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Communication Strategies and Terrorism Risk Preparedness among the Residents of Nairobi City County

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Abstract

Purpose: The main purpose of the study was to establish the association of communication strategies and terrorism risk preparedness among the residents of Nairobi City County.

Materials and Methods: This study followed a mixed-methods design mainly of a questionnaire survey complemented by observation, key informant interviews and document analysis, The design employed the Concurrent Convergent (Triangulation) Parallel strategy. According to the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, Nairobi City County has a resident population of 4,397,073. A further estimated 2.5 million non-residents troupe to the city-county daily for business and employment or as tourists and travelers in transit to other counties. Therefore, the target population for this study was approximately 6.5 million. The study population was drawn using stratified purposive random sampling technique where the list of all the sampling locations was categorized into four strata. The sample size was 640 respondents who were proportionately drawn randomly drawn from four different strata.

Findings: Regression of coefficients showed that research and alerts in communication and terrorism risk preparedness were positively and significantly related (β=0.293, p=0.000). In addition, results showed that emergency action and public education and terrorism risk preparedness were positively and significantly related (β=0.109, p=0.004). Governments that fail to warn their citizens when aware of imminent or possible terror threats will be accused of failing in their duty.

Implications to Theory, Practice and Policy: The study concludes that the use effective communication strategies is critical for terrorism risk preparedness, as they enhance message reception and thus motivate preparedness planning and action taking. This in turn can help in detecting and thwarting attacks before they happen, mitigate the impact of attacks, promote public safety during attacks, and build community resilience. Therefore, the study recommends that organizations, be they government agencies, first responders and corporates should incorporate effective Communication strategies into the overall crisis preparedness plans, in order to enhance their ability to communicate and respond effectively during terrorism attacks.

Keywords: *Communication Strategies, Terrorism Risk Preparedness, Public Alerts, Warning Systems*

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Researchers agree that terrorism is not just about violent extremism but it is also a communication construct (Falkheimer, 2014; Maito et al., 2013; Rogers et al., 2007). Thorne (2010), contends that terrorism is a strategic communication construct requiring to be countered not only militarily, but also using communication strategies. Thorne further avers that the adoption of critical risk and crisis management methodologies, including Risk Communication, and Isomorphic Learning, could significantly improve future responses to terrorism incidents (Thorne, 2010). This view is supported by Fischhoff, who maintains that communication has the potential to reduce the terrorists' chances of carrying out successful attacks or creating threats that disrupt and undermine societies (Fischhoff, 2011).

However, given the emotive nature of terrorism as a threat, terrorism risk communication calls for deliberate and careful characterization of terrorism risk perceptions held by citizens and public decision-makers with a view to understanding the motivations, and inclinations that influence the choices and behaviors of individual citizens and public decision-makers with respect to terrorism risk preparedness (Bakker & Graaf, 2014; Gibson, Lemyre, Clément, Markon, & Lee, 2007; Ben Sheppard, Janoske, & Liu, 2012). In particular, researchers have pointed out that effective terrorism risk communication is an essential factor in enhancing public perceptions of terrorism risk (Santamato, 2013) and in preparing them to counter terrorism threats (Güler, 2012). Further, researchers note that effective terrorism risk communication can reduce terrorists' chances of mounting successful operations and creating threats that disrupt everyday life or undermine the legitimacy of the societies that they attack (Fischhoff, 2011). Fischhoff, however, avers that achieving effective terrorism risk communication is an emotionally charged affair largely dependent on public perceptions regarding levels of individual, workplace, or even community vulnerability and the likelihood of attacks happening(Fischhoff, 2002; Fischhoff, 2011;Fischhoff, Gonzalez, Small, & Lerner, 2003).

Cleverly and by design, immediately following an attack, terrorism perpetrators inundate their targets with numerous follow up messages aimed at bolstering their attacks, justifying their cause and at times announcing further actions, real or imaginary (Falkheimer 2014; Papacharissi & Oliveira, 2008). Such bravado puts the first responders, in particular, the concerned government agencies expected to steer the crisis and risk communication activities, into a near communication void that defies the traditional linear process of standard, controlled crisis and risk communication planning and execution (Falkheimer, 2014).

Further, researchers aver that terror attacks fit snugly into media logic and news values (Coombs 2007; Falkheimer & Heide, 2014; Falkheimer 2014), hence making terrorism a communication and a media affair. Upon a terror attack, the media arena is swamped with public debate about contingency preparedness, search for information about victims and hostages as well as commentaries on the motives and the impact of the attacks (Weiman, 2008; Rothenberger, 2012). This way, an information power struggle ensues pitting authorities on one hand and terrorists, journalists, and a myriad of other actors on the other hand. Consequently, this information power struggle denies the responsible government agencies and other rescue and recovery agencies the media and audience attention that they would need to counter and mitigate the ensuing crisis with grave consequences for target communities.

Indeed, relevant authorities in most jurisdictions have often been accused of failing to respond to the rapid information demands set by the media and other stakeholders in the face of terror attacks. Thus, the authorities lose their position as the first source of information on terrorism threat levels and associated risks(Falkheimer, 2014). Additionally, the short response time that most terror attacks occasion, coupled with a large number of agents involved, impedes coordination and cooperation between and among actors in the various response networks (Ruggiero & Vos, 2013; Wood et al., 2012; Ropeik, 2005). This scenario yields poorly understood communication goals, haphazard division of communication responsibilities, poorly developed messages and a lack of clarity on the best channels of communication to be used, hence constricting and constraining the fulfillment of effective risk communication, both internally and externally(Reynolds & Seeger, 2014).

Against this backdrop, Strategic terrorism emergency and risk communication is seen as capable of resolving the negative implications of the competition for control of communications between terror groups, the media, and those charged with steering terrorism risk communication (Alex, 2004; Falkheimer, 2014; Veil & Ojeda, 2010). Evidently, as Thorne (2010) posits, countering terror attacks calls for proactive risk and emergency communication strategies.

Statement of the Problem

Communication is essential to preventing terrorists from achieving their objectives. Effective communication can reduce terrorists' chances of mounting successful operations, creating threats that disrupt everyday life, and undermining the legitimacy of the societies that they attack (Fischhoff, 2013). However, Effective emergency risk communication has implications for disaster preparedness among the general population and first responders (Shreve et al., 2014). This relationship between communication, risk perception, and risk preparedness becomes even more profound in the case of terror attacks, given their nature as low probability, high impact events (Ruggiero & Vos, 2013). Accordingly, the question of how governments should communicate terrorism risk to their publics with a view to preparing them for possible attacks becomes critical.

