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Luka Odita Ashafa



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 **Luka Odita Ashafa**
Dominion University Ibadan



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Abstract

Purpose: Crisis has become a recurrent phenomenon in Kaduna state. The state is arguably, said to have experienced more episodes of conflicts than most states in northern Nigeria. These violent conflicts have claimed the lives of many people and have led to loss of properties worth billions of naira. Jema’a local government area of Kaduna state arguably has experienced more violent conflicts than the whole state.

Materials and Methods: Qualitative method of research was adopted and In-depth Interview (IDI) and Key Informant Interview (KII) were administered to obtain valuable data from the participants in light of the purpose for the research and the data was analyzed with content analysis.

Findings: Notable among these violent conflicts are the 1987 college of education Gidan-Waya Crisis, the 1999 Jema’a Emirate tussle, the year 2000 Sharia law crisis, the

2011 post-election crisis and the protracted farmers-herders’ conflict. These conflicts have polarized the local government area on the basis of religion and ethnicity. Settlements choice, politics and political parties are made, practiced and created along ethno religious lines respectively. Identity politics especially on the basis of religion and ethnicity has ensured bitter animosity among the people living in the region.

Implications to Theory, Practice and Policy: It is for this reason that this paper seeks to unearth the triggers of these crises from especially the victims’ perspective. Conflict triggers like religion, indigene and settlers’ issues, competition for political space, and the economy were found to be the core factors precipitating violent conflicts in Jema’a LGA area.

Keywords: *Violence, Conflicts, Religion, Ethnicity, Farmers-Herders*

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Kaduna state in northern Nigeria presents one of the most complicated case as it is recurrently beseeched by ethno-religious and political crises. For Bello, (2015) Kaduna is the second most conflict-ridden state in Nigeria after Plateau state with 653 fatalities within 2006 to 2014. The state is made up of over 30 ethnic groups; the Hausa/Fulani in the north who are predominantly Muslims and the ethnic minorities of the south like Atyap, Bajju, Jaba, Gbagyi, Ikulu, Numana, Kaninkon and many others who are predominantly Christians (Paden, 2015). There is an almost equal percentage of Christian and Muslims in Kaduna state which creates the platform for considerable religious and political strife and since the early 80s, clashes have taken place between different ethnic groups across religious divide that have claimed thousands of lives (International Crisis Group, 2010). Furthermore, the divisions that exist among the various socio-cultural groups in the state have fostered suspicion and tension thereby precipitating the use of religion and ethnicity to construct identities that will serve as advantages to achieving whatever is the object or subject of contention (Omotosho, 2014; Angerbrandt, 2015).

Abdulbarkindo, Alupsen, and Gloria, (2017:3) asserted that “Southern Kaduna has become the threshold for violent and massive killings perpetrated especially in the years of 1987, 1992, 2000 and 2011” Nigeria Watch (2016) also reported that the violence in the southern part of Kaduna has become a perennial crisis in Nigeria. This is because southern Kaduna hosts more diverse ethnic groups than the northern part and it shares the more tropical, weather friendly atmosphere and good vegetation with the rest of the middle belt or the Guinea Savannah even as contestation over lands and political positions on the platform of religious and ethnic identities is much prevalent in the southern part of the state (Suleiman, 2011).

Jema’a local government area is geographically located at the southern part of Kaduna and it is a home to one of the oldest Islamic caliphates in Nigeria established in 1810 (Suleiman, 2011 and Smith, 1960). The caliphate is situated at Kafanchan a nodal town with so much economic importance and politically instrumental as it holds the local secretariat and the office of the local government administrator. By implication it consists of a substantial number of Hausa/ Fulani population who are predominantly Muslims surrounded with ethnic groups like Kaninkon, Fantswam, Numana, Bajju, Kagoro, Marwa, and Kagoma, who are predominantly Christians. The mainstream propositions to the violent conflicts in Jema’a is that many of these Christian ethnic groups in the region see the presence of the Hausa/Fulani as agents of a bigger Islamic conspiracy promoting a continuous Muslim expansionist agenda; it is for this reason that their supposition to this perception has turn the region into a theatre of recurrent violent conflicts.

Another perilous conflict ravaging Jema’a local government area specifically in the rural areas is the protracted farmers-herders clashes which not only led to loss of lives and properties but also threatens food security. Arguably, Jema’a local government area has had more violent conflicts than Kaduna state (Abdulbarkindo et’al, 2017) and these conflicts come in different dimensions to which this research lends itself to examine.

