Church regaining its prophetic voice. He however, notes that their agenda became so much narrowed to matters of religion; the inclusion of Kadhi courts in the constitution. Further, the different positions taken by the Church on the draft constitution had ethnic overtones. As a result, broad issues on justice went on unquestioned. The churches were divided and majority of church leaders admonished their followers to vote according to their conscience. In Masinga, the AIC leaders failed to give direction to their members. This confirms the claims raised during the study by the AIC followers in Masinga District that their church leaders are silent on political issues. From 2009–2010, the search for a new a constitution was the centre of debate for both church leaders and politicians. This time round, AIC released its first circular letter in history to its members on its stance on the draft constitution¹². Owing to the fact the Church was divided on its position to the draft constitution, this study endeavored to find out whether AIC stance 2010 draft constitution was politically or theologically motivated.

3.2 Approach to the 2007 General Elections

Despite increased socio-political involvement on the part of Kenyan Neo-Pentecostal clergy, tensions and paradoxes emerged not just within Pentecostal clergy and groups, but also within the Christian church as a whole. In the run-up to the 2007 general elections for example, the Christian churches both mainline, Evangelical and Pentecostal were seen as being openly partisan along ethnic lines¹³. They failed to speak out against socio-political issues facing the country even as it emerged that Christian clergy were increasingly divided along ethnic divides and were plagued by increased co-option, ethnicity and a loss of its prophetic voice¹⁴. The Christian churches were thus seen as divided and serving narrow political interests depending on the ethnic group to which its leaders belonged. By the time of the 2007 election, the voice of the clergy, particularly mainline church clergy, became increasingly discordant even as a section of clergy began to show signs of co-option as clergy backtracked and counselled their followers to vote with their conscience. At the same time, Christian believers were further and clearly confused by conflicting “prophesies” of prominent Christian leaders,

¹² D. Gitari, *The church's witness to the living God in seeking just political, social and economic structures in contemporary Africa..*

¹³ D. Branch, Democratization, sequencing and state failure. *African affair*, 1-26, 2008.

¹⁴ D. Persitau, *Gospel without borders*.

which predicted victory for various candidates and prayed and anointed them as God's choice for president¹⁵.

The uncertainty generated by these conflicting views, coupled with other social, political, economic and historical issues and injustices, culminated in the resulting post-election violence that gripped the country after the disputed 2007 general elections¹⁶. Against this backdrop, it is unsurprising that when the political crisis erupted leading to widespread violence in the wake of disputed presidential elections results, the church and its clergy had lost almost all of its credibility and legitimacy. They were no longer viewed by the public as neutral arbiters and their mediation efforts were largely unsuccessful¹⁷. Many were increasingly accused of failing to speak out against politicians' determined provocation of ethnic emotions and tensions long before the country went to the polls. One remarkable but shocking fall-out of the post-election violence was the burning of churches.

This anger was clearly evident in newspaper commentaries, editorials and calls to radio stations with a recent study by Kenya's leading pollster, Synovate Kenya, attesting to this feeling and frustration. According to this survey, 38% of Kenyans stated that they do not trust religious leaders at all, a considerably larger number than the 22% who said they do not trust politicians¹⁸. However, after the peak of the post-election violence churches reached out through the inter-religious forum, proposed a peace plan, interacted with politicians engaging in a national prayer day and healing exercise, and called for healing and reconciliation, indicating that these clergy were keen to rebuild not just their lost credibility and legitimacy, but also to recover their lost prophetic voice. The NCKK began by apologising for "... sins of among others taking partisan positions on national issues" and is now frequently in the news issuing statements critical of the excesses and failure of the Grand Coalition Government¹⁹. The post-election violence in Kenya demonstrated the risks of perception of faith-based actors in such ethnically politicised environments. Regrettably, this coincided with increased disregard for sanctuary space²⁰. Yet, the burning of churches points to underlying tension and contradictions not only in Christian churches, but also in the country at large²¹.

The resultant post-election violence that followed the bungled 2007 general election put all Christian churches under sharp focus with regard to the roles they played in and after the violence. This is largely because Kenyan churches did not escape unscathed. One of the most remarkable highlights of the post-election violence was the burning of

¹⁵J. De Gruchy, *Christianity and democracy*.

¹⁶N. Mue, *Reflecting on church state relationship in Kenya*.

