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GEO-STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF IDENTITY POLITICS AND ETHNIC SEPARATISM: A RE-EVALUATION OF NIGERIA'S GOOD NEIGHBOURLINESS POLITICAL FRAMEWORK IN THE FACE OF TERRORISM

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ABSTRACT

Identity politics plays a major role in the survival, peace and continued existence of independent African states. This cannot but exist in a situation where ethnic groups were factionalized between geographical delineations of colonialism. Nigeria lies between five francophone countries with geo strategic, identity and security implications. This ipso facto connotes the idea of a split of ethno religious groups originally bounded in historical empires but now exist within the borders of colonially separated states. In this wise, Nigeria's good neighbourliness becomes an important political framework of interest. International terrorism since the wake of the 11th September attack on America has metalized into local terrorism perpetrated by the Boko Haram group in the case of Nigeria. Boko Haram terrorism has been internationalized with linkages with Isis and has spread its tentacles beyond the shores of Nigeria into neighbouring states of Chad, Niger, and Cameroon (countries which since the colonial era harboured Hausa, Fulani, Kanuri (Kanouri or Yerwa or Bare/Bari) and other such Nigerian northern ethnic groups with Islamic affiliations still binding the divided units since the Fulani jihad of the 18th century). Since Independence, Nigeria has wittingly dwelt within a choking Franco phony politics of survival. She had maintained a policy of good neighbourliness that has cost her continued friendship with France and economic openness to assist the African neighbours a breathing air of survival. In the wake of the new politics of international terrorism and with the spread of terrorist activities beyond the Nigerian borders into neighbouring States, this policy (good neighbourliness) becomes an agenda for analytical consideration, primarily because, relations between pre-colonial ethnic groups continue with a natural push and pull factor that post-colonial states cannot ignore. This is the relevance of this research paper which considers terrorism and identity politics within Nigeria's security challenge as implicative on good neighbourliness. The paper argues that, terrorism, identity politics are negatively implicated on the security of Nigeria and its neighbours and that the political framework of good neighbourliness needs to be reviewed to take care of new arising challenges.

Keywords: *Terrorism, Identity Politics, Ethnic Separatism, Good Neighbourliness, Security Challenge, Nigeria.*

INTRODUCTION

Identity politics plays a major role in the survival, peace and continued existence of independent African states.¹ This is captivatingly interesting as ethnic groups factionalized between geographical delineations of colonialism continue in an intriguing push and pull of transnational relations consequent upon ethno religious identity connections. Nigeria lies between five francophone countries with geo strategic, identity and security implications. This ipso facto connotes the idea of a split of ethno religious groups, originally bounded in historical empires but now exist within the borders of colonially separated states. In this wise, Nigeria's good neighbourliness policy becomes an important political framework of interest continuously in need of academic interrogation. International terrorism since the wake of the 11th September attack on America has metalized into local terrorism perpetrated by the Boko Haram group in the case of Nigeria.

Terrorism has become a game of domestic and international politics with implications for peace, security, good governance and (with international dimensions as amongst others) good neighbourliness. The concept of good neighbourliness connotes socio-economic and diplomatic relations that promote mutual benefits. The *good Neighbour policy* was introduced into Nigerian foreign policy in the wake of diplomatic manoeuvres of the period of the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970).²

After the civil war, Nigeria has maintained this policy, as it anchored on several of its foreign policy agenda. Nigeria has been a beehive of intra and inter-ethnic cum religious wrangling that has become so intertwined with its politics that militarization became the game for settling scores. Northern ethno religious bigots transformed into arising militia which developed into a terrorist organization which has internationalized into an Isis supported structure that could not be tamed by the federal government. The spread of this insurgency into the contiguous border states; three of five francophone nations that are Nigeria's neighbours, has created a peculiar type of security challenge that requires the input of both local and international efforts in policing and management. This also has a large implication on the security of the state in congruence with that of its (Nigeria) neighbours. The origin of problematic ethno religious crisis in Nigeria is traced to historical colonialism and the lopsided unacceptance. This is further generated from intertwine of hatred implicated in religious and ethnic violence which has now manifested as terrorism. One cannot but acknowledge the effect of the complex nature of the society as a key factor in upraise of hate and violence in recent times.³ Religious differences and ethnic diversity has been tagged a major reason for such increase in conflicts which has made the country a dangerous zone for investors, tourist and international emissaries. For instance, the Australian government in September 12, 2007 issued a travel advisory warning to its citizens to reconsider any desire to travel to Nigeria, due to the increased threat of terrorist attack in some part of the country which include kidnapping, high risk of violence and civil unrest. Few days before the Australian government issued this travel

¹ M. Bernstein, Identity Politics, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 31, 2005, p. 1

²R. A. Udema, Understanding Nigeria Terrorism, Its Implications to National Peace, Security, Unity and Sustainable Development: A Discuss. IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, Vol. 8 No. 5, 2013 p. 100

³ R. A. Udema, Understanding Nigeria Terrorism, Its Implications to National Peace, Security, Unity and Sustainable Development: A Discuss. IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, Vol. 8 No. 5, 2013 p. 100

advisory; the United States Mission in Lagos had also warned her citizens against travelling to Nigeria, due to the high risk of terrorist threat and attack against the West.⁴

Terrorism has not only marred the image of Nigeria in the international community; it has also affected the rapport between Nigeria and her immediate neighbours in the West African sub-region. Further, these problems are compounded by the presence of ethno religious affiliations consequent upon colonial separateness of ethnic identities factionalized between family relations and emotionally bounded individuals, living within the borders of separated countries. These people consciously note their national belonging, but are emotionally tied to their kith and kin in other countries despite the complications of the French factor in the peculiar case of Nigeria's neighbours. The implication of these unhealthy relationships (particularly perceived so because it constitutes a hindrance to the achievement of nation building), caused by an increased trend of terrorism and security challenge is the focus of discussion in this paper. The paper argues that, violent terrorist activities crisscrossing the neighbourhood of Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad has affected good neighbourhood relations and constituted security challenge, inhibiting harmonious socio economic relations in the recent times. It is also noted that this situation is further complicated by identity relations between the citizens of this contiguous border nations, ensuring a tedious and difficult to quell insurgency, and stretching the cord of diplomatic relations between Nigeria and these neighbours to a point for concern (this to a level has been addressed by their joint efforts to combat terrorism). This paper therefore argues that Nigeria's good neighbourliness policy need to be strengthened and remodeled to suit the current national reality. The paper is subsequently divided into; a Conceptual discourse, A Geo Strategic Consideration of Nigeria's Contiguous Borders, Nigeria Foreign Policy before 1999 and the French Factor, Terrorism, Identity Politics and Nigeria's Security Challenge, Implications of Terrorism and Identity Politics on Nigeria's Good Neighbourliness Policy, and Conclusion.

