American Journal of
Agriculture
(AJA)

The Effect of Food Aid on Agricultural Development in Bal'ad District

Mohamed Abdukadir Adan

AJP

American Journal of Agriculture
ISSN 2790-5756 (online)
Vol.5, Issue 3, pp 1 - 23, 2023

www.ajpojournals.org

The Effect of Food Aid on Agricultural Development in Bal'ad District

Mohamed Abdukadir Adan[1*]
[1]Somali National University
2019

Article history
Submitted 03.10.2023 Revised Version Received 21.12.2023 Accepted 24.12.2023

Abstract

Purpose: Food aid creates a country dependent on foreign assistance rather than making it an agriculturally independent society with a stable, accessible, sustainable, and sufficient food supply. Food aid injected into the countries on the receiving end has been a destructive result on their food basket, bringing food deficit to the country. This study examines the effect of food aid on agricultural development in Bal'ad. This paper exposes the impact of food aid on agricultural production, domestic prices, and the consumption pattern.

Materials and Methods: The research methodology utilized in this study was an explanatory study. The population that was considered during this study comprised 200 farmers in Bal'ad district and 133 are sampled using Simple random sampling. The study used a questionnaire to collect data from respondents, analyzed by using Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS 20).

Findings: The findings of the study indicated that food aid has a disincentive effect on domestic agricultural production; price and it also changed the consumption pattern of the local people. Finally, the study also indicates that food aid has a strong negative relationship with agricultural development in Bal'ad district ($r = (-0.88)$ at the level $\alpha \leq 0.005$).

Implications to Theory, Practice and Policy: So, the researcher recommends for the effective management of food aid in Bal'ad district, the governments should increase their efforts in areas of scientific food research and in policy values that govern food aid in the country. This will in turn help to alleviate the country's disincentive effects on food aid and foster positive long-term solutions to food aid.

Keywords: *Food Aid, Agricultural Development, Consumption Pattern, Price, Bal'ad District, Somali.*

1.0 INTRODUCTION

In this section of chapter one, the researcher shall discuss the background of the study, the problem statements, the objective of the study, and the research questions.

Background of the Study

Food aid is one of the key interference to address food insecurity and emergency circumstances; it served as a main tool for the global community in developing food access and reducing distress from emergency circumstances in low-income countries (Segun, 2008). According to Barrett (2006), nearly half of the world population survives on $2 per day or less, more than 800 million people go to sleep hungry any given night, and a child dies every five seconds due to hunger-related causes, the need to respond to the poor's need for food is ever-present and widespread.

Food aid has been given throughout history, and the primary motivation has been humanitarian, i.e., to reduce famine and suffering, but political motives have also always been in the background. The modern type of food aid started after the First World War when around 6.2 million tons of food were shipped from the USA to Europe between 1919 and 1926. American food aid to Europe was primarily given to relieve distress, but a more political aim was also clearly spelled out: the use of food commodities as a weapon in the fight against Bolshevism. Later, this was to become one of the major influences on the geographical distribution of food aid. Food aid was not only a provision of relief supplies in cases of disasters; it became also a tool of economic and political policy planning (Tapio-Biström, 2001).

Food aid was also used to encourage major US trading partners, to open new markets for American products and to reduce accrued surplus food. While the US was the largest food aid donor in the 1960s, the European Union (EU) was the biggest food aid donor in the 1990s (Gelle, 2016). After the Second World War food aid became a usual feature of worldwide development programs. For instance, under the Marshall Plan, the US transferred massive amounts of resources, including food aid, especially to Europe to rebuild the continent. Other than humanitarian assistance, the historical past motives covered other aims, which include putting the major US trading partners back on their feet, opening new markets for American products, and removing accrued surplus food. The leading role of the USA as a food aid donor (around 90% of all food aid in the 1960s) has diminished with diminishing surpluses of the agricultural product, and in the 1990s the EU has been the largest food aid donor (Tapio-Biström, 2001).

The provision of food aid has been a debatable issue for many years. The idea turned into developed within the 1950s as a way for developed economies to dispose of surplus food production. Eventually, it has become related to issues such as food security and malnutrition. While these are critically issued there are long-standing worries that some donor countries use food aid as a form of export assistance to provide indirect price support in domestic commodity markets (Gelle, 2016).

In 1954 the basis for American food aid became laid with the enactment of Public Law 480. The reason behind it became the large grain surplus stocks that had accrued in the USA. The declared aims of the new law had been, other than doing away with surpluses, to open to new markets for American products, to decrease hunger and malnutrition, and to use food aid as a lever to achieve important raw materials in short supply in the USA from developing countries (Tapio-Biström, 2001).

Food aid policies and operations have changed significantly in the duration of beyond fifty years. Food aid has become more and more varied in terms of donors, commodities, and policy objectives. In the 1950s and much of the 1960s, the United States was the dominant donor. After the establishment of the

World Food Program (WFP), food aid became partly multilateral, particularly from the 1970s onwards. With the signing of the Food Aid Convention in 1967, the number of donors increased substantially, making food aid much less dependent on one single donor (Tapio-Biström, 2001).

Throughout its history, food aid has been given to practically all the developing countries of the world, but a major part has always been concerted on a rather small number of recipients. In the 1950s and 1960s, during the dominance of the Food for Peace Program, also known as "Public Law (PL) 480," the recipients mirrored rather loyally the political interests of the USA. After that, food aid has become more diversified and scarcer. There is an important geographical shift from Asia to Africa. The growing emphasis of development reasons in the background of food aid has resulted in an increasing concentration of food aid on underdeveloped, so called low income food deficit countries (Gelle, 2016).

Food aid is widely perceived as a simple solution to reduce poverty and food security matters in low-income or food-deficient regions. In the 1980s and 1990's the declared objective of food donors was to make food aid an instrument that promoted, rather than hampered, agricultural development (Coke, 2009). Food aid is generally considered a short-term solution to food shortages, whereas agricultural development can lead to longer-term investments and improvements in national-level agricultural production. Historically, no country has been able to maintain a rapid transition out of poverty without raising production in its agricultural sector (Singapore and Hong Kong are exceptions). A dynamic agricultural sector can raise labor productivity in the rural economy, pull up wages, improve food security, and gradually eliminate the worst dimensions of poverty (Coke, 2009).