2.0 METHODOLOGY

The research uses exploratory design to uncover conflict triggers in Jema’a from the relevant stakeholders in the local government, this is because, the major emphasis in such design is on the discovery of ideas and insights and it is flexible enough to provide opportunity for considering different aspects of the problem under study. The Qualitative method of Key Informant Interview

and In-depth Interview were conducted to generate data from the participants. Purposive sampling was used to get the sample size of this research and snowballing method was adopted to reach 29 participants in the study. The participants include traditional and religious leaders, the media, security agencies and victims of the recurrent violent conflicts from both sides of the divide. These participants were chosen purposively from the notable communities known to have experienced the recurrent conflict in Jema'a and these communities includes, Kafanchan, Takau, Dangoma, Ninte, Goska, Bakin-Kogi, Gidan-Waya and Godogodo.

Theoretical Framework

Conflict Trap Theory

Collier et' al (2003) avers that the best predictor of whether a country will be in civil war next year is whether it is at civil war now. They established that the cause of the incessant conflict in a war-torn society is what is called "Greed and Grievances". Although there are various contentions to this, the greed and grievances model is rooted in economics. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) posited that resources are naturally unevenly distributed in a country, and in many developing societies, there has been conflict on who controls such resources, its production and the distribution of benefits or profits accrued from it. In multiethnic societies, especially one practicing democracy, many at times the natural resources of a country are found in the region of the minority ethnic groups (e.g Sudan, Nigeria and Afghanistan) while the majority ethnic group on the account of population controls political power. They submitted that democracies generate grievance if one voting block is able to forge a persistent majority and uses its power to disadvantage a minority. It is on this basis that uneven distribution of resources occurs which leads the disadvantaged aggrieved ethnic groups to constitute rebellion in the country.

Colonialism was also blame for the eruption of civil war in developing nations. This is partly because, in most cases, the colonial government ceded power to some preferred ethnic groups, like the Belgians in Rwanda, the British in Nigeria and the French in Congo on the basis of population or some features that appealed to the colonialist demands. The rebellion to a constituted authority according to Collier et' al (2003) can be in the form of protest, insurgence, or armed militias.

This applies to southern Kaduna and Jema'a local government area. There have been grievances expressed by the Christian dominated ethnic groups of southern Kaduna against the Hausa/Fulani who have hold on to the helm of affairs of the state for quite a long time while dictating the economic fortune of the more diverse ethnic groups in the state. Southern Kaduna ethnic group's population accounts for the higher number of civil servants in the state but yet are denied the opportunity to hold strategic positions in the Kaduna state government. It is these grievances that echoes in Jema'a Local Government Area as the economic resourceful population of the Hausa/Fulani Muslims are denied political expression in the local politics. This greed for power has generated intense grievances among the southern Kaduna Christian dominated ethnic groups in the state politics and has also generated the same grievances among the Hausa/Fulani Muslims in Jema'a local government area.

Conflicts Triggers in Jema'a Local Government

Indigene and Settler Issues

One of the foremost factors that have been in the epicenter of violent conflict in Jema'a is premised on who arrived first in the region. Jema'a Local Government area is a miniature of Kaduna State and Nigeria as it consists of a substantial number of Hausa/ Fulani population who are

predominantly Muslims with ethnic groups like Kaninkon, Fantswam, Numana, Bajju, Kagoro, Marwa, and Kagoma, who are predominantly Christians. The research found that there is the presence of opposing narratives on who the indigenes and the settlers are in Jema'a LGA as contained in the claims of Kaninkon people of Goska against the Hausa/Fulani of Dangoma, the Fantswan People of Kafanchan against their Hausa/Fulani counterpart and the Bajju people of Madakiya against the Hausa/Fulani of Matsirga. These identities on the basis of indigene and settlers is invoke when developmental projects are at stake or in the allocation of scarce resources (Angebrandt, 2015 and Kwaja (2011:2).

In Jema'a LGA, Christian dominated ethnic groups view the Hausa/Fulani as alien to them in culture, tradition and religion which is further informed by their political culture and mode of socialization. So many of them perceived the presence of the Hausa/Fulani group as tool for the actualization of the unfinished Islamic conquest of Usman Danfodio; the implication of which in the near future will distort their identity thereby leading to the extinction of the cultural artifacts passed unto them by their ancestors (Suleiman, 2011; International Crisis Group 2010). It is a fact that these ethnic groups were the hub of slave raiding and trading perpetrated and patronized by the Hausa/Fulanis for which they (ethnic groups) were the victims. MG Smith (1960) submitted that most Hausa/Fulanis were found in enclaves and wall cities and their cities became the foci of commercial activities including slave trade. These slaves who were mostly these pagan ethnic minorities now Christians, served the entire Hausa empires of the north from Zaria to Kano, to Sokoto and Borno and even beyond the shores of what is consider today as Nigeria (Abdulkadir 2011).