TERRORISM, IDENTITY POLITICS AND GOOD NEIGHBOURLINESS: A CONCEPTUAL DISCOURSE

There are diverse explanations to the definitions of terrorism with variance in views, as well as conflicting analysis. It is however apt to ascertain that, no single definition of the concept has received global acceptance.⁵ The term "terrorist" and "terrorism" was coined by the French government during the "Reign of Terror" in 1795, when revolutionaries kicked against the actions of the government.⁶ Terrorism is viewed according to Jongman, as a method of combat that includes a target of violence...includes a state of chronic fear...mobilization for target of demands or attention.⁷ Terrorism is related to peacetime war crimes, and what is constituted as war crimes are added to the definition of terrorism. However, the most common elements of defining terrorism

⁴ E. C. Chinwokwu, Terrorism and the Dilemmas of Combating the Menace in Nigeria. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, Vol. 3. No. 4, 2013 p. 265

⁵ E. C. Chinwokwu, Terrorism and the Dilemmas of Combating the Menace in Nigeria. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, Vol. 3. No. 4, 2013 p. 268

⁶ B. Minteh & A. Perry. Terrorism in West Africa – Boko Haram's Evolution, Strategy and Affiliations. Presented at the Mid-West Political Science Association's 71st Annual Conference Palmer House Hotel, Chicago Illinois, 2013, see also B. Whitaker. The Definition of Terrorism, The Guardian Online, December 26th 2010

⁷ A. Schmid. Frameworks for Conceptualizing Terrorism, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.16: No. 2, 2004, pp. 197-221. See also B. Minteh & A. Perry. Terrorism in West Africa – Boko Haram's Evolution, Strategy and Affiliations. Presented at the Mid-West Political Science Association's 71st Annual Conference Palmer House Hotel, Chicago Illinois,

include the use, or threat of use of violence, political motivation, inducing fear and terror and threat.⁸ There are two common elements when defining terrorism; violence, or threat of violence, against civilians and behaviour/acts intended to compel, or intimidate a population into some form of action. Operationally, terrorist activity is defined as “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives”.⁹ Terrorism can occur by inspiration and imitation alone, not by direction. Hate speech and oral inciting of violence are the key motivational factor to it. Furthermore, it is believed that doctrine and psychological beliefs dictate terrorism.¹⁰ According to the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), terrorism is defined as the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objective.¹¹

To Mary Bernstein the term identity politics is widely used throughout the social sciences and the humanities to describe phenomena as diverse as multiculturalism, the women's movement, civil rights, lesbian and gay movements, separatist movements in Canada and Spain, and violent ethnic and nationalist conflicts in postcolonial Africa and Asia, as well as in the formerly communist countries of Eastern Europe.¹² With emphasis Bernstein explained that the seeds of these partially overlapping conversations are apparent from the very first uses of the term identity politics in the scholarly journals. Bernstein further enumerated that in 1979, Anspach first used the term identity politics to refer to activism by people with disabilities to transform both self- and societal conceptions of people with disabilities.¹³ Over the next decade, only three scholarly journal articles employed the term identity politics in their abstracts, to describe (a) ethnicity as a contemporary form of politics¹⁴; (b) a form of critical pedagogy that links social structure with the insights of post structuralism regarding the nature of subjectivity, while incorporating a Marxist commitment to politics¹⁵; and (c) general efforts by status based movements to foster and explore the cultural identity of members.¹⁶

Bernstein further traced the use of the word to the mid-1990s making references to identity politics as violent ethnic conflict¹⁷, and nationalism more generally.¹⁸ An important point of reference in

⁸B. Minteh& A. Perry. Terrorism in West Africa – Boko Haram’s Evolution, Strategy and Affiliations. Presented at the Mid-West Political Science Association’s 71st Annual Conference Palmer House Hotel, Chicago Illinois, 2013

⁹Defense& Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy; Vol. 37 No. 7; 2009; p. 11-12

¹⁰ M. Crenshaw. *Terrorism in Context*. Penn State University Press: University Park Print, 2005.

¹¹ E. C. Chinwokwu, Terrorism and the Dilemmas of Combating the Menace in Nigeria. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, Vol. 3. No. 4, 2013 p. 268. See also US Department of State. (2007). A Strategic assessment of progress against the terrorist. In *Countering the Terrorist Mentality, Foreign Police: US Department of State*, Vol. 12, No.5 pp. 46-50

¹² M. Bernstein, Identity Politics, *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 31, 2005, p. 10

¹³Ibid. p. 11

¹⁴ J. A. Ross. Urban development and the politics of ethnicity: a conceptual approach. *Ethn. Racial Stud.* Vol. 5 (4):1982, pp. 440-456

¹⁵ H. Bromley H. 1989. Identity politics and critical pedagogy. *Educ. Theory* Vol. 39(3):1989, pp. 207-223

¹⁶ M. Bernstein, Identity Politics, *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 31, 2005, pp. 1-2,

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/29737711>

¹⁷ S. Mezmaric. The rapists' progress: ethnicity, gender and violence. *Review of Sociology* Vol. 24(3-4): 1993, pp. 119-129

¹⁸ A. Alund. Alterity in modernity. *Acta Sociologia* Vol. 38 (4): 1995, pp. 311-22

addition to using the term identity politics to describe any mobilization related to politics, culture, and identity, are scholarly analyses that have often eluded normative political evaluations of identity politics as a political practice with sociological analyses of the relationship between identity and politics. Brubaker & Cooper's argument is reiterated here that the literature on identity politics has too many protagonists and not enough analysts.¹⁹ Lichterman describes identity politics as "a slippery term",²⁰ while Bickford claims that the concept has developed more as a critique of certain political practices than as a coherent area of study.²¹ Fraser attempted a conclusion by insisting that "the expression 'identity politics' is increasingly used as a derogatory synonym for feminism, anti-racism, and anti-heterosexism."²² To Bernstein however beneath the normative political claims about identity politics lay competing theoretical ways to understand the relationship between experience, culture, identity, politics, and power. In this work identity politics assume ethno religious mobilizations, activities, conflicts and violence in social relations among the multicultural Nigerian societies as it is limited to the northern part of Nigeria with implications for ethnic affiliations in Niger, Cameroon and Chad.²³ Such places as harboured the Boko Haram before the joint military options to fight terrorism and still ongoing.