There has been a shift in the geographic allocation of food aid towards the least developed countries, especially those of Sub- Saharan Africa (SSA) whose food problems are regarded as of "exceptional severity". Not only are many poor structures fragile but their levels of food security have deteriorated since independence. More than 100 million people (about 25% of SSA's population) obtain, on average, over good and bad crop years less than 80% of the FAO/WHO recommended daily calorie supply (Food & Agricultural, 2006). In sub-Saharan Africa food aid becomes ever more urgent as natural and man-made disasters continue to threaten the region's food security and agricultural development, but most SSA countries have an economy that is dependent on agriculture either on a small or large scale and previous research shows that agriculture plays a significant role in the development of the SSA as the major source of income, employment, food, and in its effectiveness in reducing poverty (Personal, Archive, Chen, & Song, 2009).

One of the main challenges faced by the agricultural production and development of SSA is food aid because they receive much larger quantities of food aid than any other country. The volume of food aid to Sub-Saharan Africa has varied sharply over the last three decades. From a low of only 0.62 kg per person per year in the early 1960s, food aid deliveries to the region increased almost tenfold from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s, more than tripling from an average of just over one million metric tons per year in the 1970s to more than 3.3 million metric tons in the 1990s (Abdulai & Barrett, 2004).

There is evidence in SSA, that food aid creates certain disincentives effect on both food production levels and the agricultural development of the countries. It caused increases in the food supply of the market, by raising the market with an excess of food commodities, therefore, it caused to decrease in the price of the food and discouraged the morale of the domestic farmer's (Abdulai & Barrett, 2004).

They are some positive contributions of food aid in disaster relief and in assisting several European and East Asian countries to improve their economies. In contrast, many other analysts have argued that food aid has been ineffective and has produced gloomy results (Clay, 1996). They contend that food aid

programs have not fulfilled their promise to alleviate hunger and stimulate economic development in many Sub-Sahara African and Asian recipient nations (Awokuse, 2006).

The economy of Somalia depends on the agriculture sector, in terms of its contribution to GDP, employment, and to foreign exchange earnings. Before 1991, the government played a major role in the food and agriculture sector, both in production and distribution there is a rapid growth of agriculture production and they protected the local producers, set a food distribution timing strategy; and imposed taxes on cheap food imports for price adjusting. After 1991 there is no effective government institution that support and protect the agriculture of Somalia and currently, the government's priority is not the agriculture area; farmers are at loss in plentiful seasons due to the purposeful coincidence of food aid distribution at harvesting time.

Food aid to Somalia started to increase dramatically in the mid-197Os, with the 1973-75 droughts. It then fell somewhat until 1980 when the response to the refugee problem started to appear. These flows are considerable, in terms of the overall production levels in Somalia, and could be expected to have a major impact on the food system. Prior to 1978 and the refugee crisis, food aid was used in two major ways: directly in projects, in special projects to resettle nomads; and as bulk food aid, sold on the market. It is in terms of the latter that any possible contribution of food aid to the stagnation of Somali agriculture would initially be expected (Thomson, 1983).

Food aid has potential negative impacts in terms of disincentives effect on local production, both directly through price where market forces are active, and indirectly through government policy when they are not and possible changes in food consumption patterns away from domestically produced foods. It is probable that all these factors operate in Somalia (Thomson, 1983).

Barrett and Maxwell (2005) defined food aid as foreign assistance involving international sourcing of concessional (either free or at a cost lower than the market price of the food commodity in question) resources in the form or for the provision of food. The food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations asserts that food aid involves international transactions that result in the provision of aid in form of food commodities in a country deemed in need of receiving such aid (LAWRENCE, 2010).

Food aid has certain disincentive effects on domestic agricultural production and development which may result from farm-level responses to price reduction caused by increased food supplies and dependency effects at the Government level that reduce incentives to emphasize agricultural development in central Government policy. Households that are normally food insecure and benefit from food aid, are sometimes both producers and consumers and face low prices when they sell their produce at harvest time and high prices when they buy food later in the year (Mabuza, 2007).

Several varying results have been studied with the disincentive effect of international food aid on local agricultural production. Some have found that food aid caused to increase in food production (Isenman and Singer 1977; Bezunah, 2003; Gelan 2007). While others have found that food aid has no significant effect on food production (Abdulai, 2005). Different studies have found that food aid caused to decrease in food production (Wolf, 2014).

However, the theoretical discussion by Theodore Shultz (1960), who theorizes that in kind food aid is likely, has an adverse effect on agriculture product in recipient countries. Increased food supplies provided by food aid delivery depress the price received by farmers and have the potential to cause inadequate support for pro agriculture support policy in recipient countries. Most of the evidence to support Shultz's theory is grounded in anecdotal and case study evidence, with little existence of empirical evidence (Abdulai, 2005). Shultz's theory is grounded in sound economic reasoning that increased supply will drive

prices down, so why has is failed to be observed empirically? Generally speaking, real world conditions are more complex than the scenario that Schultz describes. One complexity is that recipient countries do not function in closed economies; therefore, trade will have an impact on production levels. Srinivasan (1989) suggests that food aid acts as a replacement to commercial imports and therefore has no direct effect on domestic supply. This theory would suggest that food aid is not adding to local supply (Fritts, 2010).

Considering the extent of negative externalities attributed to food aid, this study expected to produce empirical evidence that would, to some extent, identify the thin line that currently exists between the advantages and disadvantages attached to food aid in Somali, particularly in Bal'ad. Issues of disincentive and contribution effects of food aid have been debated and analyzed since the early 1960s by numerous researchers without definite conclusions. Related studies specific to Somali are relatively scarce, and consequently, premature conclusions are often drawn because of limited evidence.

Problem Statement

Food aid has some disincentives consequence for both food production levels and the amount of agriculture development. Food aid can give relief from hunger and household pressure to secure food; additionally, it creates food production disincentives by flooding the market with surplus food commodities, therefore decreasing prices and farmers' inducement to produce the crops.

According to World Bank, the economy of Somalia depends on agricultural production. It contributed more than 65% to the national GDP from domestic distribution. Thus, the main challenge faced by the agricultural production of Somalia is food aid because it is distributed at the harvesting time of domestic food production, it caused to decrease in the price of local food in the market, and it discouraged agricultural production and development of the country. In fact, food aid has become a permanent state affair in the country since the civil war in 1991. It changed food taste away from domestically produced crops decreasing local production and causing agricultural stagnation.

However, the distributions of food aid in Somalia create a disincentive effect on local agriculture producers thereby creating a reduction in domestic agriculture production levels. The increasing rate of food aid imports in the country has had a negative effect in the market prices of locally produced products such as maize and beans. The government has also failed to give farmers incentives that will help encourage local food production and ultimately help increase the country's food security (Gitu, 2006).