Not until the advent of democracy when all the ethnic minorities in Southern Kaduna were given Chiefdoms by the then Governor Ahmed Makarfi, they were all under the control of Zaria emirate which by implications broke the Hausa/Fulani traditional and cultural grip on their heads. Okpanachi (2011) buttressed on this when he avers that the governor also created independent districts and chiefdoms for the non-Muslim communities in southern Kaduna and upgraded some of the chiefs representing these communities to first-class status. Through the process, the governor eased the resentment (and sometimes violent resistance) of the southern Kaduna communities that have persistently complained of their subjugation to emirate rule under the arrangement that previously existed (Suleiman, 2011). The Hausa/Fulani asserted that they were not only the foci of commercial activities and slave raiding and trading but the original inhabitants of Jema'a.

Jema'a was founded solely by the Muslims in 1810; some vassals came from Sokoto, and proselytized the people here, they were Fulani men. So the relative of Danfodio who came with them became the emir as such the present emir is his descendant, and he is a Fulani man. So when he came he met some tribes here, he was without a wife, as such he married some of the tribes he met especially the Numana and the Ninzom. That's how you have the emirate system, from 1810 to date. (Male, Deputy Chief Imam of Kafanchan)

Going by his assertions, the original name of the Hausa/Fulani settlement was Jema'a which was solely given by Usman Danfodio himself in 1810. This is not far from the fact since the jihad was carried out by 1804 (Suleiman 2011). Just like the capture of Ilorin, the pagan ethnic groups (southern Kaduna ethnic groups) of the south were made to serve under the emirate of Usman Danfodio in Jema'a. Another issue he raised was that when these vassals came to proselytize the natives, the relative of Usman Danfodio became the emir of the new caliphate to which he later married from the natives, Suleiman (2011:4) recognized the chief vassal to be Malam Usman.

Usman Danfodio normally put his close companions like his children and his brothers to head a conquered territory which warranted one of his relative to become the emir of Jema'a and establish his dynasty till today (Abdulkadir, 2011).

But a self-contradiction to the above comment was that the vassals met some natives which are the Ninzom and the Numana. So, does it mean that these ethnic groups began existing with the coming of the Hausa/Fulani ethnic groups or were they not humans until the coming of the Hausa Fulani to their communities? Seems like the assertions of that the history of Africa started with the coming of the Europeans. Although these ethnic groups today have the highest population of Muslims among the southern Kaduna ethnic groups the comment of the chief Imam is self-defeating. Responding to the claims of first arrival to the Jema'a region by the chief Imam, one of the participants asserted that

Our grandparents were hospitable, they accepted strangers then. And they give their daughters into marriages to the strangers. And I blame this on their lack of knowledge and foresight. (Male, Pastor) This fact is corroborated by how the Sokoto vassals were accepted and treated couple with the evidence that the history of the white man conquest of the region was on a platter of gold as no blood was spilt. Historically, the people of southern Kaduna are only known with wars among the various ethnic groups that made up the regions. These wars are mostly based on boundary disputes and marriages and not the quest for expansionism and domination of one ethnic group by another. According to the traditional leader of Ninte, they give lands freely and help strangers build houses.

An expert in Linguistics and History, at the State College of Education in Gidan-Waya, posited that there is no Hausa/Fulani settlement that is more than one hundred years in Jema'a. How old is Kaduna? Kaduna was not in existence before 1914 as large as Kaduna is today. How will the Hausas have claimed indigenes in Kafanchan. Kafanchan became very important because of the railway station built by the white men for economic purpose. It connected the North West to the south east. That is why you have large number of Hausas, Igbo and the Yorubas here. In fact, for me if anybody will claim the indigene of Kafanchan it should be the Yorubas and the Igbos. If not, explain to me why there will be Ibadan Road at the core area of Kafanchan. If the Hausas had dwelt there before any other person as important as that street is, it should have borne a Hausa name. The Yorubas and the Igbos then constituted the large workforce of the railway system. How many Igbo or Yoruba person you have heard claiming indigenes here despite their large number except for the Hausas. I have stayed in Kano for a very long time but that does not give me the impetus to claim ownership of the lands and start contesting for elections. (Male, Dr. of Linguistics and History)

A caliphate, trade and settlement cannot be established where there are no people (MG Smith, 1960). Just like the colonialist who opines that our history started with them, it is a farce to ascertain that there was nobody around the southern Kaduna region when the Hausa/Fulani came and it also inappropriate to deny right and privileges to a person in a region who has contributed to the development of a community because he/she is not part of the original ethnic group of the land.