Good neighbourliness developed out of the principles of territorial sovereignty and equality of states in international law.²⁴ It is hence a key principle managing the peaceful coexistence between states in the international community.²⁵ The exercise of the state rights inherent in full sovereignty is only possible where the good neighbourliness principle is respected in governing interstate relations. In effect, the violations of the principle, particularly between contiguous states, can lead to serious confrontations or military conflicts.²⁶

The impact of border relations between a country and the other could be either positive or otherwise. Countries involved could benefit from trade relations as well as inter-state policies; they could also become victims of one's domestic problem. The principle of good neighbourliness is meant to play a vital role within the legal order of relations between nations in the world. In a broader form, "good neighbourliness" is a preventive measure, as well as a vital tool in resolving conflicts and also maintaining peaceful co-existence among border-nations.²⁷

The concept of 'good neighbourliness' has undergone its transmutation within various themes of law. Its transformation can be traced from the Roman maxim of *sic ueteruoutalienum non*

¹⁹ M. Bernstein, Identity Politics, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 31, 2005

²⁰ P. Lichterman. Talking identity in the pub? lic sphere: broad visions and small spaces in identity politics. Theory Soc. Vol. 28 (1): 1999, p. 113

²¹ S. Bickford. Anti-anti-identity politics: feminism, democracy, and the complexities of citizenship. Hypatia 12(4): 1997, pp. 111-31

²² N. Fraser. Why overcoming prejudice is not enough: a rejoinder to Richard Rorty. Cut. Horiz. 1(1):2000, pp. 21-28

²³ M. Bernstein, Identity Politics, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 31, 2005

²⁴ F. M. Adu, and O. S. Osadola, Terrorism, Security Challenge and Implications on Nigeria's Good Neighbourliness, *IISTE Research on Humanities and Social Sciences*, Vol.8, No.14, 2018, pp. 128-136

²⁵ A. I. Asiwaju, "Borders, Crimes and Criminality: The North-Eastern Nigerian Experience in Comparative Focus" in Basse Ate and Bola Akinterinwa (eds.) *Cross-Border Armed Banditry in the North East*, Lagos: NIIA, 2011, pp.230 - 231

²⁶ W. A. Fawole, Nigeria's External Relations and Foreign Policy Under Military Rule (1966-1999), Ile-Ife: ObafemiAwolowo University Press Ltd., 2003

²⁷ M. W. Apikins, A Critical Appraisal of Nigeria's Foreign Policy under the Military Regimes: 1966-1998. M.SC Thesis, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 2003, pp. 36-37

*laedas*²⁸; in the law of property, to the principle of good neighbourliness or ‘no harm’ in International law, prohibiting a state from using its territory to harm other states, with its specific interpretation in International Environmental law. In the European Union (EU) external relations law ‘good neighbourliness’ has acquired a meaning of its own. It first appeared in 1994 in relation to the accession process. The so called ‘Essen condition’, it featured as — an additional to Copenhagen criteria — accession condition, although it has not been applied systematically or uniformly.²⁹ In Nigeria, particularly since the civil war, “the good neighbourliness policy” has been a cardinal guiding principle of Nigerian foreign policy.

NIGERIA’S CONTIGUOUS BORDERS: A GEO STRATEGIC CONSIDERATION.

Nigeria has five contiguous border neighbours. All are former French colonies. Three of these neighbours are implicated in the war against terrorism. These three countries are; Niger, Cameroon and Chad. Nigeria is an Anglophone state, a former colony of Britain, with political heritage and practices that reflect these foundations.³⁰ Nigeria’s land borders with both Niger and Cameroon covers a distance of about 1, 497 and 1, 690kms respectively.³¹ Chad covers only 87 kilometers. Cameroon gained independence in the year 1960, only a few months earlier than Nigeria, while Chad also became independent in August 1960, with about 200 ethnic groups. Niger Republic is regarded as the second poorest country in the world as a result of its poor human development index of 0.295.³²

These vital border neighbours of Nigeria have to a great extent, nomadic Fulani Islamic populace, that offer basic fringes with Nigeria's eight states in the northern district, in particular Sokoto, Katsina, Jigawa, Yobe, Borno, Adamawa, Taraba and Gombe. The cross - outskirt exercises are characterized in certain push and pull factors. As indicated by Alli,³³ the push factors comprising of the local conditions in Chad, Niger and Cameroun incorporate the extreme financial separation that slows down reasonable improvement, enduring dry season, starvation, political precariousness, social and ethnic clashes and close crumple of state control of assets and foundations, and also the survival weight on quick and more distant family individuals. The pull elements to Nigeria are basically financial prospects, sustenance, security, religious and social fondness and affinities with Nigerians and political opportunity.

²⁸ O. Ogunbadejo, Nigeria's Foreign Policy under Military Rule, 1966-79. *International Journal*, Issu.35, 1979/1980. p.748

²⁹ J. O. Ihonvbere, Nigeria as Africa's Great Power: Constraints and Prospects for the 1990s. *International Journal*, 46, 1991, pp. 510-535.

³⁰E. Meierding, IR Theory as Politics, International Politics as Theory: a Nigerian Case Study, University of Chicago, *African Nebula*, Issue 2, 2010 pp. 6-8 see also O. Aluko. Nigeria's Role in Inter-African Relations: With Special Reference to the Organization of African Unity. *African Affairs*, 72(287), 1973, pp.145-162.

³¹ I. A. Gambari, Nigeria and the World: A Growing Internal Stability, Wealth, and External Influence. *Journal of International Affairs*, 29(2), 1975, pp. 155-169. See also E. Meierding, IR Theory as Politics, International Politics as Theory: a Nigerian Case Study, University of Chicago, *African Nebula*, Issue 2, 2010 pp. 6-8

³² J. O. Ihonvbere, Nigeria as Africa's Great Power: Constraints and Prospects for the 1990s. *International Journal*, 46, 1991, pp. 510-535.

³³ W. Alli, “Extra-National Actors and Internal Security in Nigeria’s North-East: Challenges for Sub-Regional Peace and Cooperation”, in Bassey Ate and Bola Akinterinwa (eds.) *Cross-Border Armed Banditry in the North-East*, Lagos: Nigeria Institute of International Affairs, 2011. p. 140, see also Akpomera, K. Omoyibo, Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria: The Paradox and Challenges of Big Brother Foreign Policy. *International Journal of Arts and Humanities*, Ethiopia, Vol. 2. No. 1. 2013 p. 102

It is additionally basic to recognize other factors like the distinctions in lawful convention and practices, as demonstrated in the Anglo-Saxon Common Law framework in English-speaking nations and Latino/Civil Law ones in French and Spanish speaking nations on the borderlands; the high impact of the official culture of anglophony versus francophony on the political elites, which has supported the differentiating ground norm of the nations, with Nigeria embracing federalism and the alternate nations leaning towards centralism. A key component has been the sustenance of political strength in the United States contrasted with Mexico, much the same as in Nigeria.³⁴

NIGERIA FOREIGN POLICY BEFORE 1999 AND THE FRENCH FACTOR

Nigeria's foreign policy is grounded on the good neighbourliness policy as a cardinal point of its national interest³⁵ Nigeria's foreign policy agenda is characterized by social development, infrastructural upgrade, foreign investing, and economic benefits. It is a vital aspect that enhances the growth and development of Nigeria's sovereignty. Foreign policy is an aspect of international relations that is based on the assumption that "no nation can live in isolation"³⁶ hence, the need for a continuous peaceful relation among nations in the world which is hinged on reciprocity. Bilateral and multilateral inter-state relations have therefore become part of the basic ingredients of contemporary international relations. A country's foreign policy is the extension of its domestic philosophy and psyche; hence, examining Nigeria's foreign policy requires the inner workings of the society (i.e. the domestic policy). In the circumstances also, a nation must pay attention to its neighbours for the attainment of mutual benefits. This is particularly relevant with the political consideration of Nigeria, sandwiched between neighbouring francophone states.