General Objective of the Study

The main purpose of this study is to examine the effect of food aid on agricultural development in Bal'ad district.

Research Questions

This study will have the following research questions.

1. What are the effects of food aid on domestic prices in the Bal'ad district?
2. What are the effects of food aid on agricultural production in the Bal'ad district?
3. What are the effects of food aid on consumption patterns in the Bal'ad district?

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature presented in this Chapter is organized into sections according to theme approach, the first section of the chapter reviews food aid and domestic price, the second section reviews food aid and agricultural production, also the third section reviews food aid and consumption pattern.

Food Aid and Domestic Price

Food aid will normally increase aggregate demand in the recipient country. The resulting income increase will tend to increase the recipient country's demand for food. Therefore, the fundamental commodities provided in food aid shipments are normal goods. Demand for them boosts more gradually than income grows, even when the income transfers come in the form of food. Consequently, the addition of food aid to the domestic food supply will tend to expand supply more than it stimulates demand. That is why food prices characteristically fall in response to food aid inflows into developing and under-developing countries. As increased food consumption is less than the volume of food aid received, there must be some displaced of commercial food sales, whether from domestic producers and processors or commercial imports. The extent of the displacement equivalently, the degree to which food flows add to recipient consumption volumes turns fundamentally on the efficacy of the targeting (Abdulai & Barrett, 2004).

Food prices almost invariably fall in local markets after food aid distribution. Food aid can decrease local (or national) food prices in at least three ways. First, monetization of food aid can flood the market, by increasing supply of the food. Second, households receiving food aid may decrease demand for the commodity received or for locally produced substitutes or, if they produce the substitutes or the commodity received, they may possibly sell more of it. Finally, recipients may sell food aid to purchase other necessities or complements, decreasing prices of the food aid commodity and its substitutes, but also increasing demand for complements. Lowered prices hurt net sellers of the commodity and, if food aid deliveries are regular occurrences, can create a disincentive for them to invest in their own agricultural production activities. At the extreme, producers could lose their livelihoods due to low prices, rendering them dependent, although this seems more a hypothetical extreme outcome than something observed, much a less common occurrence. Further, lowered prices can decrease the relative payoff to investing in agriculture, either by governments or by producers (Barrett, 2006).

The potential price disincentive effect of food aid arises because the lower market price will apply to all food, and not just to food aid. So, farmers will receive a lower price for their crops. Given the normal link between price and production, this means that over time farmers may decrease the number of crops they grow or sell. So, this is known as the price disincentive effect of food aid. It means that food aid if it saddens local market prices, may lead to decreased local food production and self-sufficiency (Fitzpatrick & Storey, 1989).

However, price decreases may be unavoidable with respect to delivering food aid in-kind, but the magnitude of price decreases is affected by market conditions and management of the food aid operation, perhaps especially timing and targeting efficacy. The extent of any food price reduction depends heavily on how well integrated the local market is into broader regional, national, and global food markets. Supply shocks associated with food aid deliveries and demand shocks associated with local purchases or cash transfers dissipate quickly in well-integrated markets, typically with only modest price effects. In poorly functioning markets segmented from broader commercial channels, however, price movement can be dramatic (Barrett, 2006).

However, at the local level, there are several cases where producers report falling prices and market displacement because of an influx of food aid commodities. For example, in 2002 and 2003 food aid

donors over-reacted to a projected 600,000-tonne food deficit in Malawi and sent close to 600,000 tons of food in aid. However, commercial, and informal importers brought in an extra 350,000–500,000 tons. Malawi was swamped and had very large carry-over stocks. Maize prices have fallen from $250 per ton to $100 per ton in a year. The local production of maize, rice, and cassava fell markedly, and estimated losses to the Malawian economy were approximately $15m (Oxfam International, 2005).

Barrett and Maxwell (2005) describe a collapse in sorghum prices in southern Somalia in 2000, linking it, in part, to poorly timed sorghum food aid delivered to Ethiopia that then moved across the border and adversely impacted producers in southern Somalia. Tschirley, Donovan, and Weber (1996) also found that large amounts of maize food aid delivered to Mozambique caused both the yellow and white maize market prices to fall. In each of these examples, the mistiming of food aid deliveries with food aid arriving late, as the next harvest was coming to market is at least partly to blame for the adverse, unintended effects on market prices (Barrett, 2006).

As reported by Leach (1992) in her study of Liberian refugees in Sierra Leone during 1990-1991, finds that food aid sold by recipients lowered the price of food during the hungry season, a time of traditional food insecurity for the host community. Lowered prices benefited both food-insecure households in the host community and refugee households, especially those who did not directly receive food aid. According to Bezuneh (1998) and Barrett (2001) found that food aid distributed directly or through Food for Work (FFW) programs to households in northern Kenya during the lean season likewise fostered increased purchase of agricultural inputs such as improved seeds, fertilizer, and hired labor, thereby increasing agricultural productivity. Plainly, the product price effects of food aid deliveries do not have to generate negative dependency if operational agencies can manage the targeting and timing of distribution well (Barrett, 2006).

Ravallion (1997) argues that during famines, individually rational trading behavior may worsen food insecurity. Concerns about future scarcity can cause prices to rise rapidly due to speculative holding of grain stocks, such as occurred during the 1974-1975 Bangladesh famine. The actual harvest shortfall proved much smaller than expected, but by then many poor individuals had perished in the face of a food price spike or had been forced to liquidate productive assets to buy food. Injecting food aid into markets may stop the rise of food prices, with the effect of buffer stock releases and other such food supply management tools propagating easily through markets for substitute foods. Furthermore, stabilizing prices by means of supply increases can end trader speculation (Barrett, 2006).

Levisohn and McMillan (2004) estimated the supply and demand for wheat for 1999 in Ethiopia to evaluate the impact of an increase in the price of wheat that would consequence if there were no food aid by using constant-elasticity demand and supply functions. They found that the price of wheat be $295 per metric ton in the absence of food aid, contrasted with an average observed price of $193 per metric ton. Winahyu and Acaye (2005) also demonstrate that the price impacts of the post-tsunami emergency food aid in Ache were short-term and restricted. Lind and Jalleta (2005) reported that grain prices fell for the duration of distributions of food aid in Ethiopia, but stabilized to pre-distribution levels within a few weeks (LAWRENCE, 2010).