¹⁷D. Persitau, *Gospel without borders*.

¹⁸M. Ndarangwi, (2011). *Exploring the social impact of christianity in Africa*.

¹⁹N. Mue, *Reflecting on church state relationship in Kenya*.

²⁰Ibid 419

²¹N. Mue, *.Reflecting on church state relationship in Kenya*.

churches²². Rural churches were sites of horrific massacres, and there is evidence that certain churches were implicated in inciting violence in some areas. The post-election violence in Kenya demonstrated the risks of perception of faith-based actors in such ethnically politicised environments which regrettably, coincided with increased disregard for sanctuary space. Yet, the burning of churches points to underlying tensions and contradictions not only in Christian churches, but also in the country at large that needs to be further investigated. It is no wonder that at the height of the violence in January 2008, when asked to comment on the role of the church, a political analyst famously quipped, during this crisis, we have seen the Church of PNU and we have seen the church of ODM but, pray tell, where is the Church of Jesus Christ? Against this backdrop, it is unsurprising that when the political crisis erupted leading to widespread violence in the wake of disputed presidential elections results, the church struggled to find its voice and legitimacy²³.

3.3 The 2007-2008 Post Electoral Violence conflict in Kenya

Conflict is inevitable in society owing to presence of competing interests, goals and values. Incompatibilities exist on the goals, interests and the methods of achieving them. Therefore, learning to manage conflict in a constructive manner is important for peaceful coexistence²⁴. In any given society conflict manifests in different ways depending on its phase in conflict cycle. If not well managed, it transforms itself into physical violence leaving a trail of destruction and breaking the much valued structures and relationships in society. However when well managed conflict play a major role in the constructive transformation of the society since as Reuck succinctly observes, '[It] is a symptom which accompanies the birth of much that is new in society and frequently attends to the demise of whatever is outworn²⁵'.

In Kenya, the announcement of presidential elections results electoral on 30th of December, 2007 which declared the incumbent president Mwai Kibaki as the winner triggered violence. Initially the violence seemed spontaneous, a mere expression of protest amid claims that presidential vote was rigged. However within days, the violence became more organized as underlying grievances, propaganda, incitement, as well as greed converged making the conflict shift from being about disagreement on electoral outcome to dangerously taking an ethnic nature, as people perceived to have voted for the incumbent became targets of attacks, dispossession and displacement. By the time peace agreement was signed on 28th January, 2008 after a sustained African Union led mediation process, more than a thousand people had lost their lives, 350,000 displaced and property estimated to be worth billions of Kenya shillings destroyed²⁶.

²²H. Burner, *A Manifesto for Earth Spirituality*.

²³R. Elphick, *Christianity in South Africa*.

²⁴M. Eliade, *The sacred and the profane*.

²⁵H. Burner, *A Manifesto for Earth Spirituality*.

²⁶R. Dworkin, *Principles for a new political debate*.

The conflict though triggered by disputed electoral results reflected a society with deeply entrenched violent conflict generating dynamics. The dynamics include high degree of negative ethnicity, normalization of violence as a strategy for winning elections, exclusionary policies leading to ethno-based marginalization, personality based politics where propaganda and incitement to violence subordinates issues-based politics, and the land question which is based on claims to indigenous based entitlements to land and historical injustices due to dispossession during colonial and post-colonial periods²⁷.

The recognition of these underlying issues meant that for sustainable peace to take root, the African Union led mediation process had to address itself to both the immediate and root causes²⁸. The root causes were captured as agenda four during the mediation process. The agenda noted that poverty, inequitable distribution of resources and perceptions of historical injustices and exclusions on the part of the segments of Kenyan society constitute the underlying causes of the prevailing social tensions, instability and cycles of violence. This made post-agreement peace building and reconciliation critical and to do so different parties undertook this task, in expectation that their effort will bring about sustainable and peaceful Kenyan society. It is in this phase that faith based groups have played prominent role in post-2008 Kenya. They have extensively leveraged on their networks and influence to build endogenous capacities for and entrench peace and reconciliation²⁹.