The Nigerian government in the early years of independence pursued modest foreign policy aims. Political leaders at the helm of affairs were solely interested in the domestic consolidation of the new federal state. TafawaBalewa's foreign policy was restricted to upholding the principles inscribed in the Organization of African Unity's (OAU) 1963 Charter viz; non-interference, the legal equality of states, and boundary inviolability.³⁷ All of these interests were encompassed by the broader Nigerian policy predilection for "good-neighborliness." In the regional section, the country was overshadowed by Ghana governed by president, Kwame Nkrumah.³⁸ Nigeria was also resisting French grip, considering the fact that all of Nigeria's geographic neighbours are French speaking states, which were strongly influenced by their former metropolis, even after they gained independence. Nigeria's efforts to secure local influence were limited to the creation of

³⁴ A. I. Asiwaju, "Borders, Crimes and Criminality: The North-Eastern Nigerian Experience in Comparative Focus" in Bassey Ate and Bola Akinterinwa (eds.) *Cross-Border Armed Banditry in the North East*, Lagos: NIIA, 2011, pp.230 - 231

³⁵ W. A. Fawole, *Nigeria's External Relations and Foreign Policy Under Military Rule (1966-1999)*, Ile-Ife: ObafemiAwolowo University Press Ltd., 2003

³⁶ M. W. Apikins, *A Critical Appraisal of Nigeria's Foreign Policy under the Military Regimes: 1966-1998*. M.SC Thesis, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 2003, pp. 36-37

³⁷ O. Ogunbadejo, Nigeria's Foreign Policy under Military Rule, 1966-79. *International Journal*, Issu.35, 1979/1980. p.748

³⁸ J. O. Ihonvbere, Nigeria as Africa's Great Power: Constraints and Prospects for the 1990s. *International Journal*, 46, 1991, pp. 510-535.

cooperative multilateral governing bodies, such as the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the River Niger Commission.³⁹

Nigeria's continuous efforts to accomplish a more prominent regional leadership role failed during the civil war (1967-70). Apart from being challenged by the internal secessionists, Nigeria was actively opposed by France, Côte d'Ivoire, Portugal and South Africa. The civil war however revealed the dangers of continued European attachment on the continent, as well as the importance of securing sub-regional allies. The Federal government, which, in spite of Nigeria's nominally non-aligned status, had previously demonstrated a solidly pro-western orientation, now began to court more active engagement with the USSR and China.⁴⁰ Post-war leaders also went to greater lengths to reduce France's local influence and to reconcile with other states in the sub-region, including civil war enemies, such as Côte d'Ivoire, and earlier rivals, like Ghana.⁴¹ Nigeria needed to be less isolated. Good neighborliness had become a security concern, as well as a normative principle.⁴²

After the Nigerian Civil War, Nigeria intensified her efforts to reconcile with geographic neighbours with the aim of achieving a sub-regional leadership role. This was however facilitated by the oil boom. Oil had been discovered in the year 1956, near the inland city of Oloibiri. This discovery was later amplified by huge discovery in the Delta region. Based on this development, Nigeria became the world's ninth largest oil exporter in the year 1973,⁴³ and the United States' second largest international oil supplier.⁴⁴

The oil boom, which came up, due to the increase in petroleum price of the early 1970s, as well as the Arab energy crisis of 1973, generated an increase in Nigerian state revenue. Also, the Nigeria government was attracting more foreign direct investment. The Federal Government of Nigeria made use of this new income, generated from crude oil, to pursue a more focused sub-regional foreign policy. Nigeria began to provide financial assistance to its neighbours; most especially in the West Africa sub-region, with the aim of having a better relationship with them, as well as weaning them off from their dependence on France. One of the good neighbourliness approaches was in 1974, when the Nigerian government announced that it would sell oil at concessionary prices to its energy-poor neighbours.⁴⁵

Regional economic integration is the major tool which Nigeria uses to advance its leadership role in the sub-region as well as reduce the French influence. The then Head of State, General Yakubu Gowon who ruled between 1966- 1975 promoted bilateral trading pacts, the Organization of

³⁹E. Meierding, IR Theory as Politics, International Politics as Theory: a Nigerian Case Study, University of Chicago, *African Nebula*, Issue 2, 2010 pp. 6-8 see also O. Aluko. Nigeria's Role in Inter-African Relations: With Special Reference to the Organization of African Unity. *African Affairs*, 72(287), 1973, pp.145-162.

⁴⁰ I. A. Gambari, Nigeria and the World: A Growing Internal Stability, Wealth, and External Influence. *Journal of International Affairs*, 29(2), 1975, pp. 155-169. See also E. Meierding, IR Theory as Politics, International Politics as Theory: a Nigerian Case Study, University of Chicago, *African Nebula*, Issue 2, 2010 pp. 6-8

⁴¹ J. O. Ihonvbere, Nigeria as Africa's Great Power: Constraints and Prospects for the 1990s. *International Journal*, 46, 1991, pp. 510-535.

⁴² O. Aluko. *Essays in Nigerian Foreign Policy*. London: George Allen and Unwin. 1981

⁴³ O. Aluko. Nigeria's Role in Inter-African Relations: With Special Reference to the Organization of African Unity. *African Affairs*, 72(287), 1973, pp.145-162

⁴⁴ I. A. Gambari, Nigeria and the World: A Growing Internal Stability, Wealth, and External Influence. *Journal of International Affairs*, 29(2), 1975, pp. 155-169

⁴⁵ O. Aluko. *Essays in Nigerian Foreign Policy*. London: George Allen and Unwin. 1981

African Unity's (OAU) economic units, and the establishment of a new international institution for regional integration: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The neighbouring francophone states initially refused to acknowledge a Nigerian-led organization which prompted Gowon to move forward with the scheme by engaging with Anglophone states like Togo. He gained greater francophone confidence by leading negotiations for the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries to gain observer status with the European Economic Community (EEC).⁴⁶ The resultant Lomé Convention was signed on the 28th of February 1975. Thus, ECOWAS came into reality three months later.