According to Maunder (2006) studied the impact of food aid on grain markets in Southern Africa. The study argues that price control instruments are fundamental for protecting food access and welfare for the poor who are the primary beneficiaries of lower food prices. This is because a dilemma exists between upholding price incentives for food producers and making food for consumption reasonable to the poor who are net food buyers. The study argues that the timing of food aid shipments and the quantity of food

aid delivered are crucial factors in food aid programming. Delayed food aid deliveries, as a result of a lag in response time and transportation of aid commodities from donor countries to recipient countries, often cause price decreases (LAWRENCE, 2010).

However, in the 1990s Michigan State University conducted an intensive research activity in Mozambique. A major question has been the impact of yellow maize food aid on the production and markets of domestic white maize. The assumption that yellow maize would act as an inferior good did not hold. Consumer behavior was much more complex than that, with the different types of flour having a decisive role. Empirical evidence was presented showing that retail prices of both white and yellow maize fluctuated with commercial yellow maize food aid shipments. It also was suggested that the instability in yellow maize prices, caused by irregular food aid arrivals, was transmitted to the white maize market (Tapio-Biström, 2001).

Food Aid and Agricultural Production

Food aid has a long-term disincentive effect on agricultural production and development of the recipient country. The disincentive effects of food aid on agricultural production may result from farm-level responses to price reductions caused by raised food supplies and dependency effects at the government level that reduce incentives to emphasize agricultural development in central government policy. The case in Malawi gave a clear picture of how food aid could potentially impact local maize production. In the 2002/2003 marketing season, it was discovered that food aid supplies reduced demand for commercial maize, resulting in unintended excess stocks of commercial maize, which exerted a dampening effect on consumer prices during the year and producer prices for the next harvest. There is also a likelihood that food aid would change consumer preferences towards imported and away from domestically produced staples (Segun, 2008).

Much has been written on the disincentive effects of food aid since Schultz's (1960) widely influential analysis of the potential for a negative impact of food aid on recipient countries' agricultural production. There are many ways that food aid can create disincentives for recipient's agricultural economies. The supply of inexpensive food aid may have a negative policy effect as the recipient governments may ignore needed policy reforms and shift developmental resources away from the agricultural sector (Wallerstein, 1980). For example, a developing nation's government may delay or ignore politically sensitive structural economic reforms needed to alleviate persistent food shortages and inaccessibility to food by low-income households. Food aid then serves as a stop-gap measure that would not result in sustainable economic development (Awokuse, 2006).

A vast amount of unverified anecdotal evidence suggests that food aid, in the form of FFW programs, harms local production by encouraging households to reallocate their labor away from production towards FFW. The econometric or ethnographic evidence in support of this claim is thin, however, and there are examples where the opposite seems to occur, as in the case of FFW for on-farm soil and water conservation in Tigray, northern Ethiopia, crowding in on-farm labor and private investments, or in the case of lean season FFW projects enabling smallholders to purchase fertilizer and hire labor to increase on-farm labor effort on their own plots in Baringo District of central Kenya. FFW programs are frequently used to counter a perceived "dependency syndrome" connected with freely distributed food. Yet, evidence suggests that poorly designed FFW programs may cause more risk of harming local production than free food distribution does (Barrett, 2006).

One of the greatest concerns around food aid is the possibility that it can undermine the livelihoods of poor farmers by generating disincentives for local food producers, by flooding markets, and depressing

prices. Substantial volumes of food aid provided over a long-term basis could discourage local agricultural production, result in raised poverty, and create long-term food insecurity due to increased dependence on food imports. Renewing agricultural production and local markets is central to any strategy for longer-term recovery and development (Oxfam International, 2005).

According to Mann (1967) evaluated the impact of food aid in India and found support for the notion of disincentive effects. He showed that food aid imports resulted in a significant decline in Indian agricultural output. In a subsequent study on India, Isenman, and Singer (1977) also found that the disincentive effect has weakened significantly in the presence of improved government food distribution policy (Awokuse, 2006).

According to Tapio-Bistrom (2001) used a reduced-form market equilibrium model to analyze the impact of food aid on food production in Tanzania. This was a national-level study that involved the use of secondary data casing the years between 1971 and 1996 and included variables such as the quantity of maize produced; official and unofficial maize prices; fertilizer costs; agricultural labor costs; rainfall data; transport costs; variance of open market price; variance of food aid; total food aid and total commercial maize imported. The impact of food aid was measured using the reduced-form market equilibrium model that consisted of quantity and price functions expected simultaneously, using the above variables through a Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) method. Empirical findings did not indicate a statistically significant disincentive effect of food aid on maize production and maize producer price in Tanzania (Mabuza, 2007).

According to Lavy (1990) used a vector autoregression (VAR) analysis to study the impact of food aid on food production in 33 sub-Saharan countries. He used secondary data (1970 to 1987) to approximation equations for food production and food aid. The results obtained from this study demonstrated that food aid had a significant positive effect on food production. The positive net effect of food aid on food production suggested that any disincentive induced by the extra supply of food was offset by the positive effect of food aid on food production. Lavy (1990) attributes this to the benefits of relaxed liquidity constraints and augmented fertilizer consumption which he says outweighed price disincentives (Mabuza, 2007).

According to Abdulai et al (2004) used secondary data (1970 – 2000) to estimate a vector autoregression (VAR) model for 42 sub-Saharan countries that had benefited from food aid interventions. The estimation results showed that, on average, food aid exerts a positive impact on food production. The study discovered that the positive net effect of food aid on food production indicated that any disincentive effects due to disheartened product prices induced by food aid shipments were more than offset by positive risk management and factor price effects. This is not to say that food aid is necessarily the best possible resource to use for rural development interventions, but that rural sub-Saharan Africa is so starved for resources that any reasonably well-managed aid program can have net advantageous effects, despite the well-known product market disincentive effects associated with food aid (Mabuza, 2007).

According to Lowder (2004) also used a vector autoregression (VAR) analysis to differentiate between the impacts of the program and emergency food aid. The sample integrated all 145 global food recipients between 1988 and 2001. The study found that neither program nor emergency food aid was considerably associated with changes in the domestic agricultural production (Mabuza, 2007).