Further, the reflexive nature of overt terrorism intelligence communications complicates this dilemma. Overt warnings on imminent terrorism activities serves to alert the insurgents that they are being watched. This may lead to the insurgents delaying their mission or changing their plans and targets altogether. In addition, overt terrorism threat announcements may generate panic among target audience. On the other hand, implicit or imprecise communication on imminent attacks generates apathy, poor risk perception, and resultantly inadequate preparedness and despondency with grave implications for at risk populations. Poor preparedness among populations facing recurrent terror threats, in turn, breeds loathe, against those charged with communicating terrorism risk and threat levels (Ropeik, 2005 Ruggiero & Vos, 2013; Wood et al., 2012). Additionally, ill-preparedness results in high rates of morbidity and mortality whenever terror attacks are executed.

Objectives of the Study

To establish the association of communication strategies and terrorism risk preparedness among the residents of Nairobi City County

Justification of the Study

The principal inquiry underpinning this study is how terrorism crisis and emergency risk communication influences terrorism risk perception and hence terrorism preparedness among urban populations in Kenya. The study sought to demonstrate that most of the comprehensive crisis communication frameworks applicable to reactive crisis management initiatives may not necessarily be suitable in communicating the more unique threats and risks presented by terror attacks. The study will also provide a greater understanding of the centrality of strategic risk communication skills acquisition for practitioners of the relevant disciplines, policy makers, leaders and first responders charged with terrorism crises operations and terrorism risk communication.

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

Empirical Review

Terror threats present complex crisis situations. Accordingly, communication scholars agree on the need for strategic communication competencies away from traditional linear crisis communication approaches in preparing the public to counter terrorism threats (Crelinsten, 2002; Carr, 2012; Bakker & Graaf, 2014). These competences or communication strategies include: strategic crisis communication planning, public education and awareness campaigns as well as developing and implementing appropriate public alert and warning systems(Brown et al., 2016; Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2002; Crelinsten, 2002; Reynolds & Seeger, 2005; Wood et al., 2012). Other competences include, alliance and consensus building among first responder agencies, stakeholders and the general publics; isomorphic learning and emergency action drills, (Bennett, 2000; Buchanan, 2011; Eileen & Thorne, 2010; Flournoy, 2011; Gentle & Mount, 2008; Connors 2009; Herbane, 2014; Paul, 1998) Indeed these strategies are at the heart of international best practice in emergency risk and crisis communication (Carr , 2012).

Strategic crisis communication planning and execution entails approaching communication from a scientific perspective to ensure that the messages get to the right people most efficiently (Reynolds, 2002; UK Resilience, 2005;). Conceivably the most comprehensive model on strategic communication was proposed by Grunig and Repper in 1992. According to Grunig and Repper quoted in (Kim, 2011), the organization needs to understand who its stakeholders are, and engage in continuous research at the formative stage of the communication programme. This is central to the identification of the various stakeholders, publics and audiences and most importantly in establishing their concerns, needs, attitudes and risk perceptions. Additionally, it helps in determining knowledge gaps and in predicting how different publics are likely to react to risk and crisis messages (Darrell, 2003). Indeed, according to Grunig (1992) a strategic communication programme without a research component is not only likely to be flawed but is hardly fruitful.

Literature on the centrality of strategic terrorism risk communication documents the perils of ineffective risk communication for communities facing constant terror threats. These include uncertain and incomplete intelligence on impending terror threats, deficient and unsatisfactory appeals for vigilance as well as poor risk perception and ill preparedness in the event of an actual terror attack (Connors, 2009; Baruch Fischhoff, 2011; Holmes, 2006; Aradau & Van Munster, 2012; Freedman, 2005). Governments that fail to warn their citizens when aware of imminent or possible terror threats will be accused of failing in their duty while those which warn regularly,

but without much happening, are accused of alarmism (Aradau & Van Munster, 2012). There is also the risk of letting in the terrorists on government intelligence and counter-measures. Against this backdrop theorist emphasize on strategically planning and executing terrorism threat and risk communication.

Another key communication strategy in major emergency risk communication is adopting a dialogical or participatory communication with stakeholders (Falkheimer & Heide, 2014 ; Pancic, 2010). This entails dialogue with publics and stakeholders to ensure a more inclusive and participatory processes in communicating terrorism risks. It ensures open flows of information between and among the lead response organization, other response agencies and the publics (Sweden, 2011). The publics are treated as partners and are continually and meaningfully engaged with, in relation to decisions that are likely to affect them (Sheppard, 2011 ; Frimark, Abelmann, Studies, & Zuloaga, 2011). The utilization of ongoing and meaningful dialogue with publics, provides the communication practitioner with greater possibilities of enhancing communication flows to key publics during a major emergency situation. Dialogic communication also improves levels of openness, transparency, trust and credibility. Other advantages of dialogical communication include building strong and resilient societies (Fahey, 2003); creating enhanced awareness and comprehension of hazard knowledge and desirable preparedness measures among publics, as well as reducing community outrage and resistance. Moreover, dialogue with the publics allows the communication professionals and the lead response organization to tap into community knowhow and intelligence hence enhancing their knowledge-base about the target communities' beliefs, attitudes, media consumption patterns and other demographics that may be critical to successful terrorism preparedness efforts (Cottrell,2005; Hocke & O'Brien, 2003).

Consequently, the dialogical approach to communication should be carefully considered by the communication practitioner prior to undertaking a strategic major emergency communication process (Sandman, 2005; Hughes and Henry, 2003). These views are supported by Lasker (2004) who avers that the public must be directly engaged in preparations for countering serious terrorism threats.

Nonetheless, it is important to note that involving the public in the management of risk issues has its drawbacks too, especially when the risks are related to terrorism. Fordham (1998) opines that involving 'non-experts' in decisions related to hazardous situations can result in confusion, cause needless delays and conflict. Rothstein (2006) argues that involving publics in important risk decision-making, 'often promises more than it can deliver. Connors (2009) calls on response organizations to always consider a cost-benefit analysis of the process, in terms of resources to be expended vis-à-vis the improvements to the communication process and the net benefits for stakeholders and publics.

The other strategy in terrorism risk and preparedness communication is the use of Public alerts and warning systems (PAWS). Such systems provide public safety officials with an effective way to alert and warn the public about imminent dangers or threats. According to Morge (2000) there are two different categories of major emergency public warnings that can be used. 'Specific warnings', referring to obvious threats and 'General warnings', which relate to broader threats such as the probable risk of a terrorist attack. Morge (2000) adds that the issuing of public warnings 'at the right time and to the right target group …can be a matter of life or death'. NSTC (2000) concurs and highlights how effective warnings allow people to 'take actions that can save lives, minimize

damage, reduce human suffering and support speedy recovery'. Additionally, researchers emphasize the need for such warnings to reach all those who need to be warned in a timely fashion.