Competition for Political Space at State and Local Level

In this factor, I devise two levels by which political conflict occur in Jema'a Local Government area; the first is sponsored by the state politics which is a derivative of the political discrimination and domination of the entire southern Kaduna population especially in the control of the affairs of

the state. The second is at the local government level which focuses on the Jema'a region (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). On the first level, the Southern Kaduna Christian ethnic groups are said to constitute the minorities, while on the second level, they assume the status of the majorities as they are largely concentrated in Jema'a Local Government to constitute a more population than the Hausa/Fulani. In this context, the Hausa/Fulani becomes the minority. The Christian dominated ethnic groups are considered minorities in the context of their individual ethnic groups and the entire Kaduna state but the jointly constitute the majority in some part of the state particularly in Jema'a (Okpanachi 2011).

One of the Christian participants posited that:

Hausas are colonialist, look at Kaduna state for example although the white men left us in their hands under the Zazzau Emirate, we have never produced a governor in this state except by divine providence which is Yakowa who did not even last at the end of the day and now they are back again especially with this present governor. You can imagine with this Fulani attacks in southern Kaduna he is giving a directive that we should make an Ardo (a leader of Fulani, the equivalent of village head), one from every ten Fulani families in our communities. (Male, Historian)

The historian comment entails the political marginalization of the southern Kaduna ethnic group by Hausa/Fulani Muslims of the north. Since the creation of Kaduna state, the Christian dominated ethnic groups of southern Kaduna have only produced one governor while all the state chief administrators have been of Hausa/Fulani origins. Toure Kazah-Toure (2003) dealt with the above comment when he identifies conflict in pre-colonial times between small polities in southern Kaduna and the emirates of the Sokoto caliphate. He converses that when the British incorporated the Hausa/Fulani ruling elites of the emirates into the colonial state and established Anglo-Fulani hegemony, the non-Muslim peoples of the area to the south of the emirates began to be perceived as inferior (Yusufu, 1982, Kukah, 1993). At independence in 1960, this trend took the form of a Hausa-Fulani hegemony which, to Kukah (1993), based its legitimacy on political aspirations for Islam. This political domination with an ethnic character is claimed by Kazah Toure (1999) to have triggered ethnically based resistance. Christians of various ethnicities are, as already mentioned, predominantly based in the southern part of the state while Muslims, mainly of Hausa-Fulani origin, form the majority in the northern part. The religious composition of the population is contested and both Christians and Muslims claim to be in the majority (Suleiman, 2011, Alao & Mavallah 2016).

The Christian ethnic groups have long complained about marginalization by the Muslim Hausa/Fulani population. They see themselves as deprived of rights and disadvantaged in terms of development projects and appointments (Suberu, 1996; Angerbrandt, 2015). This has led to demands for splitting the state into two. Such demands have been articulated by the Southern Kaduna People's Union (SOKAPU), an umbrella organization for southern Kaduna ethnic group. We never had a say in Kaduna State affairs until the coming of Yakowa as a governor. He embraced all of us and sought our advice on some state issues which made him run an all-inclusive government. (Pastor and Moderator of Baptist Church Association)

For this commentator, many clergies especially from the Christian religion were neglected in the formation of state policy and advocacy. This marginalization further created a divide among the Kaduna state population. Of course, the sermons on the pulpit won't go well with the Muslim governors of the state and the congregation will believe anything from their supposed men of God without vetting the veracity of their claims. As such, for the pastor, the only time the felt as the

indigene of the state was when a Christian, Patrick Ibrahim Yakowa became the governor of Kaduna state.

The second level is a derivative of the first and to some extent happens to be a political reprisal conflict echoing from the first level. In this second level, it is the Hausa/Fulani Muslims who are at the tail end of the ladder complaining of victimization and domination by the majority of the Christian ethnic group who formed most of the population in Southern Kaduna. The Southern Kaduna Peoples Union (SOKAPU) has been accused by most of the Hausa/Fulani Muslims resident in southern Kaduna as operating a covert agenda of sacking all the Hausa/Fulani Muslims in southern Kaduna in its quest to form an independent state from the present Kaduna state (Osaghae & Suberu, 2005). The Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) shared in the accusation meted out to SOKAPU as accomplice of the later. CAN as posited by the International Crisis Group (2010) was created as a response to Nigeria's Jema'atu Nasril Islam (JNI) (an organization with the central objective of Islamic proselytization of whole northern Nigeria and beyond) and the introduction of Nigeria's membership in the Organization of Islamic Country. As such, SOKAPU is seen to ride on the wings of CAN to make southern Kaduna free from all Islamic and Hausa/Fulani element. In fact, it was commented by one of the participants that:

There is no Hausa man that is together with SOKAPU, even if they call any one of us it is just a decoy because what they do openly is different from what they do in secret. That SOKAPU comprises of politicians and Christian religious leaders, and all the crises that have been occurring in southern Kaduna were instigated by those politicians and their religious leaders. Politicians are using the organization to realize their political ambition and it was the religious leaders that initiated SOKAPU into CAN. (Male, Traditional leader in Kafanchan)

Although the Hausa/Fulani claimed to be the majority in Kafanchan and indigenes of Jema'a Local Government area, records has shown that they have never made it to the position of the local government chairman except councillorship allocated to them which is ward A and B. Dangoma on the other hand which is part of Kaninkon Ward has never made it to the councillorship ward despite claims to be indigenes of the community and existing there for about 150 years. This issue has become of paramount concern to the Hausa/Fulani. It is the same story in Godogodo and Madakiya before the sacking of Matsirga.

They have never voted any Hausa/Fulani man to the councillorship ward. They always promised us they will if we support them get there. All of the political parties promised us. PDP, APC, PRP, but we have not yet seen it; they just lied to us and use us to get their desires while we keep supporting them. Since the inception of this democracy no Hausa/Fulani man has become councilor in this Godogodo ward. (Messenger of Godogodo District head office) Politicians both in the state and local government levels use their political position to divert developmental projects to their communities and they go further by empowering their communities more than those they consider as rival community (Kwaja, 2011). This is visible in Kaduna state where some significant institutions and infrastructures of the state is located in the northern part while the southern part has been left to wallow in decay and backwardness. But the Hausa/Fulani in Jema'a Local Government Area complained of similar issue of discrimination and marginalization in the award of developmental project, scholarship and distribution of farming inputs.

On the other hand one of the reason that was given by some of the Christian ethnic participants is that the Hausa/Fulani use to contest but God has not yet given them victory while some are of the opinion that the Hausa/Fulanis are from the core northern states which by implications means they

can't contest as their status still remains as settlers. You cannot go to Kano no matter how long you stay there and you will say you want to contest elections. It is impossible but that is the same thing the Hausa/Fulani are asking for here. In fact, we have a lot of ethnic groups here which will make it impossible for the Hausa/Fulani win elections. (Male, Media correspondent)

The closest the Hausa/Fulani have been to in the echelon of power in Jema'a Local Government is the position of the Deputy Chairman of the local government and fortunately, the first time they got there was through the first Christian southern Kaduna governor Yakowa. He insisted that they be included in the helms of affairs in the local government to avert the reoccurrence of ethno-religious and political crises thereby making it an all-inclusive government.

Religion

Loyalty, sense of belonging and identity are recurrently constructed along religious line as persons who don't share such transcendental belief with his/her ethnic groups are seen as apostate aiding in the advancement of the supposed enemy's camp (International Crisis Group, 2010 and Okpanachi, 2011). Some of these cases can be found in Godogodo and Matsirga where it was said that Christian militia groups attacked their in-laws and grandchildren despite the bond in ethnicity and religion. Such group of persons constitutes a considerable amount in the victims of some of the crises being discussed.

But it was Suberu (2011) who captures the reality of the violent conflict in the now Kaduna state when he posited that This unequal historical political relationship between the Hausa-Fulani group and the pagan community has been compounded by religious differences. Islam is the religion of an overwhelming majority of the Hausa-Fulani. The religion also provides the doctrinal or ideological foundation for the emirate system while on the other hand; different forms of animistic worship have traditionally predominated amongst the pagan populations. Moreover, looked down upon as infidels by the emirate population, and often arbitrarily and oppressively subjected to the Muslim judicial and legal system, these pagan populations have become particularly receptive to Christian conversion and education.

The acceptance of the white man's religion was to seek his support and help by these pagan ethnic groups to regain freedom with the higher technology which he (the white man) used in conquering the Hausa/Fulani. Although that didn't work out, the consequences of accepting the white man's religion in southern Kaduna gave them an edge in western education over the Hausa/Fulani who are bent on learning only Arabic knowledge to avoid being proselytized by the Christian missionaries.