General Gowon was overthrown in a bloodless military coup on July 29, 1975. His successors; Muritala Mohammed and Olusegun Obasanjo advanced a pushy and forward looking foreign policy. They were less concerned with Nigeria's neighbouring states, which however affected ECOWAS, as well as Nigeria's previous commitments to the OAU. Murtala and Obasanjo's administrations implemented a more militant pan-African foreign policy that challenged the minority rule regimes of Southern Africa (Aluko, 1976).⁴⁷ Nigeria intervened in the Angolan civil war, supporting the MPLA against the US-supported FNLA and UNITA.⁴⁸ In 1976, African leaders were encouraged to boycott the Montreal Olympic Games, in order to protest New Zealand's interactions with apartheid South Africa.⁴⁹ In 1978, Nigeria gained a rotatory seat in the United Nations Security Council, giving it another platform for its anti-apartheid stance.⁵⁰ In contrast to Gowon's self-effacing international ambitions, Muritala and Obasanjo wanted Nigeria to obtain a higher profile on the continent, more befitting to the state's new economic power.

Under Shehu Shagari's regime (1979-83), oil revenue increased, and then declined.⁵¹ Shagari pursued a modest foreign policy like Gowon's. Activist aims were neglected and ECOWAS continued to stumble.⁵² In January 1983, the Nigerian government responded to the economic downturn by expelling illegal immigrants which was also due to the various religious riots that occurred majorly in Kano and Kaduna.⁵³ This was the state's "worst international crisis ever since

⁴⁶ O. Abegunrin, *Nigerian Foreign Policy under Military Rule, 1966-1999*. Westport, CT: Praeger. 2003 see also M. W. DeLancy, *Nigeria: Foreign Policy Alternatives*. In T. M. Shaw & O. Aluko (Eds.), *Nigerian Foreign Policy: Alternative Perceptions and Projections* (pp. 164-190). London: Macmillan. 1983

⁴⁷ O. Aluko. The 'New' Nigerian Foreign Policy: Developments since the Downfall of General Gowon. *Round Table*, 66(264), 1976, pp. 405-414. See also E. Meierding, *IR Theory as Politics, International Politics as Theory: a Nigerian Case Study*, University of Chicago, *African Nebula*, Issue 2, 2010 pp. 6-8 see also O. Aluko. Nigeria's Role in Inter-African Relations: With Special Reference to the Organization of African Unity. *African Affairs*, 72(287), 1973, pp.145-162.

⁴⁸ O. Abegunrin, *Nigerian Foreign Policy Under Military Rule, 1966-1999*. Westport, CT: Praeger. 2003

⁴⁹ E. Meierding, *IR Theory as Politics, International Politics as Theory: a Nigerian Case Study*, University of Chicago, *African Nebula*, Issue 2, 2010 pp. 6-8 see also O. Aluko. Nigeria's Role in Inter-African Relations: With Special Reference to the Organization of African Unity. *African Affairs*, 72(287), 1973, pp.145-162. See also M. W. DeLancy, *Nigeria: Foreign Policy Alternatives*. In T. M. Shaw & O. Aluko (Eds.), *Nigerian Foreign Policy: Alternative Perceptions and Projections* (pp. 164-190). London: Macmillan. 1983

⁵⁰ D. C. Bach, *Nigerian-American Relations: Converging Interests and Power Relations*. In T. M. Shaw & O. Aluko (Eds.), *Nigerian Foreign Policy: Alternative Perceptions and Projections*. London: Macmillan. 1983, pp. 35-55

⁵¹ T. M. Shaw, *Nigeria Restrained: Foreign Policy under Changing Political and Petroleum Regimes*. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 489, 1987, pp. 40-50.

⁵² T. M. Shaw, *A Problematic Power: the Debate about Nigerian Foreign Policy in the 1980s*. *Millennium*, 12(2), 1983, pp. 127-148.

⁵³ *Ibid* p. 149

the end of the civil war".⁵⁴ This crisis affected Nigeria's neighbours and further undermined sub-regional integration.⁵⁵

The same depression continued under Shagari's successor; Buhari (1983-85). He began his military rule with desires to appease Nigeria's neighbours. However, after further religious riots in Yola in 1984, he closed the state's borders as a means of checking illegal migration.⁵⁶ This move attracted severe criticism within and outside the West Africa sub-region. At an All-Nigeria Conference on Foreign Policy in April 1986 (the Kuru Conference), participants maintained that they wished to uphold a sub-regional leadership position by promoting development and economic integration, supporting the OAU, and continuing to lessen France's local power.⁵⁷ However, given the Nigeria's dependence on crude oil revenue, the continuous decline of oil prices gave Nigerian leaders limited means of achieving their foreign policy goals. From 1986-88, Babangida's new government was forced to respond to the economic crisis by implementing a structural adjustment program.⁵⁸

By the end of the 1980s, reduction of expenditure and other economic recovery programmes enabled Nigeria to regain a bit of its prior regional standing. In 1990, Nigeria led West Africa's Anglophone states in establishing ECOMOG (the ECOWAS Monitoring Group), which intervened in Liberia following the overthrow of leader Samuel Doe.⁵⁹ The apt intervention was aided by the decline in French commitment in the area.⁶⁰ However, sub-regional concerns arose over Nigeria's apparent willingness to defy its longstanding principle of non-interference in other African states' domestic affairs. Some West African nations opine that Nigeria was exploiting the Liberian clash to propel a local "Pax Nigeriana".⁶¹ Doubt was exacerbated by Babangida's residential political heartlessness and the rehashed delays of Nigeria's transition back to civilian rule.⁶²

Nigeria's global notoriety debased further after a noteworthy discretionary discussion in 1993. After the June 12 victory of the famous presidential candidate; Moshood Abiola, Babangida annulled the outcome of the election. Nigeria emitted in crisis, which prompted the EU and US to

⁵⁴ O. Abegunrin, *Nigerian Foreign Policy Under Military Rule, 1966-1999*. Westport, CT: Praeger. 2003

⁵⁵ J. O. Aremu, Responses to the 1983 Expulsion of Aliens from Nigeria: A Critique, *International Multidisciplinary Journal*, Ethiopia Vol. 7 (3), Serial No. 30, 2013:pp. 340-352 see also I. A. Gambari, *Theory and Reality in Foreign Policy Making: Nigeria After the Second Republic*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, Inc. 1989

⁵⁶ Ibid, see also E. Meierding, IR Theory as Politics, *International Politics as Theory: a Nigerian Case Study*, University of Chicago, *African Nebula*, Issue 2, 2010 pp. 6-8 see also O. Aluko. Nigeria's Role in Inter-African Relations: With Special Reference to the Organization of African Unity. *African Affairs*, 72(287), 1973, pp.145-162

⁵⁷ R. A. Akindele, & B. E. Ate., Nigeria's Foreign Policy, 1986-2000 AD: Background to and Reflections on the Views from Kuru. *Africa Spectrum*, 21(3), 1986, pp. 363-370.

⁵⁸ A. Sesay, & C. U. Ukeje., The Military, the West, and Nigerian Politics in the 1990s. *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, 11(1), 1997, pp. 25-48.