However, the effectiveness of a major emergency warning depends, to an extent, on the levels of stakeholders' preparedness as well as individual and collective perceptions of affected communities regarding the hazard and how it is likely effects (Connors, 2009). Section 2.4.5 identifies the variables that are likely to influence people's risk perception. Nordlund (1994) notes that a warning should activate previously stored preparedness information in the mind of the individual citizen besides conforming to existing major emergency communication planning. It should also describe the threat in terms of when it is expected to happen and outline what people should do to counter the threat or reduce its effects.

Moreover, Public alert and warning alarm systems do not exist without inherent difficulties. For instance, alert systems are useful to an affected community only if they are timely(Aguirre, 2004; Connors, 2009; Ucelli, 2002). Late alarms and alerts can create significant problems especially in situations where publics are used to and rely on them.(Connors, 2009). The reflexive nature of terrorism communication complicates the matter further, where a warning to the public may alert the terrorist that their cover has been blown. This way, the terrorists may revise their modus operandi, change the target or defer the attack all together(Freedman, 2005). Also, constant alarms without actual attack happening may create public apathy.

Additionally, warning systems are only effective if the public understand their meaning and know how to react accordingly(Connors, 2009). Consequently, public official charged with warning the public need to make communication decisions employing a broad-based system of dialogue, using both 'expert' and 'non-expert' knowledge, in order to determine the most effective warning alarm system that should be employed(Agee, 2009; Eriksson, 2018; Harrison & Pullman, 2005; Seeger, 2006; Sheppard et al., 2012; Swart, 2010). Thorough research and evaluation is critical in determine how particular alarm systems can be improved and how people are likely to behave once an alarm is disseminated(Connors, 2009).

Research Gaps

Despite repeated terror attacks within the country and against Kenyan military camps in Somalia, terrorism crisis and emergency risk communication in Kenya has been limited and far from satisfactory (Eboi, 2015). Few studies have been conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of Communication Strategies and Terrorism Risk Preparedness among the Residents of Nairobi City County. Majority of available literature on terrorism in Kenya focuses on other aspects of the subject such as counter terrorism and human rights abuse, the role of Kenya in the global war on terror, the media and terrorism coverage as well as emergency services and training (Kingdom, & Cup, 2012; Mogire & Agade, 2011; Abraham, 2014). Further studies from the Developed North, though numerous, may be far removed from the Kenyan scenario and other developing nations realities including the north-south social-economic and demographic variances. Such studies though numerous may not be aptly generalized for the Kenyan situation. Against this backdrop, this study aims to evaluate influence of communication strategies on terrorism risk perception and preparedness for urban populations in Kenya

Theoretical Framework

The theory that informed this study was Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication (CERC) Model. Developed by the US Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) after 9/11, the

Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication (CERC) model is an integrative risk communication paradigm combining image and reputation research with persuasion and strategic messaging research (Sheppard et al., 2012). The model amalgamates risk communication, issues management, crisis communication, and disaster communication best practices, incorporated from theory and practical applications (Seeger, 2006; CDC, 2014; Vos & Lund, 2011; Shari & Rebekah, 2013). The model has been adopted by the American Red Cross and other emergency response organization in the USA (CDC, 2014).

As a merger of traditional notions of health and risk communication (Reynolds & W Seeger, 2005), the model presents the first theoretical efforts made to combine the previously independent notions of risk communication and crisis communication into a practice described as crisis and emergency risk communication (Reynolds, 2002). The proponents of the model argue that health risk communication in an era of bioterrorism and other emerging global threats, must be strategic, broad based, responsive, and highly contingent (Reynolds, 2002; Reynolds & Seeger, 2005). The Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication (CERC) model repositions communication as a central element throughout the entire risk and crisis communication process. It emphasizes the importance of ongoing, two-way risk communication as necessary for the public, agencies, and stakeholders to understand uncertain situations and make decisions about managing and mitigating threats. CERC proponents aver that communication plays a significant role in fostering self-efficacy in emergency risk and crisis communication and management. Messages that convey actionable, step by step guidelines on how to, prevent harm to self and others y can contribute to risk reduction, crisis preparedness, community organization, and learning. They argue for crisis risk communication messages that seek to motivate self-efficacy (belief in one's ability to handle a situation) and sense-making (the process of interpreting and understanding information). Further, they note that in emergency risk and crisis communication, there is no one size fits all solutions and call for case by case analysis of each situation. They also acknowledge that the communication processes will change as a risk evolves into a crisis and as a crisis transitions to the post-crisis and recovery phases. Thus suggesting that different crisis stages and conditions will impact communication processes differently. Importantly CERC theorists underscore the interdependence between risk and crisis communication arguing that pre-crisis risk messages can influence post-crisis perceptions, expectations, and behaviors, and that crisis responses can shape subsequent risk messages. The model also emphasizes the importance of understanding how communication constraints and influences shape subsequent communication processes, thereby insisting on the importance of communication processes monitoring and stakeholder feedback as critical lessons for future similar endeavors.

CERC also acknowledges that risks and crises affect diverse groups of people with varying needs, interests, and resources differently. This aspect of audience diversity is a recurring theme in the CERC model and other communication models. This calls on communicators ensure emergency risk and crisis communications are tailored for the audience needs and concerns. For instance, health communication studies have shown uneven distribution of risks among different populations, with the most vulnerable often having limited access to vital information, communication technologies, healthcare, and social services. Understanding these variables within the crisis context is seen as a critical in ensuring that messages produce the desired results.

The model embraces the process view of a crisis. It argues that a crisis begins with pre-event stages of risk and risk development. It then progresses through the eruption of some triggering event to

full blown crisis stages and finally into post-mortem and clean up phases (Coombs, 1995; Seeger et al., 1998; Sheppard & Janoske, 2012) The model therefore proposes five stages in the evolution of a major emergency or other such crisis events upon which communicators should plan their communication activities (Reynolds & W Seeger, 2005). The stages include the pre-crisis, initial-event, maintenance, resolution, and evaluation. For each stage, the model provides a broad set of strategies and suggestions for communication. CERC further makes propositions for the most exigent publics at each stage and the types of messages that should be directed to those groups(Seeger, 2006). Table 2.1 below highlights the five stages each with its strategies, messages and the target audience(CDC, 2014).

In this study, the model serves as an assessment tool for crisis and emergency risk communication practices during terror attacks in Kenya. The model also provides theoretical insights into the characterization of terrorism emergencies across the evolution stages. It guides in the mapping out of international best practices in crisis and emergency risk communication to these phases (Seeger, 2006; CDC, 2014; Vos & Lund, 2011; Shari and Rebekah, 2013).