Another implication of this is the fact that some of the high-ranking officials who are in Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), are from Southern Kaduna. Notable among them is the CAN secretary who passed away late Dr. Asake, the Christian Council of Nigeria (CCN) secretary general Yusuf Ibrahim Wushishi and many more like Rev. father Mathew Kukah the catholic Arch-Diocese of Sokoto state. This shows the extend southern Kaduna is committed to a religion they believe will save them from the hegemony of the Hausa/Fulani and fetch them allies who are politically, economically and intellectually stronger than their perceived rivals. It was out rightly posited by a respondent that:

Yes, we go to help our brothers of other ethnic groups who are Christians whenever we heard there is conflict no matter how distant it is. It is like a solidarity movement because this Hausas also use to hire outsider whenever conflict wants to occur. You will start seeing strange faces when the

warning signs have become visible enough. (Male, Historian) This type of solidarity conflicts has become the order of the day in Jema'a Local Government as alignment and allegiance have become strictly religious as witnessed in the 2011 post-election crisis. Religious activities have intensified as preachers and adherents of different faith in Jema'a openly discussed their faith and sometimes do ridicule or point out the flaws in other religion. There was an example of a Christian missionary who was attacked and taken hostage by some Muslim group for openly reviling the religion of Islam on the street and another example where a Muslim district head was removed from his position during the 2011 post-election violence in area considered to be Christian dominated.

We the Christian are the majority in this part of Kafanchan, we use to have a Muslim district-head but was removed during the crisis and he sold his properties to some of us. (Traditional leader of Takau Kafanchan) Although the reason for his removal was not made known by the participant, it shows how polarized Jema'a Local Government is when it comes to the matters of religion. His leaving also signifies the changing nature of settlement in Jema'a which is premise on religious affiliation. It is common to see that Muslims are living on one side and Christians on the other.

International Crisis Group (2010) asserted that external support to local religious organizations, seeking the allegiance of Africa's largest Muslim and largest Christian communities, has intensified Christian-Muslim rivalries in Nigeria. Christian missions in the U.S. have invested considerably in evangelical work in Nigeria, including the far north. While leading U.S. evangelists have not recently been allowed to conduct revival programs there, they have offered training to local missionaries and sponsored the establishment of new churches. As it is now, Kafanchan might soon boast of one of the largest churches in Nigeria which sits on a large land mass with its radio station and a 14 storey building.

On the other hand, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, other Arab states and Iran, along with Islamic charities based in those countries, have also contributed substantial resources for propagating Islam in the region, or sometimes for empowering particular sects (International Crisis Group 2010). One example is the Islamic Movement of Nigeria, a Shiite Islamic religious sect supported by the Islamic Republic of Iran with its kingpin as the popular El-Zakzaki (International Crisis Group 2010). Some of the clergy men have ruled out the idea of peace as far as Kaduna state and Jema'a Local Government Area are concern; that what sponsors violence is the religious ideology that people submit to and peace can only return when they abandon such religious ideology.

I told you the light that is in you as a Christian is not in them and until the light that is in you is found in them till Jesus Christ returns there will never be peace. I told them in one of the peace meetings that Abraham has one wife but impatience made to sleep with a slave woman and God curse the fruit of that unholy union. God said to Ishmael (the fruit of the union) that he will be a bush man attacking his brothers. You see you cannot join the children of blessing with the children of the accursed, it is impossible. And I told them we are not serving the same God. (IDI 21 Pastor of ECWA Church)

A Lecturer and Muslim participants accused CAN of sponsoring SOKAPU to establish a purely Christian state. Is it not a state they are crying for; this Gurara state? then, let everybody join hands and seek for the state not that if you are an Igbo, you are a member, if you are a Hausa Christian you are a member, if you are an Igbo Christian you are a member, if you are a Jaba Christian you are a member but if you are a Jaba Muslim I think you are supposed to be a member, or if you are a Hausa Muslim you are supposed to be a member, is that not so? As far as you are living here, you see it is one of the problems prevailing here; they are looking for a state and a purely Christian

state. If they should remove the issue Christianity in this regard and then involve Muslims, Christians, pagans and what have you, then we will have the same purpose. (KII 19, Male Lecturer) Sanusi Maikudi the manager of Kaduna State Investment Company when he was interviewed on Television Intercontinental opined that the sole purpose of SOKAPU is to evict Muslims out of southern Kaduna and particularly in Jema'a Local Government area. He submitted that in time to come, the population of Muslims will outnumber that of the Christians because by Islamic injunctions he can marry more than one wife which is not permitted in Christianity and that he has three wives already and he is about to marry the fourth.