⁵⁹ O. Abegunrin, *Nigerian Foreign Policy Under Military Rule, 1966-1999*. Westport, CT: Praeger. 2003, see also G. J. Yoroms, G. J. ECOMOG and West African Regional Security: A Nigerian Perspective. *Issue: a Journal of Opinion*, 21(1/2), 1993, pp.84-91.

⁶⁰ A. Adebajo., Nigeria: Africa's New Gendarme? *Security Dialogue*, 31, 2000, pp.185-199.

⁶¹ H. A. Saliu., Nigeria and Peace Support Operations: Trends and Policy Implications. *International Peacekeeping*, 7(3), 2000, pp. 105-119. See also G. J. Yoroms., ECOMOG and West African Regional Security: A Nigerian Perspective. *Issue: a Journal of Opinion*, 21(1/2), 1993, pp.84-91.

⁶² A. Sesay, A., & C. U. Ukeje., The Military, the West, and Nigerian Politics in the 1990s. *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, 11(1), 1997. pp. 25-48.

threaten issuing sanctions. These reactions were just partially effective. Despite the fact that Babangida was forced to step aside from office, democracy was not reestablished. Following a short time of Ernest Shonekan's interim administration, Sani Abacha seized control in another military coup. A month after Abacha took over; Abacha shook the locale by invading the Bakassi Peninsula, a purportedly oil- rich area debated with Cameroon. In March 1995, Abacha blamed a substantial swath for the policy elite of a coup plot. The courts sentenced more than thirty capital punishments. Following universal criticism and dangers of expanded sanctions, these were diminished to jail terms.⁶³ However, Abacha's clemency was short-lived. In November 1995, he executed nine leaders of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), including Ken Saro-Wiwa.

The US and EU reacted to the new incitement by forcing expansive sanctions. Notwithstanding, US sanctions excluded oil.⁶⁴ Sesay and Ukeje argued that this omission weakened the effectiveness of external calls for democratization.⁶⁵ In addition, Abacha was somewhat successful in spinning the sanctions locally as an anti-imperial struggle.⁶⁶ Globally, Nigeria's notoriety was insignificantly restored in 1998, when Abacha started an ECOMOG mediation to reestablish democracy in Sierra Leone. A point of reference by Adebajo and Landsberg is the Great Powers' inability to intercede viably in Somalia and Rwanda in the mid-1990s which had expanded the fascination of regional peacekeeping endeavours, after the end of the Cold War. There was minimal key purpose behind superpower commitment in the locale.⁶⁷ Domestically however, Abacha's democratizing intervention was condemned for its hypocrisy and wastage.⁶⁸

⁶³ S. Mahmud., Controlling African States' Behavior: International Relations Theory and International Sanctions. In K. C. Dunn & T. M. Shaw (Eds.), *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory* (pp. 129-145). Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave. 2001

⁶⁴ O. Abegunrin., *Nigerian Foreign Policy Under Military Rule, 1966-1999*. Westport, CT: Praeger. 2003 see also S. Mahmud., Controlling African States' Behavior: International Relations Theory and International Sanctions. In K. C. Dunn & T. M. Shaw (Eds.), *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory* (pp. 129-145). Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave. 2001

⁶⁵ A. Sesay, A., & C. U. Ukeje., The Military, the West, and Nigerian Politics in the 1990s. *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, 11(1), 1997. pp. 25-48.

⁶⁶ S. Mahmud., Controlling African States' Behavior: International Relations Theory and International Sanctions. In K. C. Dunn & T. M. Shaw (Eds.), *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory* (pp. 129-145). Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave. 2001

⁶⁷ A. Adebajo, & C. Landsberg., South Africa and Nigeria as Regional Hegemons. In M. Baregu & C. Landsberg (Eds.), *From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa's Evolving Security Challenges* (pp. 171-203). Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiter. 2003

⁶⁸ A. Adebajo., Nigeria: Africa's New Gendarme? *Security Dialogue*, 31, 2000, pp.185-199.

TERRORISM, IDENTITY POLITICS AND NIGERIA'S SECURITY CHALLENGE

Nigeria's fourth republic began with democratically elected Obasanjo as president in 1999. Today, the country's nascent democracy is being tested by rampant crime and an unprecedented campaign of terror such that, in the South, civil unrest threatens safety and stability, in the East and west; gangs who kidnap expatriates for ransom lie in wait on the roads, in bars, and cities; and in the North, the Islamic terrorist group called Boko Haram is growing both in number and brutality.

The Boko Haram sect in Nigeria is not avowed vicious for either its terror campaigns, or the sect's mission to impose Islamic laws on the country, but also for the confusion regarding the exact cause(s) of its violent acts. However, many theories have emerged to explain the problems. These have broadly revolved around socio-economic, political, and religious themes; all of which in scholarly opinion, does not explain the reason for such violence, brutality and cruelty in one's own country against its neighbours. In view of the above, it is imperative to examine how Boko Haram has constituted itself as a national security threat to the continual and harmonious co-existence of the component nations that make up the Nigeria's state.

The concept of 'security' is a crosscutting, and multi-dimensional concept which has, over the last century, been the subject of great debate. However, long before that, the history of mankind was interspersed by the frenzied search for the best way of ensuring the security of the people, their properties, territories, states and institutions among others. In all places and countries, security has been considered as a "first order value" worth preserving. Notwithstanding, there is no consensus on the definition of security. This is not surprising because, as a social phenomenon it is often approached from different perspectives. Security has been seen as a situation where a person or thing is not exposed to any form of danger or risk of physical or moral aggression, accident, theft or deterioration.⁶⁹

Some security experts argue that, the concept of security has always been associated with the safety and survival of the state and its citizens from harm or destruction or from dangerous threats. These conceptions generally hold that the state is the only institution with the primary responsibility and power for the safety of its territory and its people. However, National security is an important requirement to maintain state survival. This is implemented through the use of economic diplomacy, power projections and sometimes alliance formations and political maneuvering. The concept developed mostly in the United States of America after World War II. Initially focusing on military might; it now encompasses a broad range of facets, all of which impinge on the non-military or economic aspects of the nation and the values espoused by the national society. Accordingly, in order to possess national security, a nation needs to possess economic security, energy security, and environmental security. "Security threats involve not only conventional foes such as other nation-states but also non-state actors such as violent non-state actors, narcotic cartels, multinational corporations and non-governmental organizations; some scholars include factors of natural disasters and events causing severe environmental damage in this category. Measures taken to ensure national security include: using diplomacy to rally allies and isolate threats; marshaling economic power to facilitate or compel cooperation; maintaining effective armed forces; implementing civil defense and emergency preparedness measures (including anti-terrorism legislation); ensuring the resilience and redundancy of critical infrastructure; using

⁶⁹ O. Obasanjo, African Leadership Forum: Leadership for Good Government in Nigeria, Ota Farm House Dialogue, 2000

intelligence services to detect and defeat or avoid threats and espionage, and to protect classified information; using counter intelligence services or secret police to protect the nation from internal threats. The various factors responsible for the continuous growth of terrorism in Nigeria are discussed below:

Leadership and Political Exploitation: One of the most salient challenges facing development among most nations in West Africa and some other under-developed nations all over the globe is poor leadership.⁷⁰ Nigeria's continuous security challenge is so knitted with poor leadership among other factors. Considering the abundant valuable natural, mineral and human resources which Nigeria has, one would find it hard to believe her pace of development. The slow pace of development is as a result of incompetent leaders who have failed in their part to harness these vast natural resources for development purposes. Poor leadership in Nigeria has led to economic hardship, huge external debt,⁷¹ weak infrastructures, food crisis, abject poverty, underdevelopment and most importantly, insecurity.