Conceptual Framework

Conceptual framework was outlined below.



Figure 1: Conceptual Framework

3.0 MATERIALS AND METHODS

Research Design

The study followed a mixed methods design. First, a detailed documents review of official literature, including strategy documents, research reports, guidance materials as well as any strategy and policy documents from Kenya was compared with those from countries embracing best practices in crisis and emergency risk communication was conducted. Secondly, a content analysis prior to, during and after three significant terrorist attacks was analyzed. The three case studies include the Westgate siege, the Mpeketoni/Witu massacre, and the Garissa University College terror attack. This study comprised elements of both exploratory and descriptive enquiry.

Target Population

The Survey were carried out in the Nairobi County targeting residents and non-residents in the university campuses, bus termini and shopping malls and relevant government agencies charged with counter terrorism operations. Whereas these are not fully representative of the entire Nairobi County population, the selection may be justified on the grounds that terrorist are proven to mostly target densely populated urban facilities and locations (Savitch, 2005). Selection of Nairobi is further premised on the fact that, Nairobi City County together with Mandera, Garissa and Lamu Counties has borne the brunt of the terrorism menace (GTD, 2015).

Sampling Frame

The sampling frame for the survey comprised lists of shopping malls, public markets, universities and bus termini obtained from the Nairobi City County and the list of universities obtained from the commission for university Education (CUE). The selection of universities campuses, shopping malls. Public markets and bus termini as the focal points of the survey data collection is premised on the fact that these types of establishments have been proved by research to form the bulk of soft targets for terror attacks globally (GTD, 2015). The Key Informant interviews sampling frame comprised the spokespersons for the security firms, the bus termini, shopping malls, university campuses in the city as well as communication officers working for the various state agencies directly involved in counter terrorism operations in the country.

Sample and Sampling Technique

The survey employed multistage stratified purposeful random sampling. The quantitative sample size for the study were determined using the formula for large populations as proposed by Cochran (1977). According to the formula any population of more than ten thousand (10,000) people is considered infinite, and the sample size is calculated thus**:**

$n = [(Z/2.\ \delta) / (E)]\ 2$

Where, **n** is the sample size, **E** is the margin of error, **Z** is the critical value from the **Z** distribution, **δ** is the population standard deviation. This formula is collaborated by Fischer et al (1991):

$n = Z2.\ p.\ q/d2$

where, **n** = sample size, **z** = the value at the chosen confidence interval (1.96 for a confidence interval of 95%), **p** = estimated population with attributes of interest which if infinite p = 0.5, q = 1-p, and d = degree of desired precision in this case 0.05.

Table 1: Sample Size

Population	Margin of Error			Confidence Level		
	10%	5%	1%	90%	95%	99%
100	50	80	99	74	80	88
500	81	218	476	176	218	286
1,000	88	278	906	215	278	400
10,000	96	370	4,900	264	370	623
100,000	96	383	8,763	270	383	660
1,000,000+	97	384	9,513	271	384	664

Using either of the formulae the required sample size comprised of 384 respondents drawn from the four strata. However to cater for non-response rate (NRR) various theorists argue in favour of over sampling (Hashim, 2010) and Bartlett, et al., (2001) suggest the use of response rates for previous similar studies in determining the final sample $\mathbf{n_2}$ with the formula given as:

$$n_2 = \frac{\text{Minimum Sample Size}}{\text{Anticipated Return Rate}}$$

Where $\mathbf{n_2}$ = sample size adjusted for response rate, minimum sample size = 384, anticipated return rate = 60%. The anticipated response rate is usually derived from responses rates from previous studies of the same or a similar population (Bartlett, et al., 2001). In this case the 60% is based on the recommended threshold for survey quality in social sciences by Johnson and Wislar (2012). Therefore, the sample size adjusted for the anticipated response rate in this study was:

$n_2 = 384/.60 = 640.$

The 640 respondents were randomly selected drawn from four different strata. The sampling fraction method shown below was employed to determine the proportionate number of random respondents from each strata. The four strata include 17 main university campuses (CUE, 2016) 34 officially designated bus termini; 11 approved public markets in the and 25 approved shopping malls (NCCG, 2016). Details of each stratum are shown in appendices III, IV and V respectively. The sample size and the proportion of respondents for each stratum, are shown in table 2 below.

Where N is the universe population (total number of units in the strata), **n** is the number of items in each stratum) and **k** is the fraction of units that must be selected from each stratum.

Table 2: Proportionate Samples Sizes for Each Stratum

Stratum	Population (n)	Sample Fraction	Sample Size	PNR
Universities	17	19.54022989	3.32183908	125.0575
Shopping Malls	25	28.73563218	7.183908046	183.908
Public Markets	11	12.64367816	1.390804598	80.91954
Bus Termini	34	39.08045977	13.28735632	250.1149
Total Units (N)	**87**		**25**	**640**

From table 2 above, the survey sample included 3 universities,7 shopping malls and 13 bus termini. The proportionate number of respondents as determined using the fraction method will include 141 from the 4 universities 207 from the 8 shopping malls and 281 from the 15 bus termini respectively.

Total of nine key informant interviews were carried out. 4 of these were selected from the above four, with each strata providing one interviewee based on their willingness to participate. These involved people individuals in management either as security or communications officers, the other five interviewees will be drawn from the first responder including the Ministry of Interior and Coordination, The National Communication Secretariat, The Kenya Police Service, the National Disaster Operations Centre (NDOC) the National Transport Safety Agency (NTSA) and the Kenya Red Cross. These agencies are the key statutory organs charged with public security and are therefore the custodians of the various security policies and strategies.

Data Collection Instruments

This mixed methods approach necessitates the use of multiple sources of data and therefore multiple data collection instruments. This also supported triangulation in data collection hence enhance the validity and reliability of the research findings. The instruments included: interview guides for the key informant Interviews, an observation strobe and a self-administered questionnaire for the survey.

Data Analysis and Presentation

The analysis of data in any research involves summarizing the mass of data that has been collected and then presenting the results in a way that communicates the most important findings or features in line with study objectives. For this study data were first be coded and entered into the computer using the statistical Package for social Scientist (SPSS) it was then analyzed using both descriptive and inferential statistics. Descriptive statistics were used to establish frequency distribution of variables. Descriptive statistics were also enabling the researcher to summarize and organize data in an effective and meaningful way and reducing information to an understandable form (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996; Wimmer & Dominick, 2011). The data was then subjected to inferential statistics to determine the differences between variables and significance of the results and the probability that they did not occur by chance.