According to Demeke et al (2004) studied the effect of food aid dependency at the macro-economy level and the effects of food aid on agricultural production at the household level in Ethiopia and they used Three-Stage Least Squares (3SLS) method of estimation. The macroeconomic effect of food aid was

analyzed using national time series data from 1980 – 2001. The scheme of equations specified in the model consisted of six equations (five stochastic equations and one identity equation describing the equilibrium between demand and supply for food aid). The equations used five endogenous variables (total quantity of local grain, per capita domestic demand for grain, per capita consumer's disposable income, commercial imports, and food grain producer price), and six exogenous variables (index for non-agricultural production, weather index, world price of food grain, retail price for food grain, food aid, and total foreign exchange flows). The equations were expected in a linearized double-log form using 3SLS. The results of the study discovered that at the macroeconomic level, food aid increased the total domestic supply of food grains. However, a continued increase in food aid quantity was found to have dampening effects on the domestic production of food grain. Therefore, the effects of food aid on the agricultural sector appeared to be considered negative as it put downward pressure on food grain producer prices (Mabuza, 2007).

Food Aid and Consumption Pattern

Food aid can play an important role in increasing food consumption. According to Bezuneh & Deaton (1997) reviewed the impacts of food aid on safety nets in developing countries. The study reported a remarkable augment in total household food consumption in the Rift Valley Province of Kenya. The findings of the study established that a considerable number of households participated in food for work activities and consumed 16% more protein, 26% more calories, and 42% more fat than the non-participating households. At the farm level, they noted significant nutritional gains experienced by households playing a significant role in food-for-work activities and attributed these nutritional gains to additional household income generated through food-for-work that is directed into additional consumption. Thus, the income elasticity of demand for food among the food for work participants is higher when income is given in the form of food. The study revealed that more food received as wages through food for work was consumed in contrast to the quantity of purchased food that would have been consumed. The analysis of food for work in Kenya's Rift Valley Province found income elasticity of demand for a protein of 0.239 and 0.137 for participants and non-participants, respectively (Nyasha, Sewell, Trent, & Marambanyika, 2017).

However, food aid that is relatively inappropriate for local uses certainly can distort consumption patterns. Massive shipments of wheat and rice into the West African Sahel during the food crises of the mid-1970s and mid-1980s were widely believed to stimulate a shift in consumer demand from indigenous coarse grains (mainly millet and sorghum) to more western crops, notably wheat, although hard empirical evidence of this remains scarce, especially given how widespread the claim has become. Similarly, food aid deliveries into pastoral areas in the Horn of Africa over the past decade have been criticized repeatedly by pastoralists as having changed dietary patterns. People traditionally reliant on animal products began to consume grains (primarily maize) in unprecedented quantities. Shifting from a protein-heavy to a carbohydrate-heavy diet can have unintended physiological consequences for pastoral populations (Barrett, 2006).

A perhaps more subtle but damaging induced consumption change occurs when culturally inappropriate foods e.g., maize to pastoralists with a strong preference for milk, meat, and tea are not consumed but instead processed into home-brewed alcohol. During the 2000 drought in northern Kenya, the price of changaa (a locally distilled alcohol) fell significantly and consumption seems to have increased as a result, all because grain food aid inflows increased the availability of low-cost inputs to the extant, town-based informal distilling industry (Barrett and Maxwell 2005). While food aid certainly doesn't cause the emergence of local brewing or of excessive alcohol consumption, the point is that excessive shipments of

foods most recipients don't especially care to eat can have adverse, unintended consequences. Once again, poor targeting is the root source of such effects (Barrett, 2006).

According to Gilligan and Hoddinott (2006) investigated whether food aid transfers play a safety net role by reducing vulnerability and protecting productive assets by assessing the impacts of food for work and free food distribution programs in Ethiopia. The study finds a significant effect of food for work on growth in consumption and food consumption (in per adult equivalent terms) and a significant reduction in perceived famine risks by food for work beneficiaries, while famine risks increased for non-beneficiaries. The free food distribution program also had a significant average impact on growth in food consumption, but a negative impact on famine risks (LAWRENCE, 2010).

According to Barrett, Reardon, and Webb (2001), reported that elders in Northern Kenya perceive that recipient households consume about 50- 80% of grain on consumption patterns on food aid as food, the 20-50% balance is used as seed, animal feed or for a local brew. People in Northern Kenya started changing their diets and consumption behaviors, and foreign food products became more popular and available than locally produced food. Food aid increased the number of meals eaten by beneficiaries per day in most recipient communities. Food aid also increased the availability of a variety of food in many communities (Nyasha et al., 2017).

According to Mudzonga and Chigwada (2009), food preference has changed in recipient communities because of a constant supply of different types of food aid. People are now more interested in food aid distributed by humanitarian organizations since it is free and easily obtainable. He revealed that developed countries with food surpluses were more concerned with their own national interests and trade. Current literature reveals that little has been done to assess the potential effects of food aid on the recipient countries. on food production and consumption patterns of communal (Nyasha et al., 2017).

Summary

The researcher has reviewed much literature closely related to the research topic of food aid and agricultural development. Various works of the literature showed that food reduces domestic agricultural production and development while others found that food aid promotes agricultural production and development.

In Africa, a variety of country-level studies have focused on the relationship between food aid and agricultural production, but there has been little research on the influence of food aid on agricultural development. However, food aid has been criticized for lowering local farm food prices, thereby creating an income effect that reduces consumption and eliminates incentives to increase outputs.

Therefore, the distribution of food aid creates a disincentive effect on local agriculture producers thereby creating a reduction in domestic agriculture production levels. Thus, the disincentive effect was postulated by Schulz (1960) who argued that by decreasing market prices foreign food aid deteriorates domestic agricultural production. This leads to a long-term reduction of agricultural production in developing countries.

So, Sub-Saharan Africa receives the largest amount of foreign assistance and the greatest proportion of food aid disbursements; on average over 50 percent of all food aid is delivered to Africa.

3.0 MATERIALS AND METHODS

Introduction

This chapter discusses research design, population, sampling, and data collection,

Research Design

The research methodology used in the research project is an explanatory research design especially survey research. This design is selected for this study because it is less expensive and easily accessible for collecting information from the target population. This design was used to identify the food aid for agricultural development in Bal'ad district.

Population of the Study

The target population for this study was 200 farmers in Bal'ad district.

Sample Size

The sample size consisted of (133) selected from farmers of the Bal'ad district.

Sampling Procedure

The study adopted probability sampling, especially a simple random sampling technique for choosing the sample.

Data Collection Instrument

The study adopted a questionnaire for collecting data in this study. The rationale for choosing a questionnaire was guided by the nature of the data to be gathered, the time available, as well as the objectives of this study.

Data Analysis Procedure

The data of this research were analyzed with the help of the statistical program SPSS 20. This program was chosen because it is capable of processing various statistical analyses that are not available in Excel.