3.4 Aftermath of the 2007 Elections: Confession of the Clergy and reconciliation efforts

Soon after the 2007 elections and the violence that engulfed Kenya, reconciliation efforts began. The clergy had lost moral authority to reconcile warring political factions and seemed to be partisan and divided along ethnic lined even after the elections. In March 2008, the NCKK formally apologized to the nation for having taken sides during the 2007 general election. This was considered an important step in the long road to the church recovering its credibility and playing its role of being the conscience of society. Several churches also joined forces in an initiative dubbed *Msafara – The Wheels of Hope* – in which over 500 believers joined a caravan from Mombasa through Nairobi, Nakuru, Eldoret, and Kisumu praying to cleanse the nation from demonic influences and taking humanitarian relief to internally displaced persons.³⁰

The second religious body to confess was the Catholic bishops in the late March 2008. The church, having gone through much turbulence, yielded to the widespread criticism and admitted liability:

²⁷R. Elphick, *Christianity in South Africa*.

²⁸M. Gecaga, *Religious movements and democratization in Kenya*.

²⁹R. Chopp, *An introduction to christian theology in the twentieth century*.

³⁰D. Branch, (2008). Democratization, sequencing and state failure. *African affair*

We (The Catholic Church) did not listen to the voice of the shepherd, who is Jesus Christ. We failed to love one another. We sinned by failing to love one another.....³¹

Cardinal John Njue made the apology at the Holy Family Basilica as faithful celebrated a thanksgiving mass for formation of a grand coalition government. Though Catholic bishops repeatedly appealed for peace in the wake of violence, the calls were dismissed especially by opposition members who said there could be no peace without justice. The church, in trying to track down its lost glory, initiated either independently or jointly with other civil society movements, lobbying of leaders for power-sharing between Raila Odinga and Mwai Kibaki.

The group held about three meetings with the former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, and the negotiating team for the National Accord. Involvement in these talks represented a positive departure for the church, which had been seen as heavily partisan and which, consequently, had lost a voice in politics at local and international level.³² Even in this quest for reconciliation, religious groups were deeply divided on many other issues, the most prominent being whether suspected perpetrators of the post-election violence should get blanket amnesty to hasten national healing and reconciliation. Those from Rift Valley and Nyanza supported unconditional release while their counterparts in Central and Eastern Provinces supported the fact that justice must be done. Cardinal John Njue, the Archbishop of Nairobi, opposed amnesty calls to youths accused of taking part in the violence in Rift Valley, Nyanza, Western and Nairobi provinces. This was seen as continuation of the partisan role the church took during the election. The Archbishop as quoted:

We have given our ears to the state, instead of the state listening to us. We are compromised to the extent that it has become difficult for religious leaders to face their flock and preach.... The church is morally and spiritually bankrupt. It is supposed to be the right regiment of God, which reconciles mankind with God. It is charge with saving mankind for life on earth and thereafter.³³

3.5 The rise of new and multiple voices in Kenya's public sphere

As the mainline church public theologies and prophetic voices were declining, new voices were emerging in the socio-political scene. These are voices of the newer Pentecostal and charismatic churches that were increasingly emerging by the dawn of the new millennium, but especially in the run up to the referendum on the new constitution for the country in November 2005³⁴. The Pentecostal and charismatic clergy that had previously played less prominent roles suddenly woke up from political hibernation to full socio-political engagement. In November 2005, and amidst heightened political activities and anxieties, Pentecostal clergy mobilised themselves and rallied their members to defeat the draft constitution during the first national

³¹ Ibid

³² D. Kalkandjiev, (2011). A Comparative analysis on church state relations in Eastern Orthodoxy.

³³ N. Mue, *Reflecting on church state relationship in Kenya.*

³⁴ K. Ross, *God, people and power in Malawi.*

referendum held in November 2005³⁵. Together with the help of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) led by the then Hon Raila Odinga and the Prime Minister, and others mobilised the public to vote and defeat the draft constitution proposed by President Kibaki. This is because it permitted abortion under certain conditions and provided for Islamic Kadhi courts.

However, the 2005 referendum became the new frontline for forces aligned to President Kibaki and those coalescing around his former ally turned political foe, Raila Odinga, who was then leading a group of rebel ministers who had been frustrated by the failure of Kibaki to honour a pre-election Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). These disgruntled politicians opposed the constitutional draft arguing that it was meant to consolidate power in the hands of the Kikuyu elite who wanted to maintain the status quo³⁶. These groups of rebel ministers were joined by a section of clergy mainly from Evangelical and Pentecostal clergy who opposed the constitutional draft for a different reason altogether: that is resisting the inclusion of Kadhi or Islamic courts in the draft constitution. Leading Pentecostal clergy and churches that opposed the passage of the Bomas constitutional draft include Bishops' Boniface Adoyo of Nairobi Pentecostal Churches, also known as Christ is the Answer Ministries (CITAM), Margaret Wanjiru of Jesus Is Alive Ministries (JIAM), Arthur Kitonga of Redeemed Gospel Church (RGC), Wilfred Lai of Jesus Celebration Centre and Mark Kariuki of Deliverance Churches (DC) and many other religious organisations including the Evangelical Alliance of Kenya (EAK)³⁷.