The relationship between the dependent variable (risk perception and preparedness) with the independent variables (communication attributes) were determined using correlations and regression. The qualitative data produced from content analysis, observation and key informant interviews was transcribed and coded into common themes. The themes were then be interpreted and explained using a narrative report enriched with quotations from key informants and reviewed documents. The outcomes were triangulated with the outcomes of the quantitative analysis with a view to capturing convergence or differences in the hypotheses (Creswell, 2009) and to enhance the reliability and validity of the results.

4.0 FINDINGS

Descriptive Content Analyses and Key Informant Interviews Results on Terrorism Risk Communication Strategies

Content was analyzed to determine whether terrorism risk communication utilized the recommended strategies including, Proactive and participatory messaging, Centralized Communication Command, Awareness Campaigns, public warning & Alerts systems, and isomorphic learning. The analysis revealed marked differences between the handling of the Westgate attack on 21 September 2013 and DusitD2 attack on -----2019.

In the Westgate attack, the analysis revealed serious shortcomings in the way government agencies handled communication about the event. For the first half hour since the initial gunshots, there was no official communication from authorities. About an hour into the attack, the Ministry of Interior and National Coordination tweeted through their handle account (@InterirKE) indicating that there was a robbery attack and that the National Police Service was in pursuit of the thugs. Soon afterward the ministry in another tweet indicated that the attack was a hostage situation. These assertions by the ministry were immediately refuted by journalists who were gathered around the mall and who indicated that whatever was happening in the Mall was much more than a robbery. In return, the presidential Strategic Communications Unit in a quick rejoinder through their Twitter

handle (@PSCU_Digital) reprimanded the media warning them to only "tweet what you are absolutely sure about…". Another reprimand from the Director National Disaster Operations Centre forced a leading local radio station Capital FM to bring down a story in which the media house had alluded to a terror attack at the Mall.

The content analyzed reveals conflicting reports regarding the number and identity of the attackers; the details of militants killed or taken into custody; details of hostages taken and even details of those killed and injured in the attack. For instance, eyewitness accounts through local and international media reported the presence of a woman leading the militants. These accounts were acknowledged by President Kenyatta in his press conference suggesting that:

"Intelligence reports had suggested that a British woman and two or three American citizens may have been involved". (@PSCU-Digital)

The President's assertions were reinforced by the then-Foreign Minister Ambassador Amina Mohamed in an interview with the US Pubic Services Broadcaster (PBS) and reported in the Guardian newspaper. The Foreign Minister suggested that two or three Americans and a British woman, whom the media interpreted to be, Lewthwaite were involved. These accounts are contradicted by military spokesperson Major Emmanuel Chirchir, who maintained in his official and personal Twitter handles @MajorEChirchir and @KDFInfo that the militants were four men led by Abu Baara al-Sudani.

Another inconsistency was about a fire that caused thick plumes of black smoke from the building. Initially, authorities claimed it was a tactic by security forces to distract the militants, but later blamed it on the attackers burning mattresses inside the supermarket. But the most glaring contradiction was on whether or not, there was prior intelligence on the attack. Messaging from Kenyan authorities indicated that there was no prior intelligence. On the other hand, *the Star* a local newspaper, the British Sunday newspaper *The Observer* and the *British Broadcasting Corporation* reported that foreign missions in Kenya, in particular Israel, had shared intelligence with Kenyan authorities from as early as January of the same year with details of confirmed targets including the Westgate Mall. The Governor of Nairobi on his Twitter handle also indicated being privy to the intelligence.

The insurgents took advantage of these lapses in communication and seized control of the messaging. They contradicted and made a mockery of the government messaging albeit temporarily through their Twitter handles @HSM-PR. Indeed, it was through the insurgents tweeting that the media and the public grasped the gravity of what was happening at the Mall. The insurgent's first tweet was to claim responsibility for the carnage:

"The Mujahideen entered Westgate mall today at around noon…fighting the Kenyan kuffar inside their own turf" (~@HSM_PR)

This tweet was soon followed by numerous other tweets in which the insurgents took advantage of the communication vacuum to spread their propaganda and issue threats to the government of Kenya and the citizens as seen in screenshot in Figure 2 below.



Figure 2: Twitter (now X) Screenshot, Showing the Insurgent's Activities during the Westgate Attack (Fassrainer, 2020)

These views were collaborated during the Key informant interviews, with most of the interviewees decreeing the poor performance of the government authorities in communicating about the Westgate attack but noted marked improvements during the DusitD2 attacks. One of the interviewees noted:

Government bungled the communications throughout the Westgate, they competed with each other to disseminate unsubstantiated information often contradicting each other.

On the DusitD2 attack the interviewee averred:

The leaner communication and coordinated structure adopted during DusitD2 attack was at least reassuring. The Coordination did not only help assuage the public anxiety but also made media coverage of the attack much easier.

Centralized Communication Command

The analysis also revealed poor coordination and a lack of central command and control in the communication activities. For instance, a report by *the Guardian* indicates that the authorities had not yet established a clear command and control structure four hours from the time the siege started leading to the exchange of friendly fire that claimed the death of one of the responding security men:

With no radio communications between army and police units, KDF soldiers opened fire on what they thought was an armed suspect – but who was in fact one of the commanders of the recce group. (*The Guardian*)

This lack of control and command was also reported in a review of the Westgate attack handling by the BBC. The analysis quoted a military officer involved in the operation, who spoke on condition of anonymity:

"We entered the mall blindly with no guide, with no concept of anything. Command and control was not there," he said. "The police felt they were undermined. The military thought the police didn't want to give them enough information so everything went wrong." (*The BBC)*

The lack of command and control is also discernible from the simultaneous, disjointed and often conflicting information dissemination by multiple agencies with no apparent leadership or designated spokesperson(s)during the Westgate siege. The analysis identified at least six key official government agencies that were actively involved in active communications across twelve Twitter handles during the Westgate attack. The six, summarized in the matrix in figure 3, included the Minster of Interior and National Coordination, Joseph Ole Lenku, The Inspector General of police David Kimaiyo, The Military Spokesperson Major E. Chirchir, The Secretary to the Cabinet, Francis Kimemia, the head of the Presidential Strategic Communications Unit (PSCU) and the director of the National Disaster Operations Centre (NDOC), Isaac Ochieng. The President, the Chief of Defense Forces, the Deputy President, and the Governor of Nairobi also directly addressed the public and the Media at different times during the attack. There was also Additional messaging during the attack from two non-government first responders namely the Kenya Red Cross, and St, John Ambulance.



Figure3: A Matrix of Government Communications During the Westgate Attack

Source: Author

The apparent lack of leadership in communication coordination among the agencies resulted in the dissemination of inaccurate messages, conflicting reports, and delays in providing accurate information. This led to confusion and panic among the public. The contradicting and often inaccurate messages also pointed to the lack of a specialized trained communication team working behind the scenes to anticipate public information needs and address them proactively. This left the media and the public in the dark as to what was exactly unfolding at the mall which created room for rumors and speculation.