4.0 DATA ANALYSIS, PRESENTATION, FINDINGS, AND DISCUSSIONS

Introduction

This chapter describes the research findings, analysis, discussion, and interpretation of data, background information of respondents, and descriptions of the independent variable's description of dependent variables.

Demographic Data

This part presents the background information of the respondents who participated in this study the purpose of this background information is to find out the characteristics of the respondents, furthermore, the respondents have also given the promise that all the data they provided be used only for academic purpose research and the identities of the respondents was confidential, in total, 133 respondents filled in the questionnaire from selected Bal'ad farmers which located in Middle Shebelle. The shape of the questionnaire in the demographic section is looked upon in terms of gender, Age, marital status, level of education, and occupation.

Table 1: Gender of the Respondents

	Frequency	Percent
Male	84	63
Female	49	37
Total	**133**	**100.0**

Source: Primary Data, 2019

Table 1 shows that most of the respondents 63% were male and 37% were female. This means most of the respondents were male**.**

Table 2: Age of the Respondents

	Frequency	Percent
18-25	21	16
26-33	55	41
34-41	40	30
Over 42	17	13
Total	**133**	**100.0**

Source: Primary Data, 2019

Table 2 shows the respondents were asked questions to indicate their ages in the questionnaire and the offered choices classified the age into four parts. Part one was intended for those whose age is between 18-25 years, they were 16% of respondents, the second part was for those who are in between 26-33 years, and they were 41% of respondents, the third part was for those between 34-41 years, they were 30% respondents, the four-part whose 42 years above, they were 13% respondents. Therefore, this implies that most of the respondents were 26-33 years.

Table 3: Marital Status of the Respondents

	Frequency	Percent
Married	75	56
Single	58	44
Total	**133**	**100.0**

Source: Primary data, 2019

Table 3 shows that respondents consisted of single and married, 56% of respondents were married, and 44% of the respondents were single, based on the data gathered, most of the respondents were married.

Table 4: Educational Level of the Respondent

	Frequency	Percent
Informal education	100	75
Primary	22	17
Secondary	11	8
Total	**133**	**100.0**

Source: Primary Data, 2019

According to table 4, the respondents were classified according to their educational level or qualifications, which can be grouped into three groups, the table revealed that 75% of respondents were informal education, 17% of respondents were in primary school, and 8% of respondents were secondary school. This means that most respondents of the study's educational level were informal education.

Data presentation and analysis

Table 5: Distribution of Food Aid Causes a Reduction in Domestic Food Price

	Frequency	Percent
Agree	44	33
Strongly Agree	78	59
Neutral	11	8
Total	**133**	**100.0**

Source: Primary Data, 2019

Table 6 shows that most of the respondent which is 59% strongly agreed, 33% of the respondent agreed and 8% of the respondent were neutral. Thus, most of the respondents strongly agreed.

Table 6: Food Aid Is Donated to Support Emergency Conditions Such as Natural Disasters and Civil Wars

	Frequency	Percent
Agree	75	56
Strongly agree	10	8
Neutral	38	28
Disagree	10	8
Total	**133**	**100.0**

Source: Primary Data, 2019

Table 7 shows that most of the respondents which is 56% agreed, 28% were neutral, 8% strongly agreed, and 8% disagreed. This means that most of the respondents agreed.

Table 7: Food Aid Is Generally Considered a Short-Term Solution to Food Shortages.

	Frequency	Percent
Agree	66	50
Strongly agree	20	15
Neutral	27	20
Disagree	20	15
Total	**133**	**100.0**

Source: Primary Data, 2019

Table 8 shows most of the respondents 50% agree, 20% of the respondent were neutral, 15% strongly agreed and 15% disagreed. This means that most of the respondents agreed.

Table 8: Rising Food Aid Distributions Prevent Donors from Contributing Resources to Agriculture Development Programs

	Frequency	Percent
Agree	59	45
Strongly agree	28	21
Neutral	27	20
Disagree	19	14
Total	**133**	**100.0**

Source: Primary Data, 2019

Table 9 shows that most of the respondent 45% were agree, 21%) were strongly agree, 20% were neutral and 14% were disagree, this implies that majority of the respondents were agreed.

Table 9: Poorly Targeted or Inappropriate Food Aid Has a Greater Likelihood of Distorting Prices

	Frequency	Percent
Agree	76	57
Strongly agree	13	10
Neutral	25	19
Disagree	16	12
Strongly disagree	3	2
Total	**133**	**100.0**

***Sources*:** Primary data**,** 2019

Table 9 shows that most of the respondents 57% agreed, 19% were neutral, 12% disagreed, 10% strongly agreed and 2% strongly disagreed. This means that most of the respondents agreed.

Table 10: Usually, Food Aid Is Distributed at the Harvest Time of Domestic Agricultural Production.

	Frequency	Percent
Agree	54	41
Strongly agree	63	47
Neutral	12	9
Disagree	4	3
Total	**133**	**100.0**

Source: Primary Data, 2019

Table 11 shows that most of the respondents 47% strongly agreed, 41% agreed, 9% were neutral and 3% disagreed. This means that most of the respondents strongly agreed.

Table 11: Food Aid Creates Serious Food Insecurity

	Frequency	Percent
Agree	58	44
Strongly agree	16	12
Neutral	24	18
Disagree	20	15
Strongly disagree	15	11
Total	**133**	**100.0**

Source: Primary Data, 2019

Table 11 shows that 44% of the respondent agreed, 18% were neutral, 15% disagreed, 12% strongly agreed and 11% strongly disagreed. This means that most of the respondents agreed.

Table 12: Food Aid Discourages the Morale of Farmers

	Frequency	Percent
Agree	43	32
Strongly agree	76	57
Neutral	11	8
Disagree	3	2
Total	**133**	**100.0**

Source: Primary Data, 2019

Table 12 shows that 57% of the respondent strongly agreed, 32% agreed, 8% were neutral and 2% disagreed, this implies that most of the respondents strongly agreed.

Table 13: Food Aid Plays an Important Role in Reducing the Food Insecurity

	Frequency	Percent
Agree	18	14
Neutral	47	35
Disagree	43	32
Strongly disagree	25	19
Total	**133**	**100.0**

Source: Primary Data, 2019

Table 13 shows that most of the respondents 35% were neutral, 32%were disagree, 19% strongly disagreed and 14% agreed. So, most of the respondents were neutral.

Table 14: Food Aid Distribution Creates a Reduction in Domestic Production.