Economic

There is the economic dimension of the conflict recurrent in Jema'a Local Government. Some of the conflicts has in its core a certain commodity of value desired by one of the parties in the conflict belonging to the opposite party. Apart from the 1987 Campus Crusade crisis in Kafanchan, the emirate tussle conflict, and Sharia crises which has religion and politics at the epicenter of the discord, the 2011 post-election crisis and the ongoing farmers-herders conflicts has an economic coloration to it. International Crisis Group (2017) put it this way:

Migration initially was seasonal, with herders spending December to May in the central zone before returning north. Over the last two decades, however, as available pastures shrank in the far north, herders have been staying in the central zone longer – from December to June or July. More recently, some have chosen to graze their herds there permanently. This has triggered increasing disputes over land and water use with central Nigeria's growing populations of sedentary crop farmers.

It is for this reason that the recurrent Fulani attacks have become so intense in modern times especially with the effect of global warming phenomenon ravaging the core northern part of Nigeria which is largely inhabited by the Hausa/Fulani ethnic group (International Crisis Group, 2017; Agbo, 2016; Bogu & Smith, 2017). The increase in population has made the demand for land very paramount. This growth in population also extend to the increasing number of animals or cattle being grazed these days. Many Nigerians, because of the economic hardship and the government policy in restricting the importation of agricultural items decided to go back to their farms and rear animals; a course which the past presidents also embarked on (International Crisis Group, 2017).

Another issue raised especially in the conflict that occurred in Ninte is in the advancement of technology and new farm input items used by the farmers. Some of these farm inputs like pesticides and herbicides are highly poisonous to animal and are being spread on the grasses they consume. (Agbo, 2016). Agbo (2016) submitted that the crisis in Ninte started when some cattle ate those grasses sprayed with the new herbicides bought by the farmers which led to their deaths. Now the epicenter of the conflict is in the fact that since the grazing route of the Fulani is amassed by large capitalist mechanized farmers to meet the growing demands for food and by extension poisonous farm inputs are used to help clear the land or protect the crops against weeds and pests, the herdsmen are forced to feed on the farm lands and produce to have their way in grazing their cattle. This has become detrimental to both parties.

He saw the Fulani man driving his cattle into his farm and he decided to confront him, the Fulani man now used machete to hack him. (The traditional leader of Ninte). The traditional leader of Ninte described how the farmers-herders conflict occur and he blamed it on the Fulani man who

drove his cattle into the farm land of one of his community members and hacked the farmer to near death when he was confronted (Agbo, 2016). Ninte is a community as it is said needs not fertilizer to grow its crops as the village is known to boast of producing some of the largest food crops and cash crops for consumption and marketing at the same time in the whole Godogodo region (Agbo, 2016).

No, it is not true what he told you. When the Fulani man hacked the farmer with his machete, the community took laws into their hands and attacked the Fulani settlements close to them and killed their Ardo meanwhile their brother that was attacked did not die (Messenger of Godogodo District Head office). Ninte did not open up on the reprisal, the traditional leader said that it is the singular act of hacking the young farmer that prompted the Fulanis to attack his community which resulted to the sacking of the whole lands and losing their crops both the one on farms and the harvested ones (Agbo, 2016). The event that followed after the crises was what I talked about earlier which have to do with the solidarity fight as it was communicated by the Historian who said that they go to help in the protection of their Christian brothers no matter the distance.

Yes, other community joined the Ninte community to fight the Fulanis and that is why the Fulanis attacked those communities one after the other (traditional leader of Godogodo) The traditional leader of Dangoma added.

They went to look for trouble down in Paskori close to Gidan Waya. The Fulanis that they went to kill their loved ones and burnt their cows are the ones who came back for them here and they followed them down to Bakin Kogi. But the sedentary Fulani and nomadic Fulani that are here, I swear to you no one partook in the fight, we just went out to protect ourselves, and there was no way they could invade us. God help us it finished that way. (Traditional leader of Dangoma) The submissions made by the participants above showed that all the warring factions have a standby mercenary who helped their kinsmen or co-religious adherent to fight perceived enemy. From the comment of the traditional leader of Dangoma, they were not part of the conflict but only came out to defend their territory.