After the rejection of the November 2005 constitutional draft, Pentecostal clergy became increasingly vocal in public life issues. However, the most significant development of the 2005 constitutional referendum is not the defeat of the draft, but the emergence of strains and tensions not just between Christians and Muslims, but also between church and state. Another significant development was the fact that the mainline clergy were increasingly viewed as partisan and divided along ethnic lines and serving narrow political interest depending on the ethnic group to which its leaders belonged³⁸.

The prophetic role and voice of the church to act as the conscience of society was lost, and the church did nothing to evaluate its own role even after the people voted to soundly reject the draft constitution. Towards the end of 2006, the NCCCK comprising 37 mainline churches in Kenya, formerly a worthy, neutral and credible public watchdog, was being accused of continued political partiality, soft stance and cooperation with the Kibaki government. Joining the bandwagon, the Kenya Catholic

³⁵P. Gifford, *Christianity, politics and public life in Kenya*.

³⁶N. Mue, *Reflecting on church state relationship in Kenya*.

³⁷A. Hastings, *History of African Christianity*.

³⁸T. Merton, *Faith and Violence*.

Episcopal Conference was also consistently accused of direct political support to the incumbent president Mwai Kibaki³⁹

4.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion

The Kibaki era has been characterized by many an events that have attracted by far and wide the attention of the clergy. In 2005, the most significant development of the 2005 constitutional referendum is not the defeat of the draft, but the emergence of strains and tensions not just between Christians and Muslims, but also between church and state. Another significant development was the fact that the mainline clergy were increasingly viewed as partisan and divided along ethnic lines and serving narrow political interest depending on the ethnic group to which its leaders belonged. The prophetic role and voice of the church to act as the conscience of society was lost, and the church did nothing to evaluate its own role even after the people voted to soundly reject the draft constitution.

Towards the end of 2006, the NCK comprising 37 mainline churches in Kenya, formerly a worthy, neutral and credible public watchdog, was being accused of continued political partiality, soft stance and cooperation with the Kibaki government. Joining the bandwagon, the Kenya Catholic Episcopal Conference was also consistently accused of direct political support to the incumbent president Mwai Kibaki. To, many Kibaki had failed to take the nation into the Promised Land, yet religious leaders largely remained silent on the matters of social justice. Charismatic movements in the public sphere, the mainline churches that were for many decades regarded as the voices of the voiceless and the conscience of society were now increasingly faced with the difficult and complex challenge of maintaining not just their own influence and significance, but also their socio-political voice and activism in an increasingly multi-religious, multi-denominational, and multi-ethnic society. The Pentecostals, it seems to me, have further introduced multiple voices into the public sphere and upset the country's religious equilibrium and topography and strained inter-faith relations and dialogue.

Recommendations

The study recommended that the government should put in place laws that would involve the church in government matters. This can be done by introducing motions into parliament that advocate for the direct involvement of the church. This would involve laws which ensure that a portion of all members sitting in any committee represents the church. This can also be done by the introduction of electoral posts for church representatives just as there are positions for women representatives. The study also recommends that amendments be made to the constitution to make a legal requirement that one of the nominated MPs must be from the church. The study has recommended

³⁹D. Kasomo, *Grabbing independence from British Colonial system*.

that since gender balance is a key issue in the constitution, then religious balance also be made a key issue with positions open for church representatives. The study has further recommended that the church unite under one umbrella body so as to gather enough critical mass to be able to have a say in national matters or even gather enough signs to cause a referendum that will influence current laws. On the same note, the study recommends that the state should put in place mechanisms to ensure that all clergy men and women should be highly vetted then trained in theological matters before being licensed to serve as Church ministers. The presidential advisory committee should include a senior minister who is either a Bishop or Pastor to provide direction and advice in case of any decision that touches on the spiritual matters.

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