	Frequency	Percent
Agree	39	29
Strongly agree	77	58
Neutral	14	11
Disagree	3	2
Total	**133**	**100.0**

Source: Primary Data, 2019

Table 15 shows that most of the respondents which are 58% strongly agreed, 29% agreed, 11% were neutral and 2% disagreed. This means that most of the respondents strongly agree.

Table 15: Food Aid Can Change the Consumption Patterns of the Local People

	Frequency	Percent
Agree	49	37
Strongly agree	67	50
Neutral	13	10
Disagree	4	3
Total	**133**	**100.0**

Source: Primary Data, 2019

Table 16shows that most of the respondents 50% strongly agreed, 37% agreed, 10% were neutral and 3% disagreed. This means that most of the respondents where strongly agree.

Table 16: Food Aid Plays an Important Role in Increasing Food Consumption

	Frequency	Percent
Agree	25	19
Neutral	31	23
Disagree	55	41
Strongly disagree	22	17
Total	**133**	**100.0**

Source: Primary Data, 2019

Table 17 shows that most of the respondents which is 41% disagreed, 23% were neural, 19% disagreed and 17% strongly disagree. This means that most of the respondents disagreed.

Table 17: Food Aid Increases the Availability of a Variety of Food in the Domestic Market

	Frequency	Percent
Agree	24	18
Neutral	38	29
Disagree	54	41
Strongly disagree	17	13
Total	**133**	**100.0**

Source: Primary Data, 2019

Table 18 shows that most of the respondents 41% disagree, 29% were neutral, 18% were agree and 13% was strongly disagree. This means most of the respondents were disagree.

Table 19: Food Aid Would Change Consumer Preferences Towards Food Imports

	Frequency	Percent
Agree	69	52
Strongly agree	15	11
Neutral	31	23
Disagree	12	9
Strongly disagree	6	5
Total	**133**	**100.0**

Source: Primary Data, 2019

Table 19 shows that most of the respondents which is 52% was agree, 23% was neutral, 11% was strongly agree, 9% was disagree, and 5% was strongly disagree. This means most of the respondents were agreed.

Table 20: Regular Food Aid Causes Government to Become Dependent on Food Aid Commodities

	Frequency	Percent
Agree	61	46
Strongly agree	39	29
Neutral	18	14
Disagree	7	5
Strongly disagree	8	6
Total	**133**	**100.0**

Source: Primary Data, 2019

Table 21 shows that most respondents which is 46% agreed, 29% strongly agreed, 14% were neutral, 6% strongly disagree, and 5% disagreed. Thus, this means that most of the respondents agreed.

Table 21: Agricultural Development Creates Consistent and Sustainable Solutions to Food Insecurity

	Frequency	Percent
Agree	75	56
Strongly agree	23	18
Neutral	27	20.
Disagree	8	6
Total	**133**	**100.0**

Source: Primary Data, 2019

Table 22 shows that the majority of respondents which is 56% was agree, 20% were neutral, 18% were strongly agree, 6% were disagree. Thus, most of the respondents were agreed.

Table 22: Agricultural Development Can Lead to Longer-Term Investments and Improvements in National Level Agricultural Production

	Frequency	Percent
Agree	58	44
Strongly agree	24	18
Neutral	40	30
Disagree	11	8
Total	**133**	**100.0**

Source: Primary Data, 2019

Table 23 shows that most respondents which are 44% agree, 30% were neutral, 18% strongly agreed and 8% disagreed. So, most of the respondents agreed.

Table 23: Technology Is Considered One of the Key Factors that Influence Agricultural Development and Production

	Frequency	Percent
Agree	33	25
Strongly Agree	79	59
Neutral	21	16
Total	**133**	**100.0**

Source: Primary Data, 2019

Table 24 shows that most of the respondents which is 59% strongly agree, 25% agreed, and 16% were neutral. This means most of the respondents strongly agree.

Table 24: Agricultural Development Programs Have Focused on Improving Local-Level Agriculture Production

	Frequency	Percent
Agree	56	42
Strongly agree	27	21
Neutral	35	26
Disagree	15	11
Total	**133**	**100.0**

Source: Primary Data, 2019

Table 25 shows that most of the respondents which is 42% was agree, 26% were neutral, 21% strongly agreed and 11% disagreed. This means that most of the respondents agreed.

Table 25: Agriculture plays an important role in reducing poverty.

	Frequency	Percent
Agree	67	50
Strongly agree	34	26
Neutral	29	22
Disagree	3	2
Total	**133**	**100.0**

Source: Primary Data, 2019

Table 4.2.20 shows most of the respondents 50% agree, 26% of the respondent strongly agreed, 22% were neutral and 2% disagreed. This means that most of the respondents agreed.

Major Findings

This section focused on discovers of the research result and findings attained from the distributed questionnaires. The main purpose of this study was to identify the effect of food aid on agricultural development in Bal'ad district. The Researcher measured the food aid by considering mainly agricultural development, the findings of the study exposed that most of the respondents were mostly assigned Strongly agree, Agree and others assigned disagree or neutral. So, most of the respondents believe that food aid is not too important for agricultural development and will have a negative effect.

Based on the results, the researcher found that the questions of objective one which is to explore the effect of food aid on domestic prices most of the respondents assigned strongly agree or agree which indicates that food aid has a negative effect on domestic prices. The questions about the effect of food aid on agricultural production that researchers asked Bal'ad farmers agreed that the food aid affects agricultural production negatively and most of the respondents assigned strongly agree or agree. On the other hand, the researchers found that food aid can change the consumption pattern of the local people which indicates that most of the respondents assigned strongly agree and agree.

Discussions

This study was basically proposed to identify the effect of food aid on agricultural development in some selected Bal'ad farmers in the Middle Shebelle. To achieve this objective, the respondents were asked to react to several items by choosing according to their perceptions. The questionnaire consisting of twenty statements was used for the collection of data and was distributed among 133 farmers. Data on these objectives were analyzed using SPSS 20 version.

The available evidence shows that food aid has a negative effect on the agricultural development in Bal'ad district. It distorts the food markets, and the dietary habits and food preferences of the domestic population. The Study shows that food aid affects domestic food production negatively. It caused a reduction in domestic food production, and it also discourages the morale of farmers. It has also been shown that the availability of free humanitarian food aid supplies reduced the demand for domestic food. Usually, the distribution of food aid is not especially well targeted to the most food insecure households, and it arrives at times of harvest of domestic agriculture production which caused the reduction of domestic food production.

The study also shows that food aid harms the local food price, because it drives down the prices of local food products and the producers are not themselves beneficiaries of food aid or hurt poor net food buyers who are overlooked in food distributions based on local purchases that drive upmarket food prices.