In contrast, during the DusitD2 attack, the Communication efforts by Kenyan authorities were proactive and well-coordinated. There were only three sources of information on the event, compared to six in the Westgate attack: The sources included the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government, Inspector General of Police, and the Presidency as seen on Figure 4. All messaging was coordinated by the National Security Advisory Committee from a strategic operation room and channeled through the official Twitter account of the National Police Service @NPSOfficial_KE. And through periodic press briefings. Messaging was kept short and consistent with targeted content focused on promoting resilience among the public and empathizing with those affected. The messages also provided instructions to those in need, on where to find help and those with helpful information on where to report. The Minister for Interior Fred Matiangi and Inspector General of Police Boinnet became the faces of the crisis with the President only appearing towards the tail end of the siege to address the Nation and provide assurance that the situation was under control.

The Key informant interviewees agreed with this analysis. One interviewee observed:

Compared to the Westgate terrorist attack, DusitD2 handling presented evidence of end –to- end coordination by the multi-agency security team deployed to respond to the attack. The operation was well coordinated and precise. Westgate was a disaster, there was discernable sibling rivalry between the securities regiments involved and there was no evidence of central command.(KI1)



Figure 4: A Matrix of Government Communications During the DusitD2 Attack

Source: Author

By disseminating accurate information and utilizing credible and consistent voices, authorities were able to increase the resonance and impact of the messaging and reassure the public. Effective counterterrorism messaging strategies were also crucial in debunking misinformation and discrediting extremist messages. The analyses further identified a campaign dubbed *Kaa Chonjo Usinyamaze* ("Be alert, don't keep quiet"). The public awareness initiative was launched under the Ministry of Interior and National Coordination led by the National Police Service in partnership with media corporations in the country and partly financed by the US government. It was aimed at combating terrorism threats. Besides creating awareness through short audio and video clips aired on radio, television stations, and online platforms, the campaign was also used to communicate terror alerts /warnings and enlist the participation of the public in identifying and reporting terror suspects and suspicious Behaviour. In particular, the analyses revealed extensive use of posters to circulate images and details of suspected terror suspects and to offer bounties to anyone who would provide information to aid in the arrest of such suspects. There was also the use of press releases to communicate both general and specific threats and to urge members of the public to remain vigilant and adopt necessary precautions. The video clips were used to simulate terror activities and to educate the public on how to detect, and report such activities. The use of public alerts and warnings is supported by Morge (2000), who notes that two different categories of major emergency public warnings can be used. 'Specific warnings', referring to obvious threats, and 'General warnings', relating to broader threats such as the probable risk of a terrorist attack. Similarly, the use of public awareness campaigns is supported by Bouder (2013) who advocates for the use of PACs to raise awareness about emergent issues or phenomena and to induce desired positive behavioural change at the level of the individual, organization, community, or society.

Figure 5: A Collage of Kaa Chonjo! Usinyamaze Counter-Terrorism Campaign Materials

On Alliance Building. Partnerships and Participatory messaging strategy, the analysis revealed clear distinctions between the two events. During the Westgate attack, the analyses revealed a lack of partnership and alliance-building before, during, and after the Siege. This was evident in the conflicting messages among the local media, international media, Government authorities, and even foreign missions on the nature of the attack, the number of casualties, and whether or not

there was prior intelligence before the attack. While, Foreign Missions, especially those of the US and UK had issued travel advisories to their citizens, Government officials including the Presidency insisted that the country was safe and decried the negative impact of such travel advisories on the economy.

Further Upon the Westgate attack, government officials insisted that there was no prior intelligence about the attack. However, the Governor of Nairobi and two international media stations *Aljazeera* and *the BBC* reported that there was prior intelligence on the attack. Conversely, a lot changed between Westgate and the DusitD2 attack. The response to the DusitD2 attack exhibited collaboration and coordination between the authorities, security agencies, the Media and other first responders including the Kenya Red Cross. The citizens were invited to provide any useful information through dedicated hotlines and Toll-Free numbers. A key informant interviewee working for the ministry of Interior and Coordination of National government affirmed the need for alliance building and partnership for effective counter- terrorism:

Kenya has adopted the "all of government" and "all of society" approach to preventing and countering terrorism… this will assist us to better detect early signs of radicalization and thwart terrorist plots by strengthening community policing, involving women and youth in peace and security and creating community awareness. The country has also stepped up regional and international cooperation as this is also critical for our security. We are working with among others, the Governments of the UK and USA, the United Nations Office of Counter Terrorism (OCT) and the UN-Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED). (KI7)

Essentially the marked difference in communications responses to the Westgate and DusitD2 attacks is indicative of isomorphic learning on the part of the Government authorities and those charged with communicating about terrorism in the country. For instance, during the Westgate attack communication from the government was fragmented and lacked transparency, leading to conflicting information. This drastically improved during DusitD2 where the government took a more transparent approach, providing timely and accurate updates to the public. On Coordination the Westgate attack communication activities were disjointed, with various government agencies and officials providing contradictory information while in the DusitD2 government demonstrated better coordination, with a designated spokesperson delivering consistent and coherent messaging. Additionally, government responses on Westgate were delayed, leaving the public and media frustrated with the lack of information. Conversely government issued regular updates and worked closely with the media, ensuring a timelier flow of information during the dusitD2 attack. There was also a lack of empathy and victim Support after Westgate as opposed to after DusitD2 government's communications that showed more concern for the victims and their families, with a greater emphasis on providing support and

Overall, the Kenyan government's communication strategies evolved from a disjointed and opaque approach during the Westgate attack to a more transparent, coordinated, and victim-centric approach during the DusitD2 attack, demonstrating the government's efforts to improve its crisis communication capabilities. This resulted in consistent and coordinated messaging, the deployment of a leaner communication structure and the cooperation between government agencies and the media during the DusitD2 attack. This signals that government communication personnel adopted lessons learned since the attack in Westgate

Survey Descriptive Results

This section contains descriptive analysis for communication strategies. A Likert scale with options of strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree and strongly agree were presented for answering by respondents. The results were presented in form of percentages, mean and standard deviations.