Discussion of Findings

Jema'a Local Government Area is a diversify region. It has over 12 ethnic groups within its enclave and it the home to one of the oldest Islamic caliphates in the country which was established in 1810. The local government also boast of an economic hub called Kafanchan where the caliphate is located and many business activities are carried out there thanks to the nodal town with one of the biggest train stations in Nigeria. These diversities have engendered recurrent ethno-religious and political crises between the Hausa/Fulani Muslims and the Christian dominated ethnic group like the Bajjus, Kaninkons, Morowa, Numana, Fanstwam and Igbos. The study found that there are four notable triggers of these conflicts: Indigene and Settlers dispute; Competition for political space both at state and at local level; Religion and Economy.

Colonialism has bequeathed to the north an imbalance in power structure. Just like other African countries like Rwanda, Congo and Central African Republic, Nigeria has had conflicts arising from the unequal distribution of power and marginalization. The Christian dominated ethnic groups in Jema'a have pointed out that the Muslim Hausa/Fulani in their midst are settlers and that their caliphate that was established in 1810 pointed to the fact that they are late comers. It is for this reason that in the distribution of power, development projects, scholarships and other state benefits, distinction is made as regard who is a settler and an indigene. Competition for political space at the state level by the Hausa/Fulani and Southern Kaduna ethnic groups has led to a more

intense competition for political space at the local level. Christians have not had many chances in producing state governors in Kaduna state and it is for this reason that they have taken it upon themselves to not share power with other religious groups in local governments where they are dominant.

The Hausa/Fulani Muslims in Jema'a have complained of political marginalization much like the Christians have at the state level. Religion in northern Nigeria forms the basis for identity and Kaduna state is of no exemption. Southern Kaduna dominance and fervency in Christian body like CAN, PFN and other mission base Christian organization despite the multicultural nature is an evidence of religious contributions in fueling conflict in the region. Muslim groups have declined to join the political umbrella body of SOKAPU which they cited as a religious body with more alliance with CAN and other international Christian bodies. This is reinforced by the investment in intense proselytization and the expansionist orientation of international Christian mission bodies and Islamic organization. Their quest is to produce a region with one religion. Such external influence has led to the 1987 campus crusade crises at the college of education in Jema'a Local Government Area which memories still lingers till date. Mechanize farming, changing nature of vegetation accompanied by desertification and reduction in freshwater body has led to intense conflicts between farmers and herders in Jema'a local government which has a far-reaching implication in the sociopolitical state of the entire local government. This conflict is also reinforced by the increase in human and animal population which has led to the expansion of farm lands and the depletion of grazing route.

3.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion

Jema'a local government located at the southern part of Kaduna state is a miniature of Kaduna state. It is a nodal region connecting southern and northern Nigeria. By implication it became a diverse region where most exchange of goods and services occur. But its importance has also put it in the eye of the public for some bad reasons and this is because the cultural diversity of the local government has created an avenue for political and economic competition which results to intense violent conflict. These conflicts are mostly between the Hausa/Fulani Muslims under the Jema'a emirate council which was established in 1810 as a caliphate by Usman Danfodio and the local ethnic groups in the region who are predominantly Christians. Some of the notable conflict that have occurred there include the 1987 College of Education Gidan-Waya religious crisis, the 1999 Jema'a emirate tussle, the 2011 post-election crisis and the protracted 2016 to 2017 farmers-herder's conflicts. It is identified that the factors precipitating the conflict includes: indigene and settlers' issues, competition for political space, religion and tussle for natural resources in the region.

Recommendation

Indigene and settler dichotomy should be abolished through the establishment of laws that give right to every Nigerian regardless of where they live. This will help to create more Nigerianess by encouraging patriotism and allegiance to the nation rather than their primordial identity.

Level playing field should be accorded to every ethnic group within the confines of Kaduna state to encourage political participation and inclusiveness at the state and local government level.

Religious body should be licensed and the censor board should be established to filter literatures and messages spewing out from our places of worship. International religious body should be scrutinized and adequate laws should be made to limit their activities in the state.

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Citation

Luka Odita Ashafa is a seasoned writer and a researcher. He had his bachelor’s degree in Sociology at Bayero University Kano and his masters in Criminology and Penology at the University of Ibadan. He is currently a Ph.D. candidate at Ahmadu Bello University Zaria. He was a researcher with House of Justice Kaduna and a member of the Community of Practice on mass atrocities at

Global Right Abuja. He is currently a researcher at the Institute of Crown Affairs Kaduna and the focal person for Afripeace Kaduna State. kingsgen17@gmail.com

Abbreviations and Acronyms

CAN	Christian Association of Nigeria
CCN	Christian Council of Nigeria
JNI	Jema'atu Nasril Islam
LGA	Local Government Area
PFN	Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria
SOKAPU	Southern Kaduna People's Union

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