The studies also found that food aid distorts the consumption pattern of the domestic people, it changes their diets and consumption behaviors, and foreign food products became more popular and available more than locally produced food. Therefore, food aid significantly altered domestic food consumption habits (particularly in Bal'ad district) by shifting consumption away from traditional grains (sorghum and maize) in favor of imported substitutes (rice and wheat products).

5.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMMENDATIONS

Introduction

This chapter describes the conclusion and recommendations and areas for further research.

Conclusions

This study was intended to investigate the effects of food aid on agricultural development s in Bal'ad district. The study has shown that food has a negative effect on agricultural development.

The first objective of this study was to examine the effect of food aid on domestic prices in Bal'ad district. The study found that most of the respondent assigned agreed or strongly agree, which indicates that food aid has a negative effect on domestic prices, and it also causes the reduction of domestic food prices in the market.

The second objective of this study was to examine the effect of food aid on agricultural production in Bal'ad district. The study discovered that most of the respondents assigned agreed or strongly agree, which indicates that food aid has a negative effect on agricultural production, the negative effect also includes disincentives on farmers to production and an overall decrease in food production in the domestic market.

The third objective of this study was to assess the effect of food aid on consumption patterns in Bal'ad district. The study discovered that most of the respondents agree that food aid has a negative effect on consumption patterns. It also affects people's dietary habits and preferences, and it changes the consumption pattern of domestic people.

Recommendations

Based on the findings and the conclusions of the study, the researcher offered the following recommendations:-

1. Formulation of policies and regulations to control the importation of food products that are affecting local farm production.
2. The government should give especial consideration when local farmers harvest their produce to control the entry of imports.
3. The government should give farmers subsidies to improve agricultural development programs.
4. Provision of modern agricultural equipment, farmers training on modern production technologies, and providing technical support to small-holder farmers who are financially weak to encourage them to produce more yields which enable them to cover the local demands and market.
5. Farmers should be empowered to produce crops that have been certified suitable for that zone (or area) as this would promote production efficiency and lead to intra-trade within the zones.
6. Food aid should be distributed during the disaster to avoid a disturbance of market prices.
7. Encourage investment towards agriculture by restricting imported food which makes more competition to the local farmers.

REFERENCES

Abdulai, a, & Barrett, C. (2004). Food aid for market development in sub-Saharan Africa. *Papers.Ssrn.Com*, (5). Retrieved from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=601266

Adong, C. J. (2012). Faculty of Bioscience Engineering Academic year 2011- 2012 PATTERNS OF FOOD CONSUMPTION AND EXPENDITURE AMONG HOUSEHOLDS IN THE LIMPOPO PROVINCE , SOUTH AFRICA.

Awokuse, T. O. (2006). Assessing the Impact of Food Aid on Recipient Countries : A Survey, (06), 34.

Barrett, C. B. (2006). Food aid's intended and unintended consequences. *ESA Working Paper No. 06-05*, (06), 1–27. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/56916991?accountid=13042%5Cnhttp://oxfordsfx.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/oxford?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&genre=preprint&sid=ProQ:ProQ:econlitshell&atitle=Food+Aid's+Intended+and+Unintende

Fitzpatrick, J., & Storey, A. (1989). Food aid and agricultural disincentives. *Food Policy*, *14*(3), 241–247. https://doi.org/10.1016/0306-9192(89)90041-9

Food, & Agricultural, O. (2006). Food Aid for SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, *24*(2), 183p. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/59989413?accountid=13042%5Cnhttp://oxfordsfx.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/oxford?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:book&genre=document&sid=ProQ:PAIS+International&atitle=&title=Food+Aid+for+Food+Security?&

Fritts, E. R. (2010). THE IMPACT OF LOCALLY PURCHASED FOOD AID ON RECIPIENT COUNTRY AGRICULTURE MARKETS.

Gelle, F. J. (2016). " The Impact of Food Aid on the Food Security of the Hargeisa A rea .," (September).

Importance, I. T. S. (1967). Introduction 1, 1–27.

Imtiaz, S., Zeeshan, M., Tahir, S., & Imtiaz, S. (2003). ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY AND AGRICULTURE PRODUCTION : A STUDY OF ADOPTION, (7), 232–236.

KOTLER, P., & WONG, G. A. J. S. V. (1999). *Principal of marketing* (Second eur).

LAWRENCE, O. (2010). EFFECTS OF FOOD AID ON HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION AND MARKETED PRODUCTION: THE CASE OF MAIZE IN NORTHERN UGANDA, (December).

LORRAINE L. COKE, B. A. (2009). DOES FOOD AID INFLUENCE AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN RECIPIENT COUNTRIES? A STUDY ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FOOD AID AND AGRICULTURE PRODUCTION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, (December,15), 56.

Mabuza, M. L. (2007b). THE IMPACT OF FOOD AID ON MAIZE PRODUCTION IN SWAZILAND Submitted in partial fulfillment of the, *48*(1), 85–105.

Nyasha, T., Sewell, S., Trent, R., & Marambanyika, T. (2017). Review of Social Sciences The Relief Food Aid and its Implications on Food Production and Consumption Patterns : A case study of Communal Farmers in, *02*(03), 24–38.

Oxfam International. (2005). Food aid or hidden dumping?Separating wheat from chaff. Oxfam Policy *and* Practice*:* Agriculture, Food and Land, *5*(1), 37.

Øygard, R., Borchgrevink, A., Lazaro, E., & Temu, A. (2002). Poverty-Reducing Effects of Agricultural Development in Tanzania By.

Personal, M., Archive, R., Chen, K., & Song, Z. (2009). Mp r a, (15211).

Segun, O. (2008). Volume 8 No . 2 2008 June 2008 Volume 8 No . 2 2008, *8*(2), 192–203.

Tapio-Biström, M. (2001). *Food aid and the disincentive effect in Tanzania*. Retrieved from http://ethesis.helsinki.fi/julkaisut/maa/mekon/vk/tapio-bistrom/foodaida.pdf

Thomson, A. M. (1983). Somalia. Food aid in a long-term emergency. *Food Policy*, *8*(3), 209–219. https://doi.org/10.1016/0306-9192(82)90020-3

Universily, H. (1994). The relationship and technology, *23*, 477–486.

Wolf, S. M. (2014). Effect of Food Aid Delivery Mode on Food Production in Recipient Nation. Retrieved from http://ir.library.illinoisstate.edu/etd