Table 3: Communication Strategies on Terrorism Risk Preparedness among the Residents of Nairobi City County

Statement	SD	D	N	S	SA	Mean	Std. Dev
The choice of communication strategies influences message perception and in turn terrorism risk preparedness	16.70%	9.40%	25.20%	26.30%	22.40%	3.28	1.36
Our organisation engages in communication research and planning for effective terrorism risk preparedness messaging	15.80%	10.70%	21.60%	37.00%	15.00%	3.25	1.28
We receive threat alerts and warning on possible terror attacks and this motivates preparedness actions	14.10%	5.10%	35.90%	28.00%	16.90%	3.28	1.22
Inclusive and participatory processes in communicating terrorism risks among our organisation, government agencies and other stakeholders motivates terrorism risk preparedness planning and action taking	15.60%	13.00%	20.30%	29.50%	21.60%	3.28	1.35
Effective Public alerts and warning systems (PAWS) would motivate my organization to be prepared in case of a terrorist attack	14.30%	16.90%	30.10%	23.50%	15.20%	3.08	1.26
My organisation gathers stakeholder/ publics' feedback to improve our crisis and emergency risk Communication system	15.60%	11.50%	20.10%	32.30%	20.50%	3.31	1.34
I deliberately seek information to confirm any threats of an impending terrorism attack	10.50%	16.90%	13.20%	48.30%	11.10%	3.33	1.19
I deliberately seek information to validate any terrorism attack threats	4.90%	10.90%	34.60%	36.80%	12.80%	3.42	1.01
Average						**3.28**	**1.25**

Where strongly disagree (SD), disagree (D), neutral (N), agree CA) and strongly agree (SA)

The results revealed that majority of the respondents who were 48.7% agreed with the statement that the choice of communication strategies influences message perception and in turn terrorism risk preparedness. 52.0% agreed with the statement that their company engages in research and planning for effective terrorism risk preparedness communication, while 44.9% agreed that they received threat alerts on possible terror attacks and this motivates preparedness actions. The results also revealed that 51.1% acknowledge the that inclusive and participatory processes in communicating terrorism risks would motivate preparedness in case of terrorism attack.

In addition, 38.7% agreed with the statement that Effective Public alerts and warning systems (PAWS) motivates their organization to be prepared for terrorism attacks while 52.8% confirmed

that their organization gathers stakeholder and publics' feedback to improve their crisis and emergency risk Communication system. 59.4% acknowledged deliberately seeking information to confirm any threats of an impending terrorism attack. Similarly, 49.6% agreed that they deliberately seek information to validate any terrorism attack threats. These findings agreed with that of Sandman (2005); Hughes and Henry (2003) who argued that the utilization of ongoing and meaningful dialogue with publics, provides the communication practitioner with greater possibilities of enhancing communication flows to key publics during a major emergency situation by improving levels of openness, transparency, trust and credibility.

The respondents were asked to state whether there are dialogues on terrorism risk that are held by publics and stakeholders in their organisation/company. The results revealed that majority of the stated that there are dialogues on terrorism risk that are held by publics and stakeholders in their organisation/company while only a few who stated that there are no dialogues on terrorism risk that are held by publics and stakeholders in their organisation/company.

The respondents were further asked to state whether they believed that the country had a counter-terrorism communication strategy. Majority of the respondents stated that the country has no counter-terrorism communication strategy. These findings agree with that of Eboi (2015) who noted that the government has not invested in communication strategies that could be harnessed to deter Al-Shabaab insurgents from carrying out their evil intentions. The study continues to lament the lack of formal communication campaigns towards terrorism awareness, detection and prevention as is the practice elsewhere

The respondents were further asked to state the methods they communicate terrorism risk and counter terrorism information to the community. Majority of the respondents stated that they use mobile phones where they make a call to all relevant authority. Other respondents stated that they use the media.

The respondents were further asked to state whether there have ever engaged in conversations on terrorism risks and the need to adopt and preparedness behavior by employees and other stakeholders in their organization/company. The results revealed that majority of the respondents at 51.1% confirmed having engaged in such conversations at their work place while 48.9% stated that there have never engaged in such conversations.

Table 4: Conversations on Workplace Terrorism Risk Preparedness

	Frequency	Percent
No	229	48.9
Yes	239	51.1
Total	**468**	**100**

A Likert scale with options of strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree and strongly agree were presented for answering by respondents. The results were presented in form of percentages, mean and standard deviations.

Factor Analysis for Communication Strategies

Table 5: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Communication strategies

KMO and Bartlett's Test		
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		0.819
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	674.058
	Df	28
	Sig.	0.000

The value of the KMO measure of sampling adequacy for communication strategies was 0.819 as indicated in table 5 above, which would be labeled as 'meritorious'. The significance of the KMO coefficient was evaluated using a chi square test and a critical probability value (p value) of 0.05. A chi square coefficient of 674.058 and a p value of 0.000 imply that the coefficient is significant. This implies that there was a significant correlation between the statements measuring communication attributes and terrorism risk perception

The next characteristic of interest was to evaluate how strong the eight statements measuring source attributes were in measurement of the predictor. As a result, the next factor analysis output generation for communication channels was Total Variance Explained (TVE) using the rotation sums of squared loadings values. Tables 6 represent the distribution of the variance after the varimax orthogonal rotation of the statements measuring the variable.

Table 6: Total Variance Explained for Communication Strategies

Component	**Initial Eigen values a**			**Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings**		
	Total	**% of Variance**	**Cumulative %**	**Total**	**% of Variance**	**Cumulative %**
1	8.448	66.935	66.935	5.595	44.328	44.328
2	1.584	12.549	79.484	4.437	35.156	79.484
3	0.983	7.789	87.273			
4	0.561	4.448	91.721			
5	0.396	3.138	94.859			
6	0.276	2.19	97.049			
7	0.23	1.822	98.87			
8	0.143	1.13	100			

Eigenvalues associated with each linear component were listed before extraction, after extraction and after rotation as shown in Table 6. Before extraction, SPSS had identified seven linear components within the data set. The eigenvalues associated with each factor represents the variance explained by that particular linear component and it is displayed in terms of percentage of variance explained. Further the results showed that there were two critical factor influencing terrorism risk preparedness which accumulated to 79.484% of the total variance in this construct.

In order to evaluate the construct of communication strategies, two components generated and the results of the varimax orthogonal rotation are presented in Table 7.

Table 7: Rotated Component Matrix for Communication Strategies

	Component 1	Component 2
The choice of communication strategies influences message perception and in turn terrorism risk preparedness	0.964	0.685
Our organisation engages in communication research and planning for effective terrorism risk preparedness messaging	0.256	1.138
We receive threat alerts and warning on possible terror attacks and this motivates preparedness actions	0.831	0.702
Inclusive and participatory processes in communicating terrorism risks among our organisation, government agencies and other stakeholders motivates terrorism risk preparedness planning and action taking	1.066	0.623
Effective Public alerts and warning systems (PAWS) would motivate my organization to be prepared in case of a terrorist attack	1.142	0.100
My organisation gathers stakeholder/ publics' feedback to improve our crisis and emergency risk Communication system	1.118	0.432
I deliberately seek information to confirm any threats of an impending terrorism attack	0.324	0.970
I deliberately seek information to validate any terrorism attack threats	0.336	0.809

The eight measures of communication strategies were subjected to factor analysis. All the statements of communication strategies had a factor loading of more than 0.4. The results further showed that statements on communication strategies can only be regrouped into two variables.