Meanwhile, the role politics played in Nigeria's conflict and security challenge cannot be overemphasized. A cursory look at electoral politics in Nigeria since 1999 depicts a catalogue of election related assassinations. For instance, on the 23rd of December, 2001, the former Attorney General of the Federation Chief Bola Ige was assassinated and on March 5, 2003, Harry Marshall- the national Vice Chairman for the South-South Zone of All Nigeria Peoples Party was also assassinated. The former Nigerian Bar Association Chairman, Onitsha Branch in Anambra State, Barnabas Igwe and his wife were gruesomely murdered on September 1, 2002 and Engr. Funsho Willians, Dr. Ayodeji Daramola former gubernatorial candidates of PDP in Lagos and Ekiti States suffered the same fate.⁷² Recently, a serving Senator from Plateau State, Senator Dantong Gyang Daylop, the majority leader of Plateau State House of Assembly, and Honourable Gyang, a Fulani, were gruesomely murdered while many were left injured by unidentified gunmen.⁷³ Indeed, incessant political violence in Nigeria could be attributed to over-zealousness and desperation by political gladiators to win elections.

Poor Governance and Corruption: Corruption is bad not because money and benefits change hands, and not because of the motives of participants, but because it privatizes valuable aspects of public life, bypassing processes of representation, debate, and choice.⁷⁴ It has been described in the academic circles as cancer militating against Nigeria's development; corruption is deeply threatening the fabric of the Nigeria society.⁷⁵ Corruption hampers economic growth and disproportionately affect elections with would be "do or die" affair spirit. Government at all levels has not fared well in the provision of facilities such as infrastructure, health, education,

⁷⁰ O. Obasanjo, African Leadership Forum: Leadership for Good Government in Nigeria, Ota Farm House Dialogue, 2000

⁷¹ S. O. Soetan, O. S. Osadola, Debt Burden: A Re-Examination of its Effects on Nigeria's Nation Building. Journal for Studies in Management and Planning ISSN: 2395-0463 Volume 04 Issue 01, 2018, pp. 43-50

⁷² S. Iduh., The Challenges to Peace in Nigeria. International Journal of Vocational and Technical Education Vol 3 No 8, 2011, p. 124

⁷³ The Sun Newspaper July 9, 2012, p. 2

⁷⁴ L. J. Graf, Corruption and Rent-Seeking. Springer. Vol.113, No ½ <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30025775> 2002, Accessed: 28/04/2018. p. 97

⁷⁵ S. Iduh., The Challenges to Peace in Nigeria. International Journal of Vocational and Technical Education Vol 3 No 8, 2011, p. 124

employment and security, despite the enormous oil revenues accruing into their coffers.⁷⁶ Provision of necessary amenities has become the duty of few privileged individuals who could afford it. Monies are allocated to the various tiers of government for the development of their areas, but it is diverted by those in position of authority into private pockets.⁷⁷ According to Gwom, kidnapping and terrorism are resultant effects and consequences of the ineffectiveness of formal authority in governance.⁷⁸ Despite astounding wealth in the country, majority of the youth lack or have low or no access to (quality) education and employment. This is made worst by the inexplicable wealth displayed by those whose rise to fame could only be traceable to few moments of lawlessness or defiance of order rather than to hard work. Most of the youth learn from those they see as models, even if they are not doing the right thing. Some of the super-rich were former coup plotters turned Head of States and their retinue of appointees. In addition, they are those who looted the ministries and parastatals dry by taking advantage of the loose judicial and weak enforcement arms of government⁷⁹. The collective wealth of the people has been appropriated by a few opportunists. At one time, a certain governor of one of the states that Boko-Haram took its roots boasted to the press that he had seventy eight brand new; four runner jeeps packed in his residence in the face of wallowing poverty that has engulfed the entire state.⁸⁰

Religious Misapprehension: Religious and ideological indoctrination and its manipulation have played immense role in conflicts or civil unrest in Nigeria. Most conflicts in Nigeria have been given religious tint, where atrocious crimes such as maiming and cruel murder of fellow citizens and unjustifiable destruction of properties and homes have been carried out.⁸¹ Boko Haram is a religious Islamic sect that came into the limelight in 2002, when the presence of the radical Islamic sect was first reported in Kanama (Yobe state) and also in Gwoza (Borno state).⁸² Boko Haram,” which, in local Hausa language means “Western education is forbidden,” officially calls itself “Jama’atul AlhulSunnah Lidda’watiwal Jihad,” which means “people committed to the propagation of the Prophet’s teachings and jihad”.⁸³ Beyond religious explanations, Boko Haram could be arguably described as a “home-grown” terrorist group that romances with some desperate politicians in the North. It appears that the sect enjoys effective support from some well-to-do individuals, religious leaders, allies, admirers of their ideology and highly placed politicians in the North who claim to be Nigerians but are clandestinely working against the State. For instance,

⁷⁶ R. A. Udema, Understanding Nigeria Terrorism, Its Implications to National Peace, Security, Unity and Sustainable Development: A Discuss. IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, Vol. 8 No. 5, 2013, p. 107

⁷⁷ R. A. Udema, Understanding Nigeria Terrorism, Its Implications to National Peace, Security, Unity and Sustainable Development: A Discuss. IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, Vol. 8 No. 5, 2013, p. 107

⁷⁸ S. Gwom., Source: War Against Terror in Plateau State: History of Kidnapping and Terrorism in Nigeria. 2011, Retrieved from: <http://www.causes.com/cause/559771-war-against-terror-in-plateau-state>, on April 25, 2018.

⁷⁹ S. Gwom., Source: War Against Terror in Plateau State: History of Kidnapping and Terrorism in Nigeria. 2011, Retrieved from: <http://www.causes.com/cause/559771-war-against-terror-in-plateau-state>, on April 25, 2018

⁸⁰ R. A. Udema, Understanding Nigeria Terrorism, Its Implications to National Peace, Security, Unity and Sustainable Development: A Discuss. IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, Vol. 8 No. 5, 2013, p. 108

⁸¹ A. Majekodunmi, Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism In Contemporary Nigeria: Understanding the Emerging Trends, *Journal of Policy and Development Studies* Vol. 9, No. 4, 2015

⁸² O. Adagba, S. C. Ugwu .S. C and O. I. Eme, Activities of Boko Haram and Insecurity Problems in Nigeria. *Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review* Vol. 1 No. 9, 2012

⁸³ P. Mechan, and J. Speier., Boko Haram, Threat to the U.S. Homeland, 2011 p. 6 see also Akpomera, Eddy & Omoyibo, Kingsley, *Boko Haram* Terrorism in Nigeria: The Paradox and Challenges of Big Brother Foreign Policy, *AFRREV*, An International Journal of Arts and Humanities Bahir Dar, Ethiopia Vol. 2 (1), Serial 5, 2013:pp. 94-113

Lister,⁸⁴ observed that, it is no longer a sect of Islamic fanatics but they now enjoy the support of disgruntled politicians.

IMPLICATIONS OF TERRORISM AND IDENTITY POLITICS ON NIGERIA'S GOOD NEIGHBOURLINESS POLICY,

One of the major setbacks to development in Nigeria is insecurity. Security is evidently the pillar upon which every meaningful development could be achieved and sustained. Nigeria is endowed with abundant resources; negligence to numerous challenges of insecurity of the environment appears to have created porous security condition that engendered violence and retards development. It is a fact that development of any state in the world depend on many factors, which may hasten or delay such country's growth. Among these factors, security is central, security of lives and property plays a major role in the development of any country.

The danger posed by Boko-Haram in the light of the present onslaught and the extent the insurgence has shaped development trajectories in Nigeria is central to the discourse of this paper. The implications of this on Nigeria's good neighbourliness are the central argument. Security avails the opportunity for development. Thus, Nigeria can achieve sustainable development only through firm prioritization of security in the development agenda. The Boko Haram insurgency has lately introduced a terrorist dimension into the crime space of Nigeria. The trademarks of this gang are destruction of lives and properties through bombing, abduction and slaughtering of humans like animals, most especially in the northern area of Nigeria.

It is no longer news, that, the activities of the Boko Haram sect have often led to loss of lives and breakdown of law and order, and disruption of peace and security at large. This has created fear and a sense of insecurity in the public, as well as neighbouring states. Foreign Investors into any economy want to be assured of the safety of their investment. Since the risk of doing business increases when there is insecurity in the polity, investors, who are to facilitate industrial growth and employment generation, loose interest in that environment. The Boko Haram sect is a highly destructive political tool, with a cosmetic pretension of being religious. The bombing of the Nigeria Police Force Headquarters⁸⁴ in Abuja on June 16, 2011, the U.N embassy in Abuja on August 26, 2011 and other high profile bombings attest to this assertion. Nigeria does not seem to have suffered only the economic setbacks caused by Boko Haram's bombings, but also suffer from the battered image and humanitarian disasters the group inflicts on the nation. For instance, between July 27, 2009 and February 17, 2012, the Boko Haram had launched fifty three (53) attacks in which 1,157 people were killed and hundreds of people were injured in the Northern Nigeria. These indiscriminate and sporadic bombings seem to make Northern Nigeria increasingly unsafe and have compelled most non-indigenes of the region to relocate, especially the Igbos. The phobia of being attacked especially in cities like Kano, Kaduna, Maiduguri, Jalingo and Yola was responsible for the exodus of people from the North to other parts of the country as witnessed in the recent times.⁸⁵

⁸⁴ E, Eddy & K. Omoyibo, *Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria: The Paradox and Challenges of Big Brother Foreign Policy*, AFRREV, An International Journal of Arts and Humanities Bahir Dar, Ethiopia Vol. 2 (1), Serial 5, 2013:p. 100

⁸⁵ F. M. Adu, and O. S. Osadola, *Terrorism, Security Challenge and Implications on Nigeria's Good Neighbourliness*, *IISTE Research on Humanities and Social Sciences*, Vol.8, No.14, 2018, pp. 128-136

Furthermore, many from various ethnic groups seem to have followed suit in the exodus, while economic activities in the North have drastically been reduced as a result of this crisis. The implication is that, the crisis is causing under-development. It is further impoverishing an already underdeveloped Northern region and threatens Nigeria's future prospect of joining the league of highly developed countries. Generally, Boko Haram's activities have perforated the peace and tend to have impacted negatively on socio-economic development in Nigeria.

It has been observed that, a lot of attacks have been made in many states across Nigeria, including the federal capital territory, Abuja, while the puzzling part of it was the fact that most of the attacks are not done by suicide bombers, yet, the culprits often escape unharmed. This leaves a big question mark concerning the security apparatus and the relevance of agencies (as regards their duties in protection of lives and properties and the procurement of weapons of mass destruction and small arms made available to this political rebels).

Nigeria's security situation has over the years deteriorated owing to poor governance, political desperation and government inability to deliver the needed dividend. To this end, there is need for government and stakeholders to explore alternative avenues (dialogue maybe) rather than force to finding lasting solutions to the security lapses and the menace of Boko Haram. Also, combating a scourge like Boko Haram necessarily involves a significant drain on the nation's material and human resources. Government as a matter of priority and must do everything possible to put an end to Boko Haram terrorism and also reduce youth unemployment to the barest minimum to forestall further easy recruitment into terrorist and other criminal gangs. Security agencies should be effectively motivated and mobilized as critical stakeholders. Most importantly Nigeria's good neighbourliness policy should be reviewed to meet the needs of contemporary Nigerian challenges.

CONCLUSION

Terrorism is a growing world problem. In the Nigerian instance, it is made more complex by the presence of identity politics, even more debilitating in the case of post-colonial Africa; where for over six decades of independence, African states still wallow under its dangling debacles, with solutions farfetched as they continue in divisive politics of conflict. The presence of identity network has complicated terrorism in the instance of the Boko Haram group in Nigeria, as tribal networks of the Fulani and Hausa speaking tribes spanned across the Francophone; Chad, Niger and Cameroon continue to give aid and protection to their kith and kin, while some foreign elements, members of the dissident group pretend to be Nigerians and clandestinely operate to frustrate the government's effort at solution finding. Attempts at solution finding transcend the boundary of individual nation states. It is therefore of importance to note that no nation can fight terrorism in isolation. Interestingly too, is the noted good point that, a nation's security is important to its survival and development. The Boko Haram menace in Nigeria has implications for security, development and national survival. Nigeria's 'good neighbourliness policy' was created to assist the country in establishing and maintaining peaceful exchanges in the wake of the aborted secessionist moves of the Biafra. The Good neighbourliness policy as currently enunciated, has outlived its political value in the wake of security challenges that cut across the boundary of the state, indiscriminately penetrating the borders of international geographic neighbours. This is made worse by identity relations between these terrorists and their tribal affiliates separated into other countries by colonialism. The emerging terrorist activities of the

Boko Haram have exposed the inherent weaknesses in the policy, which has become moribund and in dire need of a political review to take care of new arising challenges.

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