Correlation Results

Correlation was conducted between communication strategies and terrorism risk preparedness

Table 8: Correlation Results

		Risk preparedness	Communication strategies
Risk preparedness	Pearson Correlation	1.000	
	Sig. (2-tailed)		
Communication strategies	Pearson Correlation	.452**	1.000
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The results revealed that communication strategies have a significant association with terrorism risk preparedness among the residents of Nairobi City County (r = 0.452, p = 0.000). These findings agreed with that of Sandman (2005); Hughes and Henry (2003) who argued that the

utilization of ongoing and meaningful dialogue with publics, provides the communication practitioner with greater possibilities of enhancing communication flows to key publics during a major emergency situation by improving levels of openness, transparency, trust and credibility

Regression Results

Regression analysis was done to determine the relationship between communication strategies and terrorism risk preparedness among the residents of Nairobi City County. Results were presented below

Table 9: Model Fitness for Communication Strategies and Terrorism Risk Preparedness

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.452a	0.204	0.203	0.40649

Communication strategies were found to be satisfactory variable in explaining terrorism risk preparedness. This is supported by coefficient of determination, R square of 20.4%. This means that Communication strategies explain 20.4% of the variations in the dependent variable which is terrorism risk preparedness. This also implies that 79.6% of the variation in the dependent variable is attributed to other variables not captured in the model. These findings agreed with that of Sandman (2005); Hughes and Henry (2003) who argued that the utilization of ongoing and meaningful dialogue with publics, provides the communication practitioner with greater possibilities of enhancing communication flows to key publics during a major emergency situation by improving levels of openness, transparency, trust and credibility.

Table 10 provides the results on the analysis of the variance (ANOVA).

Table 10: Analysis of the Variance (ANOVA)

	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	19.774	1	19.774	119.672	0.000
Residual	76.999	466	0.165		
Total	96.773	467			

The results indicate that the overall model was statistically significant as supported by a p value of 0.000 which is lesser than the critical p value of 0.05. This was supported by an F statistic of 119.672which imply that communication strategies is a good predictor of terrorism risk preparedness. These findings agreed with that of Sandman (2005); Hughes and Henry (2003) who argued that the utilization of ongoing and meaningful dialogue with publics, provides the communication practitioner with greater possibilities of enhancing communication flows to key publics during a major emergency situation by improving levels of openness, transparency, trust and credibility.

Table 11: Regression of Coefficient for Communication Strategies and Terrorism Risk Preparedness

	B	Std. Error	T	Sig.
(Constant)	2.376	0.083	28.675	0
Communication strategies	0.268	0.025	10.939	0.000

Regression of coefficients showed that communication strategies and terrorism risk preparedness were positively and significantly related (β=0.268, p=0.000). These findings agreed with that of Sandman (2005); Hughes and Henry (2003) who argued that the utilization of ongoing and meaningful dialogue with publics, provides the communication practitioner with greater possibilities of enhancing communication flows to key publics during a major emergency situation by improving levels of openness, transparency, trust and credibility.

$Y = 2.376 + 0.268X_1 + e$

Where Y is Terrorism Risk Preparedness

X_1 is communication strategies

Hypothesis Results

The hypothesis stated that communication strategies do not significantly influence terrorism risk preparedness among the residents of Nairobi City County. The results revealed that F_{cal} (112.108)> $F_{critical}$ (3.94) and thus the null hypothesis was rejected. The results further indicated that the p (0.000) was less than 0.05. Therefore, the study concluded that communication strategies significantly influence terrorism risk preparedness among the residents of Nairobi City County. These findings agreed with that of Sandman (2005); Hughes and Henry (2003) who argued that the utilization of ongoing and meaningful dialogue with the publics, provides the communication practitioner with greater possibilities of enhancing communication flows to key publics during major emergencies by improving levels of openness, transparency, trust and credibility.

5.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

The choice of communication strategies employed in communicating terrorism risk will significantly influence the success of the communications. In particular crisis communication planning that incorporates stakeholder engagement, public awareness and education, rapid response and proactive information sharing, as well as isomorphic learning can significantly enhance terrorism risk preparedness. Stakeholder collaboration facilitates coordinated emergency protocols, while public engagement empowers citizens to be vigilant and responsive. Timely and transparent communication during a crisis maintains trust and enables coordinated action. Learning from past incidents and best practices helps organizations and communities anticipate vulnerabilities and develop more effective preparedness strategies. By strategically aligning these communication approaches, crisis communication planning can create a comprehensive and resilient framework to address the challenges posed by terrorist threats.

Analysis of the choice and use of terrorism risk communications in Kenya from the Westgate attack in 2013 through to the DusitD2 attack in 2019 indicates a progressive isomorphic learning curve. During the Westgate Mall attack communication activities by the authorities were widely criticized for lack of coordination, limited information sharing, and delayed response, undermining public trust. However, the country's approach evolved significantly by the time of the DusitD2 complex attack in 2019, demonstrating marked improvements. The authorities responded more rapidly, shared information proactively, and collaborated better with stakeholders, enabling a more cohesive and effective crisis communication strategy. Public engagement and trust also improved, as the government's communication efforts were perceived as more transparent and reassuring.

These advancements showcase Kenya's commitment to learning from past experiences and strengthening its crisis response capabilities, enhancing the country's overall terrorism risk preparedness and resilience.

Recommendations

The study recommends authorities charged with terrorism risk communications should focus on effective crisis communication planning to enhance coordination, collaboration, and information sharing before, during, and after terrorism incidences. This includes establishing clear communication protocols between various government agencies, security forces, and emergency responders, as well as conducting joint training and simulations to ensure seamless coordination during crises.

Equally important is the need to prioritize rapid response. Authorities should develop robust emergency communication systems to quickly disseminate accurate and timely information to the public and stakeholders. Additionally, they should implement comprehensive public awareness and education campaigns to inform citizens about potential threats and emergency procedures, while regularly engaging with the community to build trust and maintain open communication channels.

Lastly, authorities should institutionalize a culture of continuous learning and improvement. This involves conducting thorough post-incident reviews, identifying strengths and weaknesses, and facilitating the exchange of best practices and lessons learned with other organizations. By investing in technology, and infrastructure, and integrating crisis communication into a comprehensive preparedness strategy, Kenya can enhance its overall resilience against terrorist threats.

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